Resilience to capitalism, resilience through capitalism: indigenous communities, industrialization, and radical resilience in Arctic Alaska by Hillmer-Pegram, Kevin C.
RESILIENCE TO CAPITALISM, RESILIENCE THROUGH CAPITALISM: INDIGENOUS 
COMMUNITIES, INDUSTRIALIZATION, AND RADICAL RESILIENCE IN ARCTIC
ALASKA.
By
Kevin Hillmer-Pegram, B.A., M.S.
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy 
in
Resilience and Adaptation: Interdisciplinary Program
University of Alaska Fairbanks 
August 2016
© 2016 Kevin Hillmer-Pegram
APPROVED:
Amy Lauren Lovecraft, Committee Chair, Chair 
Department o f  Political Science 
Hajo Eicken, Committee Member 
Jonathan Rosenberg, Committee Member 
Dennis Takahashi-Kelso, Committee Member 
Todd Sherman, Dean
College o f  Liberal Arts 
John C. Eichelberger, Dean o f  the Graduate School
Abstract
A large and expanding body of scientific evidence shows that the Arctic is experiencing 
rapid social-ecological changes. Arctic stewardship is a framework for governance that is based 
on the principles of resilience thinking and is gaining prominence in both academic and political 
settings. However, critical scholars have indicted resilience thinking for failing to adequately 
comprehend the social dimensions of social-ecological systems. Resilience, therefore, remains a 
problematic theoretical foundation on which to base governance. The aim of this dissertation is 
to improve resilience thinking so that it can overcome its demonstrated shortcomings and thereby 
contribute to improved Arctic governance. I propose a novel theoretical framework called 
radical resilience, which integrates conventional resilience thinking with key insights from the 
political economic theories of certain Marxists and post-Marxists -  namely that the capitalist 
mode of production and consumption is a key driver of ecological degradation and social 
inequity. Focusing on populations who maintain high degrees of non-capitalist modes of 
economic activity, I use radical resilience to answer the research question: How is the global 
capitalist system affecting the social-ecological resilience of Indigenous communities in northern 
Alaska as the Arctic continues to industrialize? Empirical case studies revolving around the three 
sectors of industrial activity increasing the fastest in the Arctic -  tourism, natural resource 
extraction, and shipping -  show that the relationship between capitalism and the resilience of 
Indigenous communities is complex and conflicted. While engaging in capitalism challenges 
traditional values, it is also a key strategy for maintaining adaptive capacity. Rather than calling 
for local places to ‘weather the storm’ of change -  as resilience has been critiqued for doing -  
governance should enable local influence over global processes through enhanced bottom-up 
democracy, or what the resilience literature calls revolt.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Because of climate change and socio-economic globalization, the Arctic is one of the 
most rapidly changing regions on Earth (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 
2014; Larsen, Nilsson, & Young, 2014). The rate of Arctic change raises concerns about the 
capacity of the region’s human and non-human life to adapt and remain resilient over the coming 
decades (Chapin, Sommerkorn, Robards, & Hillmer-Pegram, 2015; Young, 2012). The resilience 
of Indigenous communities in northern Alaska is of special interest because many of these 
communities continue to practice high degrees of non-capitalist economic activities -  meaning 
those in which there is no appropriation of surplus value by one class or group from another -  
that may offer innovative normative and material alternatives to the environmental degradation 
and social inequity wrought by the globalization of capitalism (Hunn, 1999). As regional 
decision makers increasingly embrace resilience thinking as a framework for governing Arctic 
change, critics of resilience thinking continue to point out its shortcomings (see Biermann, 
Hillmer-Pegram, Knapp, & Hum, 2016, for a state of the field review of resilience and its 
detractors). This ideological tension calls for scholarship that attempts to ‘fix’ resilience thinking 
in order to create improved governance outcomes in the Arctic, which is the aim of this 
dissertation. While my reconstruction of resilience thinking is inevitably partial and unfinished, I 
argue that resilience can be salvaged from its critiques if modifications are made, and that this is 
worth doing because the power that it wields has potential for bringing about positive social- 
ecological change.
1
1.2 Dissertation Methodology
This dissertation improves resilience thinking -  meaning the mental logics and related 
actions that social-ecological resilience theory is producing -  and its application to Arctic 
governance. It does so by answering the main research question: How is the global capitalist 
system affecting the social-ecological resilience of Indigenous communities in northern Alaska 
as the Arctic continues to industrialize? To answer this question, I first explore pertinent 
literature on Arctic environmental, social, and coupled social-ecological change in order to 
establish the research context. I then review existing scholarship that proposes strategies for 
using resilience thinking to govern Arctic change and research on prominent critiques of 
resilience thinking. Comparing these two areas of research -  resilience and its detractors -  
demonstrates an ideological tension that I reconcile through the introduction of a novel 
theoretical framework called radical resilience.
In the subsequent three chapters of this dissertation, I address the main research question 
through empirical studies of the three industrial sectors increasing the fastest in the Arctic -  
tourism, natural resource extraction, and shipping. By focusing on rapidly increasing industrial 
sectors, I provide findings that are relevant to regional decision makers today and in the near 
future. Moreover, by focusing on issues of pan-Arctic importance, the findings from northern 
Alaska should prove useful for future comparative studies. The tourism case is focused on the 
single village of Barrow, Alaska, while the natural resource case pertains to the northern and 
interior portions of the state, and the shipping case covers the west coast of northern Alaska 
(Figure 1.1). Research methods used for the case studies include interviews, surveys, participant 
observation, and document analysis. Further methodological details are provided in each chapter.
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The last chapter of this dissertation takes the empirical data from each case study and 
analyzes it through the radical resilience framework that I introduce below. My final chapter 
draws specific insights from each case study, and more general conclusions from a comparative 
examination of the findings, about the relationship between capitalism, non-capitalist modes of 
production and consumption, and the resilience of Indigenous communities in northern Alaska 
and the Arctic more broadly. Lastly, I use my findings to make recommendations for improving 
arctic stewardship and governance in this time of rapid change.
This dissertation makes multiple contributions to the transdisciplinary effort -  meaning 
that which integrates the energy of academic and non-academic stakeholders -  to create a 
thriving arctic community (see Lang et al., 2012). On one hand, each of the three case studies 
represents a bounded, complete piece of published scholarship about an important aspect of 
arctic change. The natural resource extraction case, for example, quantifies the extent of existing 
and plausible future industrial infrastructure in the region and has already been distributed as a 
technical report to over 500 stakeholders. On the other hand, taken as a single unit, the 
dissertation presents a coherent and sustained analysis of regional industrial development and the 
impacts on the livelihoods and cultures of its Indigenous inhabitants. On the theoretical side, this 
dissertation contributes to the theoretical underpinnings of resilience thinking by building on 
recent efforts to radicalize resilience in terms of political economy (e.g., Cretney, 2014; 
Hornborg, 2013; Nelson, 2014).
This dissertation’s theoretical work should be of interest to scholars from both resilience 
thinking and more traditional critical fields of nature-society research, while the factual data 
compiled in the three case studies can inform applied efforts to manage specific sectors of arctic 
industrialization. The ultimate goals -  and the point of conducting theoretically grounded
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research that is empirically tested -  is praxis, or the coming together of theory and practice (see 
Lather, 1986). Ideally, the benefits of balancing capitalist and non-capitalist social-ecological 
relations that I explore herein will make their way into the lived experiences of the Arctic’s 
human and non-human populations
1.3 Arctic Change
1.3.1 Defining the Arctic
The Arctic. The High North. A region of the world with many identities. Some have 
viewed it as a space of exploration, scientific research, or geopolitical contention. For many 
endemic plant and animal species and over 4 million humans (Larsen et al., 2014), it is home.
But it is also perceived as a storehouse of natural resources ripe for exploitation. Conservation 
groups paint it as a nature reserve, unscathed (but threatened) by human activities. It is fair to say 
that the Arctic may be all of these things and probably more. This dissertation, however, is 
concerned with the Arctic in terms of the ways it is changing and what those changes mean for 
human and non-human life there. It is concerned with environmental change, social change, the 
linkages between the two, and the linkages across spatial scales.
In terms of physical geography, the Arctic has been defined by such features as the 
presence of permafrost, the extent of sea ice, specific temperature ranges, the northern tree line, 
and the Arctic Circle -  the line of latitude at 66°33’ north, above which the sun does not set for 
24 hours on the summer solstice. Other definitions of the Arctic are more flexible, such as that 
used by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, which includes the High Arctic, the
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sub-Arctic, and adjacent marine and terrestrial areas that are relevant to the scope of particular 
research agendas (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, n.d.). This dissertation adopts 
the latter definition of the Arctic because many of the causes and results of Arctic change are 
spatially fluid and cannot be confined to fixed boundaries. This dissertation is interested in 
variables (i.e., manifestations of global capitalism and Indigenous communities) that exist 
primarily within this definition of the Arctic as well.
The heterogeneity of Arctic social and environmental conditions is important to 
acknowledge when speaking of the entire region as a single unit. There are eight Arctic nations 
that contain contrasting regions such as the vast coasts in Russian Siberia, the urban centers of 
northern Scandinavia, the Indigenous villages lining the Northwest Passage, and the industrial oil 
outposts in northern Alaska. However, having acknowledged heterogeneity in the Arctic and 
being cautious about overgeneralizations, there are also key traits that distinguish the area as a 
distinct region. These include an environment marked by extremes in coldness, light, and dark; 
the presence of unique, highly adapted ecosystems; and internationally recognized Indigenous 
groups (except in Iceland). There are over 40 Indigenous groups in the Arctic (comprising 
roughly 10 percent of the population), including: Saami in Finland, Sweden, and Norway; Nenets 
in Russia; Aleut, Yupik, and Inupiat Inuit in Alaska; Inuvialuit Inuit in Canada; and Kalaallit 
Inuit in Greenland (Arctic Centre -  University of Lapland, n.d.).
1.3.2 Environmental Changes
The most fundamental physical trait of the Arctic, its coldness, is fading. Climate change 
is significant in the Arctic (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment [ACIA], 2005; IPCC, 2014). As
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the Earth’s atmosphere increasingly traps solar radiation because of rising levels of greenhouse 
gases, global temperatures are forced upward. Polar amplification of global warming, whereby 
decreasing ice and snow coverage increases absorption of solar radiation, is causing the Arctic to 
warm at twice the global rate (Walsh, Overland, Groisman, & Rudolf, 2011). Looking back, 
Arctic temperatures have increased considerably over the past half-decade (Jeffries, Richter- 
Menge, & Overland, 2013) and, looking forward, are projected to continue warming at a faster 
rate than the global average, with a 2°C global increase this century and a polar amplification 
factor of between 2.5 and 4 (IPCC, 2014).
Climate change is causally linked to a series of secondary changes in both the abiotic and 
biotic environments of the Arctic. Rising temperatures are especially impactful for the 
cryosphere (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme [AMAP], 2013). Arctic sea ice 
extent, for example, has declined since the late 1970s and is continuing to decline (Lemke et al., 
2007; Stroeve et al., 2012). The average annual minimum Arctic sea ice shrunk from 6.22 
million km2 from 1981-2010 to a record low of 3.41 million km2 in the summer of 2012 
(National Snow and Ice Data Center [NSIDC], 2013). In addition to sea ice extent, it is very 
likely that central Arctic sea ice thickness has decreased by up to 1 m from 1987 to 1997 (Lemke 
et al., 2007), and some predict a nearly ice-free Arctic Ocean in the summer by 2040 (e.g., 
Overland & Wang, 2013). Dramatic changes have also been observed in Arctic snow cover -  
including a reduction in the presence of snow (Vincent, Laurion, Pienitz, & Walter Anthony, 
2012) -  and the condition of permafrost -  including significant regions of degradations and final 
thawing in some cases (Molau, 2010). Overall, a continued reduction of snow and ice masses is 
expected (AMAP, 2013). Other changes to the physical landscape include increasing rates of 
coastal erosion (caused by rising sea levels, less sea ice, and increased wave action (Barber et al.,
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2012), and changes to fresh water systems caused by altered precipitation patterns and 
permafrost thaw (Callaghan et al., 2013). While there is uncertainty in predictions of future 
change and spatial variability the changes that have already been observed, it is clear that the 
physical landscapes and seascapes that have provided the habitat for life in the Arctic for 
thousands of years are transforming rapidly.
Rising temperatures combined with the landscape transformations associated with 
cryospheric thaw and melt are already altering some biotic variables and are expected to 
challenge the adaptive capacities of some species (IPCC, 2014). The polar bear (Ursus 
maritimus) is perhaps the most iconic Arctic species, and a wide range of other wildlife relies on 
the region as critical habitat, including multiple species of whales, fish, birds, and the terrestrial 
rangifers caribou and reindeer. Certain marine ecosystems, however, have shifted from being 
dominated by arctic species to sub-Arctic species (Grebmeier et al., 2006). Other studies link 
climate change to shifting wildfire regimes and plant communities, and therefore to the potential 
future range of the caribou who feed on the plants (Gustine et al., 2014). Increased shrubification 
and a northward advance of the tree line have also been observed (Myers-Smith et al., 2011).
The impacts of climate change on the plants and animals of the Arctic may result in some 
species losing out, but, other species may be ‘winners’ as they become able to colonize spaces 
where conditions were previously unhospitable (IPCC, 2014). While many observed and 
projected biotic changes are connected to climate change, the Arctic Council stresses that 
environmental changes are also driven by other factors, such as environmental pollutants, habitat 
fragmentation, industrial development, and unsustainable harvests (Conservation of Arctic Flora 
and Fauna [CAFF], 2010). Similar to the changes being observed and predicted in the 
geophysical environment, arctic biotic change contains many uncertainties and spatial variability
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within the region. Nonetheless, there is sound reason for concern that artic ecosystems may soon 
reach tipping points of transformation, after which there will be no returning to previous states 
(Arctic Council, 2013).
1.3.3 Social Changes
Demographically, some of the key trends taking place globally are also occurring in the 
Arctic. Urbanization -  where people move away from rural villages to larger hub-communities 
or cities for work, education, or some other preferred lifestyle opportunity -  is an Arctic reality, 
with disproportionately high rates of younger people and women making the move (Larsen et al., 
2014). Rural residents are finding it increasingly difficult to succeed at traditional livelihoods 
due to environmental changes (Larsen et al., 2014). In addition to urbanization within the Arctic, 
immigration from outside the region by a widening range of non-Arctic ethnic and cultural 
populations seeking economic opportunities is increasing, making the Arctic more socially 
diverse (Larsen et al., 2014). However, after years of rapid growth, the Arctic population is 
expected to become relatively stable in the near future. Total population growth across the entire 
region is projected at a very modest 4% over the next two decades, increasing from roughly 4.05 
to 4.197 million people, and with Russia exhibiting the most notable decline in arctic population 
over that period, as rural resident move to non-Arctic urban centers (Larsen et al., 2014).
While the arctic population may be holding steady, the level of industrial activity taking 
place is on the rise. As consumptions levels in many developing countries around the world are 
increasing, demand for the fossil fuels -  oil and gas -  contained in the Arctic geologic subsurface 
is driving the spread of exploratory and productive activities in marine and terrestrial
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environments (Harsem, Eide, & Heen, 2011; Mikkelsen & Langhelle, 2008). However, the 
collapse of global oil prices in 2014 (see Tokic, 2015), has reduced the economic incentive to 
develop some arctic reserves -  an issue discussed further in Chapter 3. In addition to energy 
resources, arctic landscapes hold significant quantities of rare minerals, which has led to 
industrial mining projects in certain areas (Andrew, 2014). While these natural resources are 
thought to be the most significant driver of increasing industrial activity, at least two other 
commercial sectors are expected to increase substantially in the near future as corporations seek 
new opportunities for profit-making: shipping and tourism. When the sea ice conditions permit 
passage, the Northeast Sea Route (roughly following Russia’s arctic coast) is already offering a 
cheaper transportation route for the movements of some goods from the Pacific to the Atlantic 
and vise-versa (Liu & Kronbak, 2010). Similarly, the Northwest Passage, through the Canadian 
Archipelago, is seeing the regular transit of summer cruise ships for the first time in history. If 
sea ice continues to decline, marine-based industrial activity in the Arctic is expected to keep 
rising (Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment [PAME], 2009). The presence of industry is 
a double-edged sword for the Arctic -  on one hand it can disturb non-industrial cultural practices 
and the function of ecosystems but, on the other, it provides the foundation for much of the 
Arctic’s cash economies.
It is the job of arctic political systems, inter alia, to balance the negative and positive 
aspects of development, and to decide how to respond to the threats and opportunities presented 
by environmental change. At the international level, arctic governance has transitioned from a 
contentious Cold War period of geopolitical jockeying into a relatively stable era of international 
peace and cooperation (Nord, 2015). The Arctic Council has emerged as a high level 
intergovernmental body for the promotion of regional coordination, science, and policy advising.
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Despite the lack of any major conflicts, some boundary disputes are ongoing (especially around 
sovereign control over the outer continental shelves of arctic seas) and Russia continues to 
aggressively develop their offshore resources. At the national and sub-national levels of 
governance, several trends have been identified, including: devolution of authority; increasing 
Indigenous empowerment; challenges in fiscal and human capacity; and continued governance 
innovation (e.g., co-management of subsistence species) -  trends driven largely by Indigenous 
activism or the desires of national governments to reduce expenditures (Larsen et al., 2014). 
While arctic governance shows many encouraging trends, significant challenges remain.
Indigenous cultures in the Arctic are also changing, as increasing connectedness to global 
systems is bringing new livelihood challenges and opportunities to native peoples (Larsen et al., 
2014). In contrast to such changes, however, numerous trends suggest that Indigenous 
populations are increasingly empowered to sustain those aspects of their traditional culture and 
identity that they find important to the well-being of their communities (Larsen et al., 2014). 
These trends include: increasing use of Indigenous knowledge (such as native languages in 
education and ecological knowledge in resource management); higher levels of local 
participation, control, and ownership in governance; and the emergence of Arctic identities -  
especially Indigenous identities -  as a basis for external political and economic recognition. Of 
course, all advancements in this area must be viewed in light of the negative cultural impacts 
caused by centuries of exploitation and marginalization form colonizing governments. While 
Indigenous arctic groups have successfully blended tradition with modernity on many fronts 
(Cameron, 2012), concerns remain about human health and safety within northern communities 
(Larsen et al., 2014). In sum, warming arctic environments are challenging traditional rural 
livelihoods, while encouraging expanded natural resource development by corporations. At the
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same time, globalization is presenting rural communities and immigrants to the Arctic with new 
economic and cultural opportunities, but mostly in urban areas, leaving rural communities 
unconnected.
1.3.4 Changes in Coupled Social-Ecological Systems
The environmental and social changes taking place in the Arctic are closely linked in 
many instances, with causation and influence flowing in both directions. The analysis of 
relationships between the environment and society has a rich and diverse history in fields such as 
geography, anthropology, and sociology (Catton & Dunlap, 1978; Dove & Carpenter, 2013; 
Zimmerer, 2010). Here, however, I specifically use the lens of social-ecological systems to 
consider arctic change because this particular approach is gaining prominence in the Arctic in 
both scientific and governance communities (Chapin et al., 2015; Young, 2012). A social- 
ecological system defines a set of relationships, “in which people depend on resources and 
services provided by ecosystems, and ecosystem dynamics are influenced, to varying degrees, by 
human activity” (Chapin, Kofinas, & Folke, 2009, p. 6). It has been explained that, “There are no 
natural systems without people, nor social systems without nature. Social and ecological systems 
are truly interdependent and constantly co-evolving” (Stockholm Resilience Centre, 2007). 
Social-ecological systems exist at all spatial scales and across scales. I will examine the roots of 
social-ecological systems thinking and associated concepts shortly, but first I will briefly review 
key research on social-ecological change in the Arctic. While the social-ecological systems lens 
helps address the complex interactions between human and non-human variables, it must be 
acknowledged that researchers are responsible for constructing given systems (i.e., deciding what
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is included and is excluded from analysis) and that, in this way, social-ecological systems 
research reflects the normative predilections of researchers (see Lovecraft, 2008, and later 
section of this chapter).
A key dynamic in arctic social-ecological systems is that climate change is causing 
environmental transformations that require social adaptation in order for communities and 
regions to sustain their livelihoods and well-being. In one case from arctic Canada, climate 
change was shown to alter the spatial and temporal aspects of hunting for an Indigenous 
subsistence-based community (Berkes & Jolly, 2002). There have also been observed and 
predicted challenges associated with changing sea ice regimes for Indigenous whale hunters who 
travel on ice to access whales (e.g., Druckenmiller, Eicken, George, & Brower, 2013). While 
climate change is creating challenges for subsistence users across the Arctic, it is generally 
thought to offer opportunities for increased commercial activity, which could potentially bring 
more cash into the region.
Climate change is not the only driver of social-ecological change. The expansion of 
industrial activities has been linked to perceived increases in the difficulty of hunting Caribou 
among Indigenous communities in northern Alaska and Canada (Bali & Kofinas, 2014) and to 
changes in reindeer herding behavior among the Siberian Nenets (Kumpula, Forbes, Stammler,
& Meschtyb, 2012). The degradation of certain arctic marine ecosystems from overfishing 
combined with increasingly restrictive regulations on local harvesting has been shown to force 
changes in the social organization of fishery-dependent Sami communities in Norway 
(Broderstad & Eythorsson, 2014). International law, or lack thereof, and local politics affect the 
sustainability of polar bear and walrus populations in the Bering Strait (Meek, Lovecraft, 
Robards, & Kofinas, 2008).
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Cases such as these reveal some generalities about change in arctic social-ecological 
systems. Climate change, an anthropogenic phenomenon, is driving environmental changes that 
challenge local subsistence users to sustain their livelihoods -  the mechanism for this dynamic is 
that the plants, animals, and landscapes that constitute subsistence resources are transforming. 
Other pressure on subsistence systems include the environmental impacts of commercial 
activities (e.g., habitat fragmentation, reduced access, pollution), which are largely expected to 
be exacerbated by climate change. Commercial activities based on natural resource extraction, 
also bring Indigenous communities certain economic and social changes associated with greater 
integration into global markets, which is a central theme explored throughout this dissertation.
1.4 Arctic Stewardship and Resilience
1.4.1 Ecosystem Stewardship Applied to the Arctic
Arctic stewardship (Chapin et al., 2015) is the application of ecosystem or earth 
stewardship (Chapin et al., 2010; 2011) to the Arctic region. The term ‘arctic stewardship’ has 
been used elsewhere in discussions that pertain strictly to the social and legal aspects of arctic 
change (Young, 2012) but the usage in this dissertation describes a framework that is focused 
more centrally on social-ecological relations. Ecosystem stewardship was envisioned largely as a 
response to the call from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment to combine and apply ecology 
(as a basis for the conservation of biodiversity) with the United Nations’ goals for socio­
economic development and human well-being, thus creating “an action-oriented framework 
intended to foster the social-ecological sustainability of a rapidly changing planet” (Chapin et al.,
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2010, p. 241). In identifying the urgent need to apply ecosystem stewardship in the Arctic,
Chapin et al., (2015) write,
The intersection of climate change, resource development, and global socio­
economic processes poses major challenges for conservation of species, 
landscapes, and cultures. Although similar problems occur throughout the planet, 
they have and will continue to happen most rapidly in the Arctic (p. 2).
The authors identify three key components of stewardship: (1) its dual goals of ecosystem 
resilience and human well-being, (2) a focus on social and ecological processes and their 
interactions across scales, and (3) its emphasis on actions that shape the future rather than simply 
trying to restore the past. The arctic stewardship framework acknowledges the bevy of arctic 
changes reviewed above.
1.4.2 Resilience Theory and its Application
To understand arctic stewardship at a deeper level -  including how it formulates solutions 
to the problems it acknowledges -  resilience thinking must be examined, as it is the foundation 
of knowledge and theory that ecosystem stewardship is built upon. The concept of resilience 
emerged in the field of ecology in the 1970s. Innovative thinkers, using insights from 
mathematics and complex system modeling, rejected notions about ecosystems tending to remain 
in single equilibrium states, and replaced them with models wherein ecosystems undergo 
collapses and renewal, and alternate between multiple states via the adaptive cycle (Figure 1.2)
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(Gunderson & Holling, 2002). In resilience thinking, systems can collapse and reorganize around 
the same structures and functions, or reorganize around profoundly different structures and 
functions, marking a regime shift or transformation. Resilience, then, is defined as the amount of 
perturbation a system can absorb -  through adaptation -  before flipping into a different state 
marked by fundamentally different structures and functions.
While resilience thinking was originally applied to ecosystems, it is now commonly used 
to frame studies of social-ecological systems. Adger (2000), for example, provides one of the 
first explorations into this realm by illustrating the interconnections between the ecology of a 
natural resource, the institutions that govern its use, and the economics of a community that 
depends on it for their livelihoods. Folke (2006) announced the emergence of resilience as a 
perspective for social-ecological systems analysis, arguing that many of the principles of 
ecological resilience translate to social systems. More recently, however, and in response to 
ongoing concern from social scientists and theorists, resilience thinking has begun to emphasize 
the difference between natural systems and systems comprised of human beings -  with human 
agency playing a distinguishing role in the latter (see discussion in Arctic Council, 2013).
The panarchy theory of the structure and function of complex systems is central to 
resilience thinking. Panarchy was named after the Greek god of nature, Pan, and emerged from 
what Gunderson and Holling (2002) call their quest for a theory of adaptive change. A key 
innovation of panarchy was to challenge the hierarchical idea of top-down control by contending 
that systems can be controlled by small-scale, bottom-up adaptations that cascade change 
upward. Panarchy also introduced the novel concept that complex systems are, in fact, 
characterized by a series of coupled, scale-specific adaptive cycles (Figure 1.3).
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As resilience has grown in use and popularity in a variety of fields, its terminology has 
overlapped with concepts from research areas such as climate change adaptation, vulnerability 
studies, and development. Folke et al., (2010) attempt to overcome terminological confusion 
with resilience by explaining,
In a nutshell, resilience thinking focuses on three aspects of social-ecological 
systems (SES): resilience as persistence, adaptability and transformability.
Resilience is the tendency of a SES subject to change to remain within a stability 
domain, continually changing and adapting yet remaining within critical 
thresholds. Adaptability is a part of resilience. Adaptability is the capacity of a 
SES to adjust its responses to changing external drivers and internal processes and 
thereby allow for development within the current stability domain, along the 
current trajectory. Transformability is the capacity to create new stability domains 
for development.. .and cross thresholds into a new development trajectory (p. 1).
The concept of transition is similar to adaptation and implies a shift within a current system state 
that makes that state more preferable without witnessing a shift to a new system state. 
Transitions, however, are not always adequate and transformability, or “the capacity to create a 
fundamentally new system,” is appropriate when, “ecological, economic, or social structures 
make the existing system untenable” (Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004). A great deal 
of resilience research has revolved around the concepts of transformative and adaptive capacities 
and how to measure and promote them in social-ecological systems.
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The concept of adaptive co-management is a governance strategy that emerged from, or 
co-evolved with, resilience thinking (Plummer & Armitage, 2007). The adaptive part of this 
framework refers to the capacity of resource managers to adjust their management practices in 
accordance with changing knowledge about the social-ecological system in order to maintain the 
system’s resilience (or transformative capacity) and thereby keep it in a desirable system state (or 
guide a transitions to a new system state). Learning is the key facilitator of adaptation, since 
understanding how management practices interact with changing systems is necessary before 
practices can be adjusted (Lebel, Grothmann, & Siebenhuner, 2010). The “co” aspect of adaptive 
co-management explicitly aims to collaborate with stakeholders, both vertically and horizontally, 
on the formation of management policies, which can help empower resource users (Armitage, 
Berkes, & Doubleday, 2007). This aspect of co-management is in recognition of the complexity 
of the social world. It attempts to address the concerns of multiple groups while also drawing 
ecological knowledge from a wider range of sources than just western science. Adaptive co­
management is part of arctic stewardship but arctic stewardship takes a bigger-picture view of 
guiding social-ecological change (Chapin et al., 2015). Adaptive co-management is a relevant 
paradigm for social actors in the privileged position of managing social-ecological systems, but 
its usefulness for those marginalized from power is less clear.
Across the globe, resilience thinking is increasingly applied to the governance of real 
people and places. The international development community has built resilience toolkits and 
programs to help communities withstand the shocks caused by global markets and climate 
change (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2008; US Agency for International 
Development [USAID], 2012). Other high-level intergovernmental agencies invoking the 
resilience narrative include the United Nations Panel on Global Sustainability (UNPGS 2012)
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and the World Economic Forum (Howell, 2013). Germane to this dissertation is the Arctic 
Resilience Report being conducted under the auspices of the Arctic Council and led by high- 
level resilience think tanks. At the time of writing, the final report is underway, but the 2013 
interim report (http://arctic-council.org/arr/) provides evidence of cutting-edge resilience 
thinking applied in the Arctic context and is an example of arctic stewardship in action. As seen 
below, even this latest version of resilience thinking makes some problematic assumptions. 
Coinciding with the rise of resilience thinking in research and application has been a critique of 
its core principles and the ramifications of its application.
1.5 Critiques of Resilience Thinking
1.5.1 Overview
Beginning around 2010, scholars from multiple fields of nature-society research began 
expressing concern about resilience thinking and the politics it animates due to its incomplete 
grasp of social phenomenon (e.g., Ahlborg & Nightingale, 2012; Nadasdy, 2007). In 2008 a 
high-level report called “Re-framing Resilience” (Leach, 2008) articulated the primary problems 
that social researchers were having with resilience thinking, as well as the responses of 
prominent resilient thinkers to those issues. New resilience journals have emerged to highlight 
the shortcomings of earlier research approaches and to better address the social dimensions of 
resilience (e.g., Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses). There have even 
been books written with the sole goal of deconstructing the resilience ‘doctrine’ (Evans & Reid, 
2014). Many of these critiques are aimed at classical social-ecological resilience thinking, which
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was described above. However, critics have also targeted a second realm of resilience thinking. 
The second realm views resilience not a systemic property, but as a psychological trait that both 
individuals and communities can possess, and that should be nurtured within communities in 
preparation for experiencing natural disasters (e.g., Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & 
Pfefferbaum, 2008). Critiques continue to emerge from multiple corners of the academy but can 
be organized into three main categories.
The first category is a specific example of the broader post-modern critique of the claim 
of science to be objective and therefore be the holder of Truth, with a capital T. Theories from 
intellectual realms such feminism and the philosophy of science argue that no human endeavor 
can be truly objective or free from value judgments since all thoughts and actions are deeply 
enmeshed in historical trajectories that presuppose particular ontological and epistemological 
positions at the exclusion of others, and resilience thinking is no exception. Resilience hails from 
discrete lineages of western natural science and computer modeling that posit specific and 
contingent (although hegemonic) worldviews. Criticisms show how the unquestioned culture of 
resilience thinking has failed to recognize and reflect on its own positionality, inherent 
normativity and accordant limitations (Cannon & Muller-Mahn, 2010; Cote & Nightingale,
2012; Kirchhoff, Brand, Hoheisel, & Grimm, 2010).
The second category is similar to the first, but instead of issuing the criticism at the 
culture of resilience thinkers, per se, scholars have pointed out that resilience thinking has 
historically marginalized important concepts from the social sciences -  such as power, agency, 
difference, and the validity of conflicting knowledge(s) -  in the subjects it studies. Turner (2014) 
points out, “resilience scholars.. .have continued to embrace systems-modeling 
perspectives.. .[and] as a result, resilience adherents, when reaching out to the social
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sciences.. .are attracted to approaches such as ecological economics and rational-choice theory” 
(p. 619). By privileging modeling approaches to social research, resilience thinking has missed 
the vast bodies of work on topics such as identity, culture, and justice in the social sciences. 
Hornborg (2013) puts it succinctly: “resilience discourse generally appears to be ignorant of 
most of the tenets of modern social science” (p. 118).
1.5.2 Radical Political Economy Critiques
1.5.2.1 Background
The third category of critique, based in theories from radical political economy, is the one 
I engage most centrally in this dissertation. Radical political economy, in brief, is meant to mean 
the field of study concerned with the social inequities and environmental harms that are intrinsic 
to the capitalist mode of production and consumption, and also concerned with the justice-related 
benefits of doing things differently (Foster 1999, 2002; Harvey, 1982, 1996; O’Connor, 1988; 
Smith, 1984; Wallerstein, 1979). Often associated with the writings of Marx and Engels, the 
political left, and socialism, radical political economy encompasses the work of a broad range of 
theorists and activists, and their critics. Despite the diversity in the field, the central focus of 
radical political economy can be understood as the nexus of economic relations, social power, 
and nature, as viewed through a lens that values collective responsibility, a strong interpretation 
of equality, and a moral obligation to the other.
Marx’s theory of historical materialism (1867/1990) rests on the observation that 
capitalist modes of production divide society into two uneven classes, and the hypothesis that the
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labor class (workers) will revolt against the bourgeois class (owners) and cease the means of 
production when their exploitation becomes intolerable. This dialectical relationship, whereby 
capitalism contain the seed of its own destruction, forms the first contradiction of capitalism. The 
second contradiction of capitalism (see O’Connor, 1991) focuses centrally on social-ecological 
relations (rather than relations between the classes), positing that capitalism sows the seeds of its 
own destruction through its fundamentally unsustainable relationship with nature, founded on 
capitalism’s imperative for unlimited growth (and unlimited consumption of natural resources) in 
a limited world. Both contradictions are explored further below.
In the beginning, according to Marx, there was primitive accumulation— a notion that he 
himself equates to the original sin of capitalism in Capital Volume I  (1867/1990). Primitive 
accumulation is the process by which social classes separated, with some individuals forcefully 
seizing power over the means of production (natural resources and production infrastructure) and 
other individuals thus being dispossessed from land and capital. The dispossessed, stripped of the 
means to produce their own subsistence, find themselves with only their labor to sell to the 
capital class in exchange for the wages they need to live and to feed their families. The 
capitalists, in turn, are able to sell the commodities the laborers produce, pay the labors the 
minimum to survive (i.e., social reproduction so that they can keep working), and still extract a 
profit from the process. Marx calls this profit surplus value and the process by which it is 
generated exploitation. Its maximization is the basic tenant of capitalism. What happens to the 
humans involved, however, is a profound alienation from themselves, society, and nature. Peet, 
Robbins, and Watts (2011) describe the process:
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[I]ncreasing [capitalist] socialization binds workers into a more extensive labor 
process that they do not collectively control.. .The.. .labor process loses its 
inherent meaning as the social production of human existence.. .The result is a 
severing of relations: among workers, and between workers and capitalist owners 
of production systems; between the individual and its species being; between 
producers and their products; and between producers and the environment on 
which continued existence nevertheless depends (p. 13).
When workers do not control the products of their own labor and capitalists are unrequired to 
contribute labor to their own survival, everyone loses touch with the meaning of life, which can 
only be realized, according to Marx, by working as a free person for the survival of oneself and 
one’s species (thus the mention of species being).
Humans’ ontological status as a communal species being is replaced in capitalist social 
relations by, “competitive individuals each pursing self-interested goals” (Peet et al., 2011, p.
14). The competitive selfishness of capitalism, “becomes an alienated force controlling 
individuals rather than being controlled by them, so they are forced by competition to do things 
they already know to be socially and environmentally destructive,” (p. 14) according to Peet et 
al. (2011). Supporters of capitalism leave such externalities as social and environmental damage 
to the logic of the market to sort out with price signals being the guide, but, as Peet et al. (2011) 
write, “Market prices do not represent social and environmental costs and long-term 
consequences at all,” and “As a result, market systems are environmentally destructive and 
socially irresponsible” (p. 14). A contention that is clearly backed up by the state of affairs today 
by, for example, cheap oil and its ecological and social tolls. Referencing the “energy-intensive,
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mechanized, resource-eating, polluting” history of capitalism, Peet et al. (2011) state, “the 
practical, ‘efficient’, competitive rationality used every day in capitalism reverses the social and 
environmental rationality needed to sustain continued social existence in the longer run” (p. 18).
Peet et al. (2011), use Marx’s theory of alienation, his critique of markets, and an lengthy 
examination of anthropogenic climate change to suggest that, “something scarcely credible might 
indeed be happening: ‘normal’ production and consumption destroy the natural environment, 
historical origin and material source of human existence, to the point of collapse” (p. 14). As 
Peet et al. (2011) catalog the problems,
Waves of multiple global environmental crises break with particular ferocity on 
the shores of the popular imagination: destruction of the rain forests, the 
disappearance of species, pollution from carbon dioxide emissions, melting of the 
polar ice caps, the poisoning of the seas, the return of nuclear proliferation, global 
pandemics, massive oil leaks, and the threats of genetically modified organisms 
are regular staples of the mainstream media (p. 13).
These types of environmental crises are social products. Attempted solutions must therefore be 
social as well. Again, Peet et al. (2011), summarize:
The destruction of nature.. .results from an alienated form of the production of 
human existence, one that is not democratically controlled, that is organized 
indirectly through markets, that is based in the self-interested pursuit of profit, and 
that has to grow to survive. If we want to understand what is happening to the
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environment, we have to understand the origins, development, structure and 
dynamics of capitalism.. .(p. 15).
In this theory, alienated human beings cannot make environmentally rational decisions 
because competition drives them do the opposite. “ [Environmental degradation is not an 
unfortunate accident under advanced capitalism,” Peet et al. (2011) write, “it is instead a part of 
the logic of that economic system.. .of various logics and trajectories of accumulation— and the 
deadly operation of markets—worked out the land and specific resources” (p. 26). Recently, 
scholars have been working to incorporate this type of Marxist social-ecological thinking into 
critiques of resilience thinking.
1.5.2.2 The Critique
The basic critique that radical political economists have levied on resilience thinking, is 
that resilience is being used as a conceptual tool to create political-environmental subjects that fit 
into the neoliberal world order (Joseph, 2013; MacKinnon & Derickson, 2013; Nelson, 2014). 
Neoliberalism is used here to describe a set of mental logics and public policies -  brought into 
prominence in the 1980s by Ronald Regan, Margret Thatcher, and other world leaders -  that 
operate primarily to expand free markets, invigorate privatization, and minimize government 
intervention in production and distribution of goods and services (except for when the 
interventions support neoliberal goals), or to promote the reproduction and expansion of a 
particular form of contemporary capitalism (Castree 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Harvey, 2005). 
Proponents of neoliberalism, the critique argues, are advancing the resilience paradigm so that
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localities exposed to the volatility of global markets and the environmental insecurities brought 
about by anthropogenic environmental change (associated with capitalist accumulation) will be 
able to survive on their own and without the aid of public support. Resilience is being used by 
powerful neoliberal actors to perpetuate a culture of individual and local-scale responsibility 
within a global system that is inherently unstable and prone to crisis. Resilient communities will 
not contest neoliberalism, the critique insists, because they can affectively absorb the 
perturbations it causes through adaptation and transformation.
Neoliberalism can be understood as a hegemonic ideology operating at the global scale in 
support of capitalism (Gallaher, 2009). In their critique of resilience, MacKinnon and Derickson 
(2013) contend, “resilient spaces are precisely what capitalism needs -  spaces that are 
periodically reinvented to meet the changing demands of capital accumulation in an increasingly 
globalized society” (p. 254). By appealing to metaphors of nature and natural systems, resilience 
thinking naturalizes environmental and social problems that are not actually natural, but rather a 
result of capitalist production and consumption -  one particular and historic way of organizing 
society. “The effect,” they say, “is to naturalize crisis, reasoning with neoliberal discourses 
which stress the inevitability of globalization” (p. 259) and the environmental crises of climate 
change. Resilience thinking, in sum, supports neoliberal ideology at the expense of possible 
alternative modes of political economy that would be less socially and environmentally 
destructive.
The relationship between global-scale processes of capital accumulation and local 
communities caught up in the act is central to this line of critique. As MacKinnon and Derickson 
(2013) write,
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[C]oncern with the resilience of place is misconceived.. .[It] locates the sources of 
resilience as lying within the particular scale in question.. .By contrast, we 
contend that the processes which shape resilience operate primarily at the scale of 
[global] capitalist social relations (p. 255).
Devolving responsibility to local places to ‘be resilient’, they contend, is creating a condition 
where communities become responsible for adapting to global threats but lack the power to 
influence the original causes of those threats.
The use of scale in political economic critiques of resilience is similar to early work in 
political ecology. Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) demonstrate that soil degradation on African 
farms should not be attributed to local mismanagement, but rather to larger scale capitalist forces 
that effectively require increased agricultural output from the land. Resilience thinking can learn 
from their call for ‘chains of explanation’ when analyzing systems at a single scale. The 
panarchy model within resilience thinking emphasizes cross-scale interactions, but despite this, 
resilience scholars have not adequately considered global causes (and solutions) to local 
problems. The resilience of communities does not preclude mitigation or social change at other 
levels. To the contrary, the resilience of communities may very well depend on global scale 
social change.
MacKinnon and Derickson (2013) conclude by stating, “[P]romoting resilience in the 
face of the urgent crisis of climate change and global recession actually serves to naturalize the 
ecologically dominant systems of global capitalism” (p. 266). As an alternative, they offer a 
politics of resourcefulness, which they claim overcomes the shortcomings of resilience by 
promoting in local places, “genuinely deliberative democratic dialogue to develop.. .alternative
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agendas and.. .meaningfully challenge existing power relations” (p. 263). This is a promising 
concept and should definitely be pursued. However, I am interested in taking a slightly different 
tack. Instead of replacing resilience with an alternative concept, I am interested in ‘fixing’ 
resilience by integrating it with radical political economy. Unlike MacKinnon and Derickson 
(2013), I do not view the two as mutually exclusive. Following recent arguments by Hornborg
(2013), Cretney (2014), and Nelson (2014), I contend that resilience can be harnessed to promote 
radical projects that challenge capitalist ideology. To show how this can work I turn to Gibson- 
Graham’s critique of radical political economy.
1.5.3 Capitalism with a Lower Case ‘c’
Gibson-Graham’s central argument is that Marxists have inadvertently strengthened 
capitalism by producing a discourse that presents it as an absolute, all encompassing, inescapable 
phenomenon -  or Capitalism with a capital ‘C’. In so doing, the argument goes, Marxists have 
engendered a situation where the only perceivable alternative to capitalism is a complete and 
total working-class revolution. The entire social system of the world must be replaced by a whole 
new system. The problem with this understanding of capitalism is that in light of the failure and 
fall of many of the world’s communist governments, the working class revolution seems like an 
impossible dream. In turn, Marxists of all stripes have been rendered frustrated and empty 
handed in terms of ‘solutions’. “It is the way capitalism has been ‘thought’”, Gibson-Graham 
writes, “that make it so difficult for people to imagine its supersession” (1996, pp 4.)
Gibson-Graham deconstructs the radical political economy discourse on capitalism to 
show that capitalism is not actually all encompassing and that non-capitalist modes of production
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and consumption occur all the time, all over the place, right alongside capitalism. They 
effectively argue for seeing the economic field of society as a differentiated plane, with multiple 
types of economic relations coexisting. When one views the situation thus, it becomes clear that 
a complete and total working-class revolution is not the only viable option for bringing about 
positive change. One can instead focus on the small day-to-day projects that offer immediate 
realizations of the benefits of capitalism’s alternatives.
At the center of their deconstruction is their understanding of Marx’s definition of 
capitalism. Marx defined capitalism as a system of production and consumption wherein the 
means of production are controlled by an owning class while the production itself is provided by 
a laboring class. The value of the work the labors provide is more than they are paid for, which 
allows the owning class to syphon-off surplus value in the form of profit. It is the appropriation 
of surplus value (i.e., capital accumulation) by one entity away from  another that constitutes 
exploitation and defines capitalism. Gibson-Graham demonstrates instances where this type of 
exploitation is not occurring: self-employment (where surplus value is appropriated by the 
laborer); cooperative businesses (where surplus value is appropriated by employee-owners, 
consumer-owners, and reinvested into the community); and household production (where labor is 
never transformed into its monetary value form, thus providing no surplus to be appropriated). 
Gibson-Graham also bring to light the fluidity of economic identities, showing how an individual 
can be both an exploited laborer at their day job, for example, but an appropriator of surplus 
value through the investment of their retirements funds in the stock market. “Economic sites that 
have usually been seen as homogenously capitalist,” Gibson-Graham explains, “may be re­
envisioned as sites of economic difference, where a variety of capitalist and non-capitalist class 
processes interact” (1996, p. 18).
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Similar approaches to studying alternatives to capitalism include work on moral 
economies (Scott, 1977), Buddhist economics (Schumacher, 1973), and sharing (Gold, 2004). In 
sum, alternatives to capitalism can be viewed as those processes of production and consumption 
of goods and services— and the social-ecological relations the processes intimate—wherein the 
driving force is not the maximization of capital accumulation by an elite class of owners, but 
rather the maximization of social-ecological well-being through an equitable distribution of the 
products of human labor.
Pulling away from Gibson-Graham and returning the purposes of this dissertation, an 
important question emerges. If capitalism’s alternatives are still predicated on the production of 
surplus value through the exploitation of labor (humans) and raw materials (non-human 
environments), do these modes of economy offer any real promise for remedying the social and 
environmental impacts of capitalism and thereby contributing to the of resilience of Indigenous 
communities in the Arctic? On the social front, it is relatively straight forward to see how 
alternative modes of production/consumption and distribution enhance social justice and 
equity— surplus value is distributed equitably among many rather than horded by a few.
Similarly, on the environmental side, we know that communally owned natural resources can be 
sustainably managed (Ostrom, 1990). By replacing profit maximization with equitable well-being 
as the key driver of economies (Figure 1.4), alternatives to capitalism make room for decisions 
that are more ecologically sound than those determined by capitalist logic.
29
1.5.4 Resilience and Capitalism: Reconsidering the Relationship
Resilience thinking, I contend, is a site of economic differentiation because its application 
supports both capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production and consumption. Radical 
political economists have critiqued it as a homogenously capitalist project, but the evidence 
suggests otherwise. Take for example the previously mentioned Arctic Resilience Report. 
Although still in draft form, much of the report appears to be a manifestation of neoliberal logic 
aimed at bringing new places into capitalist modes of production. A table on page 75, for 
example, summarizes the risks and opportunities for arctic investment as defined by Lloyds 
Bank. In contrast, other parts of the report are explicitly critical of capitalism, such as the case 
study of Norwegian reindeer herders that identifies the “imposition of global market capitalism” 
(p. 32) as a key factor in eroding Indigenous knowledge. Consider also the recent article on arctic 
stewardship cited earlier (Chapin et al., 2015). A quote from Pope Francis opens the article and 
addresses the globe’s growing economic disparities, the defenselessness of nature to increased 
profits, and the problems of a “deified market” (p. 207). These resilience thinkers recognize the 
link between capitalism, ecological degradation, and social inequity.
Resilience thinking may be predominately friendly to capitalism, but it is not completely 
so. It may be more accurate to say that resilience thinking, as a whole, is conflicted about its 
stance on capitalism. Thus we must avoid the pitfall Gibson-Graham showed Marxists to have 
fallen into. We need not replace resilience in toto with another concept, but instead work to grow 
the non-capitalist options that exist within resilience thinking currently. To do this, resilience 
thinking needs to integrate concepts from radical political economy. This will help resilience 
thinkers understand more clearly than they currently do capitalisms implications and alternatives,
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how capitalism interacts with non-capitalist modes of production and consumption, and what this 
means for applying resilience thinking in specific locations.
1.6 Radical Resilience: A New Framework for Steering Arctic Change
The theoretical framework of radical resilience retains many of resilience thinking’s core 
concepts and metaphors. The unit of study is still social-ecological systems, as defined by 
researchers. Systems are still described in terms of their persistence, adaptability, and 
transformability. Models such as the adaptive cycle and panarchy are still utilized to 
conceptualize change over space and time. The difference in radical resilience is that it brings 
into resilience research and politics an epistemological lineage that explicitly questions the 
ideology of neoliberal capitalism -  it brings a type of skepticism or criticality around exploitative 
systems of production and consumption that resilience thinking has largely lacked. In radical 
resilience, the relationship between capitalism and social-ecological systems becomes a subject 
to study and evaluations, rather than an assumed, or naturalized, structure of the system. To 
achieve these goals, radical resilience must use vocabulary from radical political economy to 
shape its research questions.
A quote from Robbins (2004) exemplifies the type of vocabulary that resilience needs to 
incorporate to become more radical. He writes, “No explanation of environmental change is 
complete.. .without serious attention to who profits from changes in control over resources, and 
without exploring who takes what from whom” (p. 75). While environmental change is 
obviously within the purview of resilience thinking, it would be very surprising for a resilience 
scholar to write about social agents taking or profiting from one another in the way that Robbins
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uses the terms. When resilience thinkers want to indicate that something is wrong with a system, 
they tend to use terms such as undesirable system state and lock-in trap, but these terms obscure 
the human agency that is ultimately responsible for the condition being analyzed. This issue goes 
back to the critique discussed earlier about resilience thinking’s tendency to naturalize processes 
that lead to social inequity and environmental degradation that are actually caused by human 
choice, and therefore avoidable.
Turner (2014) attributes resilience’s hesitancy to think critically about the social 
dimension of social-ecological systems to its claim to objectivity. He writes, “Ecologists may 
feel that as biophysical scientists they escape the ‘bias’ that plagues much of social science”; but 
Turner expresses skepticism in that claim when he adds, “[T]he choice of the appropriate 
parameter become particularly difficult and dare I say, normative, for open socio-ecological 
systems” (p. 620). Turner also suggests that the human struggle, pain, and injustice that is 
endured by some groups as social-ecological systems adapt and transform, are abstracted and 
largely ignored in resilience-based modeling. This unwillingness to engage difficult topics, 
Turner continues, has led to a “disturbing voyeurism -  coming too close, for many social 
scientists, to social Darwinism” (p. 621). Turner’s criticism suggests a need for academic 
resilience thinking to overcome its normative reluctance. Table 1.1 presents the contrasting 
approaches to social-ecological systems and the resultant outcomes of three schools of thought -  
capitalism, conventional resilience thinking, and radical resilience.
Radical resilience, drawing on Marxism, posits that the social inequity inherent in 
capitalism is something that society has a moral obligation to avoid (Harvey, 1982, 1996; Smith, 
1984). Drawing on eco-Marxism, radical resilience posits that society also has a moral obligation 
to avoid the unsustainable environmental degradation caused by capitalism (Foster 1999, 2002;
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O’Connor, 1988). However, tempered by post-Marxist theory (Gibson-Graham, 1996), radical 
resilience is not purely anti-capitalist, but instead seeks to explore the relationship between 
capitalist and non-capitalist values and material outcomes and analyze what this means for the 
resilience of social-ecological systems. Under radical resilience, society has a moral obligation to 
provide care for other human and non-human lifeforms. A radical resilience research agenda 
includes the following questions (which I return to in the dissertation’s Conclusion):
• What are the key social-ecological dynamics of the given system?
• Who benefits from the arrangement, at what scale, and how much?
• Who suffers from the arrangement, at what scale, and how much?
• Is power equitably distributed in this arrangement?
• In this context, what should be made resilient to what and for whom?
Having proposed this framework for understanding and steering Arctic change, the next 
three chapters of this dissertation present empirical studies of existing and possible future 
industrialization processes in northern Alaska, focusing respectively on the three sectors of 
tourism, natural resource extraction, and shipping. In the Conclusion I interpret the case study 
data through the lens of radical resilience to address the main research question: How is the 
global capitalist system affecting the social-ecological resilience of Indigenous communities in 
northern Alaska as the Arctic continues to industrialize?
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Table 1.1 Contrasting social-ecological approaches and outcomes o f capitalism, conventional resilience thinking, and radical 
resilience.
Capitalism Conventional resilience 
thinking
Radical resilience
Approach to 
social- 
ecological 
systems
• Exploit social- 
ecological systems 
to maximum 
efficiency for profit 
maximization and 
infinite growth
• Guide local-scale 
social-ecological 
systems into states that 
resilience thinkers 
deem desirable but in a 
manner that embraces 
capitalism as a natural 
systemic property
• Expects that 
capitalism will have 
environmentally and 
socially harmful 
impacts on 
communities
• Promote community 
empowerment over 
global-scale social- 
ecological processes
Social-
ecological
outcomes
• Environmental 
degradation and 
possible catastrophic 
transformation of the 
global climate 
system
• Social inequity and 
alienation from 
social-ecological 
meaning
• Local-scale 
ecosystems system are 
propped-up against or 
transformed to accept 
the consumption and 
pollution of capitalism
• Local-scale social- 
systems (i.e., 
communities) remain 
in an exploited and 
alienated state
• Communities acquire 
greater sovereignty 
over their own social- 
ecological resources
• Environmental 
degradation and social 
alienation are reduced 
as non-local resource 
exploitation is 
minimized
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Figure 1.1 The geographic scope o f each o f the three case studies from  northern Alaska.
47
Figure 1.2 Resilience thinking's adaptive-cycle model o f  change in 
systems. A system in the exploitation phase (r), is ju st getting started -  
drawing on its resource base to increase its potential and internal 
connectedness (e.g., a forest ju st beginning to grow). As the system  
builds in complexity, it reaches the conservation phase (K), where 
maximum resources are contained within (e.g., an old growth forest). 
When a complex system collapses, it enters the release phase (Q) 
where its resources are redistributed to the environment (e.g., a major 
forest fire). Following release, systems enter a reorganization phase (a), 
where resources can become mobilized around the same, or 
fundamentally different, structures and functions (e.g., the same type 
o f forest re-growing vs. a different ecosystem emerging). Source: 
Gunderson & Holling, 2002.
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Figure 1.3 Resilience thinking's panarchy model o f  cross-scale change in 
systems. Source: Gunderson & Holling, 2002.
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Figure 1.4 Three different models o f economic activity. The top model depicts a capitalist economy, where capital is 
invested into labor and materials fo r the purpose o f producing a commodity (C), which is exchanged in a market for  
money (M). Surplus value is derived from  this process and controlled by the bourgeois, who minimize the am ount spent 
on social reproduction in order to maximize the amount they are able to appropriate. The appropriated share can then 
be reinvested to produce more commodities (M-C-M) and continue the cycle, or horded, or spent on the extravagances 
o f the mega-rich. In order to maximize bourgeois appropriation, the so called  ' externalities' o f environmental 
destruction and social inequity are assured. In the middle model, capital is again invested in labor and materials to 
produce a commodity that is exchanged fo r money in a market, but this time the surplus value is not appropriated by 
the bourgeois, but rather spent on social well-being, perhaps through redistribution by the state or through direct 
control by labor. Reinvestment in the cycle can occur once social well-being is adequately addressed, but maximizing 
the appropriation o f surplus value is not the driving force. Accordingly, negative externalities can be minimized. The 
bottom model represents a non-market economy, where labor and materials combine to produce a consumable good 
or service that is shared fo r the well-being o f society, and never commodified or exchanged fo r money. In such a 
system, there may not be much surplus value and it is rather the social well-being that is reinvested to keep the system  
going. A ll three model o f  economics occur simultaneously and interact with one another.
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CHAPTER 2: INTEGRATING INDIGENOUS VALUES WITH CAPITALISM THROUGH 
TOURISM: ALASKAN EXPERIENCES AND OUTSTANDING ISSUES 1
Abstract: Radical theories from political economy assert that capitalism is founded on the 
creation and appropriation of surplus value through exploiting human labor and nature. Such 
exploitative social and social-ecological relations are generally understood as contradictory to 
Indigenous worldviews, which tend to emphasize community wellbeing and environmental 
reciprocity over maximizing private accumulation. Enter tourism, tantalizing in its promise as a 
‘silver bullet’ for Indigenous sustainable development. When done ‘right’, tourism can generate 
capitalist economic activity without drastically damaging cultural and ecological systems. This 
study examines spaces of confluence and divergence in Barrow, Alaska between current tourism 
and the values of its Indigenous people, the Inupiat. It considers the scenario of increased 
tourism in the future and identifies local visions for expanding tourism in a culturally appropriate 
manner. Key ideas for future development include increasing regulation of cruise ship tourists 
and enhancing capacity to host high-end tourists. The study reveals conflicting views about using 
subsistence hunting, fishing and whaling activities as tourism attractions, and concludes that the 
ability of leaders in Barrow to support Indigenous values through tourism highlights an 
opportunity and need for a research agenda focused on exploring the relationship between 
capitalism and its alternatives within tourism destinations.
Keywords: Indigenous capitalism, Marx, Inupiaq values, Alaska tourism, Arctic tourism, Arctic 
development, critical theory
1 Hillmer-Pegram, K. (2016). Integrating Indigenous values with capitalism through tourism: 
Alaskan experiences and outstanding issues. Journal o f  Sustainable Tourism, 1-17. 
doi: 10.1080/09669582.2016.1182536
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2.1 Introduction
The political leadership of Barrow— a primarily Indigenous coastal community located in 
the US Arctic at the northernmost point of Alaska—wants to develop more tourism in order to 
diversify their oil dependent economy. This desire is laid out in Soaring to the Future: Barrow 
Comprehensive Plan 2015-2035, an official planning document recently completed 
collaboratively by the major local governing bodies of Barrow for the purpose of providing a 
unified direction for future development (North Slope Borough [NSB], 2014). The plan goes into 
detail describing a vision for the next two decades for tourism in Barrow, demonstrated by a 
selection of quotes:
• Expand tourism opportunities, including the need for additional visitor 
accommodations; and encourage additional commercial enterprises, such 
as restaurants and coffee shops (p. 7).
• Strengths identified by Barrow residents were:.. .Tourism, specifically 
wildlife and birding as a tourist attraction (p. 8).
• Strengthen the local community through tourism development.. .Expand 
tourism activities.. .develop feasible Eco-tourism.. .Research tourist 
preferences.. .Develop a website (p. 144).
• Opportunities:.. .Culturally influenced tourism (p. 265).
While the parties involved with the creation of the comprehensive plan (i.e., regional 
municipal governments, Native governments, and Native corporations -  all of which are
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explained further later) would not claim that it represents the views of every individual in 
Barrow, the plan nonetheless presents a clear and nuanced intention to increase tourism and its 
related businesses. The plan is likely to be implementable given the political clout of the 
authoring parties.
From a theoretical framework based on the paradigm of sustainable tourism (Bramwell, 
2011; Bramwell & Lane, 1993; Butler, 1999; Clarke, 1997; Farrell & Twining-Ward, 2005; 
Hunter, 1995, 1997; Jamal & Camargo, 2014; Liu, 2003; Lu & Nepal, 2009; Muller, 1994; 
Sharpley, 2000), Barrow’s goals for tourism development appear positive— a locally-led, 
community-vetted effort to promote economic diversification through tourism, in a manner that 
is environmentally and culturally sensitive. However, theoretical insights derived from research 
on Indigenous tourism (Butler & Hinch, 2007; Bunten, 2008, 2010, 2011; Honey, 1999;
Johnston, 2000, 2006; Notzke, 1999; Robinson, 1999; Sofield, 1993; Turner, Berkes, & Turner, 
2012; Zeppel, 2006) and from research taking a radical political economy approach to tourism 
(Bianchi, 2009, 2011; Britton, 1982a, 1991; Mosedale, 2011; Shepherd, 2002; Weaver, 2013), on 
the other hand, would likely advise a cautionary approach to tourism development. These latter 
realms of theory contend that tourism, especially in Indigenous communities where close ties to 
local ecosystems have been identified by the communities as culturally essential, can lead to 
undesirable impacts and outcomes if processes of development are dominated by outside forces 
and subjected to the global economic imperative for profit maximization through social- 
ecological commoditization.
Given the apparent tension between the need for sustainable economic development in 
the US Arctic on the one hand and the risks that are known to be associated with tourism 
development on the other hand, what should be made of the expressed desire of Barrow’s
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political leadership, which is primarily Indigenous, to expand tourism in their community? What 
do they know that makes them confident that they can avoid the common pitfalls of tourism? 
What lessons can be drawn from the Barrow case for the field of sustainable tourism?
To address these questions, this study is contextualized by presenting a social-ecological 
overview of Barrow, Alaska. Three areas of related but distinct tourism studies literature— 
sustainable tourism, Indigenous tourism, and the radical political economy of tourism— are then 
reviewed to build a theoretical framework for the Barrow study. Bunten’s work on Indigenous 
capitalism through tourism (2008, 2010, 2011) emerges as a key theoretical concept. Study 
methods and findings are discussed. In conclusion, the implications of this case within the 
broader geographic context of Alaska and within the broader theoretical context of sustainable 
tourism are considered. It is argued that Barrow’s apparent capacity to channel the forces of 
global capitalism into less-exploitative, community-oriented goals points towards the need for 
further research in the area of capitalism’s alternatives (Gibson-Graham, 1996) in tourism 
destinations.
2.1.1 Overview of Barrow, Alaska
The community of Barrow was named after Sir John Barrow, (1764-1848), a British 
statesman, but the location is the homeland of the Inupiat, an Indigenous Inuit ethnic group who 
have lived in the region for thousands of years. In Inupiaq, the location is called Ukpeagvik, 
which means a place to hunt snowy owls.2 The afore mentioned comprehensive plan explains,
2 Inupiaq is the adjective form of Inupiat (a plural noun) and also the name of the native 
language. The spelling with a ‘q’ is used for the singular form of the noun as well.
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“Inupiat translates as the real people.. .[who] have relied on their intimate knowledge of the 
environment and values of sharing and cooperation.. .Subsistence hunting, fishing and whaling 
traditions remain an integral way of life in Barrow” (p. 16). The 2010 US Census reports the 
population of Barrow at 4,974, with around 65% being Inupiat. Hence, while Barrow is 
undoubtedly an Inupiat community in terms of cultural authority, it is clearly not strictly Inupiat. 
The prominence of subsistence activities, especially whaling, cannot be over stated. The 
comprehensive plan explains, “The bowhead whale is the foundation of the Inupiat people” (p. 
157).
Governance in Barrow is divided between multiple entities. There are two regional 
bodies: the North Slope Borough (an Indigenously created subdivision of the State of Alaska) 
and the Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope (a federally recognized tribal government). There 
are also two governments specific to Barrow: the City of Barrow (an Alaska first class city) and 
the Native Village of Barrow (a federally recognized tribal government). The North Slope 
Borough (NSB) possesses authority to tax oil and gas infrastructure on Borough land. The 
extensive oil and gas activity in the region, emanating from the Prudhoe Bay facility, has led to 
NSB establishing a substantial (although largely one-dimensional) revenue stream for public 
services. High quality water, sewer, and energy systems, as well as quality schools, public safety, 
health, wildlife management, and cultural programs, have resulted from this arrangement.
Two Native corporations also influence Barrow governance: Arctic Slope Regional 
Corporation (ASRC) and Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corporation (UIC). These Native corporations, 
along with hundreds more, were formed along regional and village boundaries by the Alaska 
Native Claims Settle Act of 1971 (ANCSA). ANCSA was motivated by the federal desire to 
construction an intrastate oil pipeline, which required clear land title, and served as Congress’
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action to settle ongoing Indigenous land claims in the state. While some Alaska Natives 
vehemently opposed the settlement, many were in favor. The highly effective political action of 
Native activists resulted in over 44 million acres of land and nearly $1 billion being transferred 
to Alaska Natives. For-profit Native corporations were established to administer those assets and 
Alaska’s Indigenous people were enrolled as shareholders in their associated village and regional 
corporations. A major difference between regional and village corporations is the terms of their 
land rights, whereby the former possesses title to the subsurface while the latter is restricted to 
surface ownership. In Barrow, ASRC (the regional for-profit corporation, serving about 11,000 
shareholders), has profited directly from oil and gas production, while UIC (the village 
corporations, serving over 2,500 shareholders) owns key tracts of surface land in and around 
Barrow.
Environmentally, Barrow is located in low-lying, coastal tundra underlain by permafrost 
and marked by numerous lakes and swampy areas. Being treeless, cold, and dry, the environment 
is classified as Arctic desert. Winters are long, dark, and snow covered with temperatures 
regularly dropping to below -40° F, with strong winds and frozen landscapes. Within these 
conditions, human and non-human life thrives. Marine, terrestrial, and avian animal species are 
multitudinous and include polar bears (Ursus maritimus). While Inupiat remain closely linked to 
the natural environment though subsistence, the natural environment throughout the Arctic is 
rapidly changing as the effects of anthropogenic climate warming play-out in particular places 
(Arctic Climate Impact Assessment [ACIA], 2005; Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme [AMAP], 2013; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014). In 
Barrow, currently observable impacts include thawing permafrost (which threatens built 
infrastructure) and reduced sea ice (which impacts spring whaling and hastens coastal erosion).
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Tourism in Barrow takes place within this context of rapid social-ecological change at local to 
pan-Arctic scales. Given this context, it is necessary to develop a theoretical framework with 
which to examine tourism in Barrow.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 Sustainable Tourism
The academic discussion of sustainable tourism began over 40 years ago (see Bramwell 
& Lane, 1993), with the increasingly recognized fundamental contention that tourism should be 
conducted in an environmentally sustainable manner to align with the goals identified for 
sustainable development in the United Nation’s report Our Common Future (World Commission 
on Environment and Development [WCED], 1987). The document, known as the Brundtland 
Report, states, “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Sustainable 
tourism, then, must also conform to these ambitious yet vague guidelines. While a detailed 
recounting of the evolution of the sustainable tourism concept is not required here since it has 
been provided elsewhere (Buckley, 2012; Butler, 1999; Liu, 2003; Lu & Nepal, 2009) it is worth 
reviewing some of the main points and recent directions of the field.
Since the beginning of sustainable tourism research, there has been healthy debate about 
a) the definition of sustainability, b) the proper relationship between sustainable tourism and 
sustainable development, and c) whether or not sustainability is actually achievable within the 
tourism sector. Muller (1994) effectively argues for definitional flexibility and warns against the
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search for a perfect sustainability formula. Hunter (1995) points out two problems with early 
sustainable tourism research: it over emphasizes tourism’s environmental impacts while ignoring 
its social impacts, and it focuses on sustaining particular tourism activities while ignoring the 
ostensibly more important goals of sustainable development. Sustainable tourism should be 
understood as a spectrum that varies depending on a given location’s relative stage of socio­
economic development, Hunter later argues (1997).
Liu (2003) provides a milestone in sustainable tourism research by summarizing the key 
research that came before, pointing out its shortcomings, and recommending six directions for 
the future. His recommendations integrate the advances that had taken place within sustainable 
development during the previous decades into the sustainable tourism research-agenda. These 
are, “the nature of tourism demand, the nature of tourism resources, the imperative of intra- 
generational equity, the role of tourism in promoting socio-cultural progress, the measurement of 
sustainability, and forms of sustainable development” (p. 459). Lu and Nepal (2009) provide a 
state-of-the-field review (as represented by Journal o f  Sustainable Tourism), which shows that 
the topics described above and topics broached earlier, were still being pursued at that time.
While today’s sustainable tourism research is varied in topic, theoretical approach, and 
researchers’ disciplinary backgrounds, key themes include: the need to integrate complex 
systems thinking and resilience approaches into tourism studies (Farrell & Twining-Ward, 2005; 
Hillmer-Pegram, 2014), the usefulness of the sustainable livelihoods concept for tourism studies 
(Tao & Wall, 2009), the impacts of climate change on the effort to advance sustainable tourism 
(Weaver, 2011), and the importance of studying tourism through the theoretical lenses of justice 
and ethics (Jamal & Camargo, 2014). Many of these themes correspond with parallel discussions 
taking place in the field of sustainable development and continue to expand the field. Bramwell
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and Lane (2015) suggest that an important area for future research is the motivations of 
sustainable tourism scholars themselves, as this will help explain the field’s diversity. In the next 
two sections, I draw on literature from Indigenous tourism and the radical political economy of 
tourism in an attempt to develop a critical framework for sustainable Indigenous tourism.
2.2.2 Indigenous Tourism
Indigenous tourism studies can be viewed as a sub-category of the sustainable tourism 
field; one that integrates insights from Indigenous studies, anthropology, and critical 
development studies. The work reviewed below advances discussions about sustainable tourism 
in key ways: it has brought colonialism and its legacy of exploitation to the forefront of analysis; 
it has forced questions about the commoditization of Indigenous cultures within tourism 
development frameworks; it has explored the relationship between Indigenous peoples, the 
ecosystems from which they draw subsistence, and tourism; and it repeatedly drives homes the 
necessity for Indigenous control of Indigenous tourism. When these lessons are applied, the 
power to determine how tourism development is done is transferred from international 
organizations and the global tourism industry to the Indigenous communities experiencing 
tourism. Critical development studies calls this empowerment, while Indigenous people might 
call it self-determination.
An academic discussion about Indigenous tourism began around the same time the 
academic discussion about sustainable tourism began (Smith, 1989). While the two streams of 
literature have run parallel-but-separately at times, they have overlapped and directly engaged 
each other as well. Sofield (1993), addresses one of the major critical themes in Indigenous
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tourism, namely the social injustices that result when outside forces use existing power 
asymmetries to control tourism development in Indigenous communities. His South Pacific case 
study shows how colonial interventions included tourism development that used “imported 
models imposed from above,” whereby, “Little account was taken of prevailing traditional values 
and practices” (p. 729).
Other scholars have presented even stronger critiques of the Indigenous tourism industry, 
such as Johnston (2000), who contends, “The tourism industry, especially ecotourism, is 
arguably the prime force today threatening Indigenous homelands and cultures” (p. 89). In that 
article and elsewhere (Johnston, 2006), the author reveals the darker side of the growing 
eco/Indigenous tourism trend, such as its position in the global capitalist tourism-system and the 
tendency of outside interests to be the main profiteers. Indigenous rights, especially to land and 
intellectual property, are central to her proposed solution and constitute another major theme in 
Indigenous tourism research.
The relationship between Indigenous tourism and ecotourism is explored in many studies. 
Turner et al. (2012), present the case of the Gitga’at First Nation near Hartley Bay in Canada, 
which is considering developing tourism around its subsistence activities, especially fishing. 
Fennell (2008) presents an opposing perspective on the relationship between Indigenous people 
and ecotourism, suggesting that “there may be serious philosophical and operational problems 
inherent in packaging aboriginal ecotours as having a superior environmental ethic” (p. 129). 
These studies, and others (e.g., Butler & Hinch, 2007; Honey, 1999), demonstrate the commonly 
perceived relationship between Indigenous people and their local ecosystems—usually around 
subsistence—that often comes to the surface during tourism development processes.
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A useful level of conceptual clarity about Indigenous tourism is provided by Zeppel 
(2006). Drawing on authoritative sources, she distinguishes between Indigenous-controlled 
tourism and Indigenous-themed tourism and offers six key features of the former:
• tourism connected with Indigenous culture, values and traditions
• tourism products owned and operated by Indigenous people
• tourism based on Indigenous land and cultural identity, controlled from within by 
Indigenous groups
• tourism which includes Indigenous habitat, heritage, history, and handicrafts
• typically involves small tourism businesses owned by tribes or families and
• tourism focused on Indigenous knowledge of culture and nature. (p. 9)
These key features emphasize Indigenous-controlled tourism, thereby integrating many of the 
insights from critical research, and do not unnecessarily conflate Indigenous tourism with 
ecotourism (although they do include nature-based tourism as part of the definition).
2.2.3 Radical Political Economy of Tourism
A third stream of literature—the radical political economy of tourism—makes additional 
critical contributions to my framework for sustainable Indigenous tourism. Arguments emerging 
from this area run contrary to many from traditional sustainable tourism literature. Sustainable 
tourism, working under the logic of sustainable development, largely views socio-economic 
globalization and the spread of market economies as positive occurrences, focusing on their
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potential for poverty alleviation and enhanced living conditions. Radical political economy, on 
the other hand, understands capitalism to be an unacceptably destructive mode of producing and 
consuming goods and services, and generally considers globalization to be highly problematic 
(e.g., Peet, Robbins, & Watts, 2011).
Radical political economy is underlain by Karl Marx’s theory of capitalism (see the 
discussion in Chapter 1, section 1.5.2.1 of this dissertation for a further definition and 
explanation of capitalism). An expansive world of theory has developed from the basic 
foundations of Marxism, as has a world of theory critiquing it. Interestingly, however, only a 
small number of tourism scholars have centrally engaged Marxism. Bianchi (2009, 2011) is a 
principal figure in this area. His work argues for approaches to tourism studies that are based in 
historical materialism—Marx’s name for his theory of social change— and that “scrutinize the 
logics of state power and the increasingly liberalized modes of capital accumulation in tourism” 
(2009, p. 498). Bianchi criticizes neo-liberalism within the tourism sector, meaning the set of 
policies and ideologies that advance the spread of capitalism around the world today.
Bianchi’s work builds on Britton (1982a, 1991), who is largely regarded as the first 
radical political economic tourism scholar. The 2011 volume edited by Mosedale, entitled 
Political Economy of Tourism: A Critical Perspective, has been described as “an homage 
to .. .Britton, [whose] efforts.. .to locate tourism within the broader context of capitalist 
accumulation.. .[has] had deep and lasting influence” (Mair, 2012, p. 1276). A key take away 
from the radical political economy of tourism is that research focusing solely on the cultural, 
performative, and representative aspects of the tourism encounter—which was a trend in 
anthropological tourism studies that Bianchi (2009) critiqued—is insufficient because it 
overlooks the material foundations of the phenomenon. A radical political economic approach to
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sustainable tourism returns to the Marxist basics of looking at financial flows (money) and 
governance structures (power) and analyzing whether they promote social equity or the 
continued exploitation of labor and land by capitalists. This approach is reinforced by Buscher 
and Fletcher (2016), who describe the capital accumulation of modern tourism as “structural 
violence”.
2.2.4 A Framework for Critical Indigenous Sustainable Tourism
Indigenous tourism under Indigenous control is an admirable achievement. However, 
radical political economy raises questions about the socio-cultural impacts that even this type of 
tourism has on Indigenous communities. Tourism, after all, is fundamentally a market-based, 
commodity-driven activity, subject to the exploitative imperatives of capitalism. Does engaging 
in capitalism transform Indigenous people from communal to selfish? How do Indigenous 
capitalists reconcile their position? Indigenous person and tourism scholar Alexis Bunten pursues 
such questions.
Bunten (2008) argues for the normative acceptability of an Indigenous commodified 
persona within the tourism industry. Her paper responds to the criticism that Indigenous persons 
inevitably compromise their cultural integrity and psychological wellbeing when they work as 
tour guides of their own heritage— a narrative that Bunten shows persists in some circles, both 
Indigenous and academic, but that is ultimately counterproductive to positive change. She writes:
Rather than viewing the Native guide under a rubric of melancholia and seeing
him as powerless to act within the dominant, globalized political economy that
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governs tourism, one can understand the guide as someone who exercises control 
over his self-presentation. (p. 392).
Bunten merges theories about tourism’s discourses and representations with concerns from 
radical political economy about who profits from labor and commodity production. In her vision, 
Indigenous tourism workers can use the tools of representation to achieve economic gains.
Bunten (2010, 2011) examines larger questions about the resilience of Indigenous 
cultures to forces of capitalistic tourism. She presents a vision of how Indigenous people can 
embed capitalist activities in their own values:
We should be paying attention to the ways in which commodifying Indigenous 
resources, including landscapes, foods, stories, songs, dances, and worldviews, 
upholds family values, spiritual beliefs, cultural knowledge, and pride (Bunten,
2010, p. 305).
Bunten provides the framework for analyzing whether Indigenous-controlled tourism is 
successful. That is, by asking whether its political economy supports traditional cultural values, 
as defined internally. Armed with Bunten’s theoretical work on Indigenous capitalism through 
tourism, I turn to the case study, asking: How does tourism in Barrow converge and diverge with 
Inupiaq values and how might this change in the future?
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2.3 Barrow Case Study
2.3.1 Methods
A primarily qualitative mixed-methods approach with three data sources was employed. 
The first source was an intensive two-week period of onsite participatory observation and 
stakeholder interviews in January 2015. During this period, I stayed in local hotels, visited 
Barrow’s tourism attractions, hired local tour guides, and conducted semi-structured interviews 
with key participants in the industry. I traveled through the community exclusively on foot and 
collected observational data through extensive note taking, photography, and by collecting 
tourism-related media, such as informational pamphlets, visitor maps, and advertisement fliers.
Earlier site visits had been conducted in March 2013 and May 2013 to establish contacts 
and collect reconnaissance data, such as the type and location of tourism infrastructure. During 
the main fieldwork period, I asked the contacts to identify interviewees based on a) being 
affiliated with the tourism industry and b) being willing to talk to researchers. Interviews with 
five individuals were audio recorded and transcribed. These interviews were between 37 and 87 
minutes long. Eleven other individuals were interviewed but not recorded because of interviewee 
preference or logistical constraints. Data from the non-recoded interviews were captured through 
note-taking. The non-recorded interviews ranged from short conversation to hour-long 
discussions.
Interviewees included hotel employees of various position, independent tour guides, 
local-government officials, and handicraft artisans. Interviews occurred either at the 
interviewee’s place of employment or in public meeting spaces. Because interviewees had
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different relationships to the tourism industry, different sets of questions were developed for each 
interview. Questions centered around four topics: 1) the facts of tourism in Barrow—Who? 
What? When? And Where?; 2) their perceptions of the current relationship between tourism and 
Indigenous culture in Barrow; 3) how they envision tourism changing over time; and 4) how they 
would like to see tourism develop in Barrow.
Second, data were gathered at a three-day scenario workshop in Barrow during February 
2015. The workshop was part of a National Science Foundation funded project in which my 
research group facilitated over thirty local leaders to envision sustainable healthy communities in 
northern Alaska by the year 2040 (see: iarc.uaf.edu/en/NX2020/current-projects/NASP/). The 
scenarios were holistic in scope and provided important contextual information about culture, 
politics, and power in the region. Tourism related data from the workshop were recorded through 
observational note taking and by photographing the large sheets of butcher paper that 
participants wrote on during certain activities. Workshop participants were surveyed (n = 29) 
about four key questions regarding tourism development in the region: 1) Would they like to see 
more tourism?; 2) Is tourism currently being done in a way that is consistent with Inupiaq 
values?; 3) Could tourism provide good jobs for local residents?; and 4) Could more tourism 
cause problems? Survey responses were recorded with a five-point Likert scale and analyzed 
using descriptive statistics.
Third, internet-based research was conducted to collect quantitative tourism data about 
visitors to Barrow. Internet sources included reports from the Alaska Visitors Statistics Program 
(available through the State of Alaska website), and a study that quantified past and projected 
future enplanements at Barrow’s airport (PDC Inc., 2013). Once all the data were collected, 
triangulation was utilized to compare the multiple sources (i.e., notes, photographs, and tourism
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media from the field; interview transcripts; notes and photographs from the workshops; 
workshop survey data; and internet data). Through systematic comparison, emergent themes 
were identified about tourism in Barrow today, the relationship between tourism and Inupiaq 
values, how tourism might change in the future, and what local stakeholders would like to see 
done. Each theme is discussed in turn in the Findings and Discussion section below.
Additional fieldwork during the summer—which is the height of tourism season—would 
be beneficial to further test the findings discussed below and for developing a more highly 
nuanced understanding of the complex power dynamics that underline the community’s decision 
making processes around tourism. Nonetheless the methods outlined above provide sufficient 
data to describe Barrow’s tourism industry and adequately address the key research question in a 
meaningful manner.
2.3.2 Findings and Discussion
2.3.2.1 Inupiaq Values
The first step in analyzing the convergences and divergences between tourism and 
Inupiaq values in Barrow is to establish what is meant by Inupiaq values. Inupiaq values are 
codified and appear as written lists. Participants at the workshop explained that the purpose of 
creating these lists is to establish and promote a common set of historically-rooted cultural values 
that are central to Inupiat identities. Lists are constructed by different community groups, usually 
through deliberative discussion, and vary slightly from one another. Moreover, the values are 
somewhat flexible in terms of interpretation. Nonetheless, different lists present the same general
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themes and have been integrated into the mission and statements of Inupiaq organization— such 
as the regional and village corporations— and are widely available online to the public. For the 
purposes of this article, I draw on the 12 core values utilized by NSB, as this is a manageable list 
that is posted in many public spaces throughout Barrow (Table 2.1). Inupiaq values are generally 
community-oriented and differ significantly from the individualistic, hyper-rational, and 
ceaselessly ambitious values of capitalism, which makes it somewhat surprising that local 
Indigenous leadership has expressed the desire to increase tourism -  a capitalistic phenomenon.
During the workshop, participants were asked to identify and rank factors that affected 
the health and sustainability of their communities by allocating ten small round stickers to pieces 
of paper displaying different options. From a grouping of 46 wide-ranging factors, Inupiaq 
Values and Transmission and Recognition of Traditional Knowledge were voted to the top by a 
wide margin. This result, as well as the discussions that took place about these factors, suggests a 
widespread and explicit agreement that the maintenance and practice of these values are essential 
to the wellbeing of communities in northern Alaska, including Barrow.
2.3.2.2 Tourism in Barrow
The second step in analyzing the convergences and divergences between tourism and 
Inupiaq values in Barrow is to understand what tourism currently entails. Quantifying tourism in 
Barrow is an inexact science. The State of Alaska conducts regular surveys of visitors to the 
state, which are somewhat helpful in building a picture of Barrow’s tourism. During the 12 
month period from October 2013 to September 2014, total visitor spending in the state was 
estimated at $1.83 billion, with around 1% (or $25 million with rounding) taking place in the Far
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North—a vast area encompassing Barrow and numerous other small rural communities 
(McDowell Group, 2015). Similarly, total visitor industry-related employment in Alaska was 
estimated at 38,700 jobs with around 1% (or 300 jobs with rounding) being contributed in the 
Far North (McDowell Group, 2015).
Visitor volume in Alaska has hovered just below 2 million visitors per year in the recent 
past (McDowell Group, 2015) and, while the number for the Far North is not provided, it could 
be estimated at 1% (or around 20,000 visitors per year) based on the estimates of other metrics. 
This estimate is not unreasonable given enplanement data from Barrow’s airport. Enplanement 
numbers have shown a steady increase from just over 35,000 individuals in 2003 to nearly 
45,000 enplanements in 2012 (PDC Inc., 2013). Enplanements include both visitors and local 
residents traveling through the airport. Barrow is not accessible by land (except via ice-road and 
snow machine in the winter) but multiple interviewees explained that visitors are increasingly 
arriving via ship. While numerical estimates are not available for ship-borne visitors, interview 
and internet data reveal multiple incidents every summer of both large cruise ships and small 
private vessels making port calls in Barrow, although the total number of ship-borne visitors is 
perhaps two orders of magnitude less than those traveling by air. A local government official 
reported, “We do get tourism ships up here.. .seven are so far scheduled to come to Barrow this 
summer.” Clearly, there are significant numbers of visitors coming and going on a regular basis.
Interview and observational data reveal that the attractions drawing tourists to Barrow are 
many and span the categories of nature/geographic tourism, Indigenous-cultural tourism, and 
western-historical tourism (Table 2.2). Birding is a major draw, as a hotel employee emphasized, 
“We have a lot of birding groups, a lot of birders!” Motorized terrestrial tours are offered by 
independent operators and by one hotel, and are generally marketed as either ‘comprehensive
69
tours’ or ‘wildlife photography tours’. The handicraft industry is well developed, with artisans 
selling their wares at multiple locations and, as one hotel employee mentioned, through social 
media. There are tour businesses located in the southern portion of Alaska (in the cities of 
Fairbanks and Anchorage) that run tours to Barrow. Built photo opportunities include a sign 
reading ‘Welcome to Barrow, Top of the World’, a whalebone arch with traditional whaling 
boats, and a memorial for American humorist Will Rogers and his pilot Wiley Post, whose small 
aircraft crashed in Barrow in 1935. Barrow currently has three hotels, with a total of 105 rooms. 
Other tourism-related infrastructure includes six restaurants, three grocery stores, a furrier that 
sells souvenirs, a post office, a hospital, a bank, abundant taxis, and one espresso shop. 
Quantifying the number of visitors and their motivations more closely is an important area for 
future research that would provide currently-lacking baseline data.
2.3.2.3 Spaces of Confluence and Divergence
The largest hotel in Barrow is the Top of the World Hotel— a newly constructed, 70 room 
facility, owned and operated by ASRC. The hotel supports Inupiaq values in two key ways. First, 
because ASRC is a Native corporation, the profits derived from the operation of the hotel are 
redistributed to Inupiat via their status as corporate shareholders. It stands to reason that this 
income source helps Native individuals finance cultural activities, such as subsistence, which 
require the use of money to buy supplies (see Nuttall et al., 2009, for an authoritative discussion 
of Arctic mixed economies). Through this redistribution of surplus value, Barrow has managed 
to avoid major drawbacks of tourism development that Bianchi (2009, 2011) and Britton (1982a, 
1991) warned about—the extraction of profits by outside interests. This hotel is unquestionably
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not a foreign chain dropping into an exotic destination to maximize profits. With much of the 
profit going directly back to community residents, I contend that the largest hotel in Barrow is 
more like a social cooperative than a conventional private corporation.
Second, Top of the World Hotel has taken extensive steps to promote education about 
Inupiaq culture. A non-Inupiaq hotel employee explained, “One of the values that is really 
prevalent up here is the sharing, the generosity, the authenticity. They share their culture.” The 
hotel’s efforts include: offering a van tour of Barrow with an Inupiaq guide; giving its restaurant 
an Inupiaq name (Niggivikput, meaning our place to eat); having a section in its visitors’ guide 
called ‘Our Alaska Native Heritage’; collaborating with Inupiaq dancers to support paid 
performances for guests; and implementing a photographic story telling strategy in the hotel. The 
common spaces of the hotel are adorned with photographic collages of Inupiat performing 
cultural activities (Figure 2.1). The collages overlap historic and contemporary photos to 
communicate that the Inupiat identity is rooted in the past but firmly established in the present as 
well, I was told. These type of tourism activities are examples of ways that Barrow’s Inupiat 
control their Indigenous commodified persona, to invoke Bunten’s concept (2008).
The capacity of the Barrow’s Inupiat to control their own cultural representation within 
tourism is further evidenced by the Inupiat Heritage Center, a museum and community center 
funded by NSB. The main exhibit is called ‘The People of Whaling’, and presents material 
artifacts from historic and contemporary Inupiat life, which range from a sealskin whaling boat 
to a mesh basketball jersey (Barrow’s high school mascot is the Whalers). The museum explains 
each of the 12 core Inupiaq values and includes a life-size replica of a bowhead whale.
Additional museum themes include the diversity of local wildlife, the Inupiat struggle for self­
governance, the importance of elders, and promotion of traditional handicrafts— all themes that
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resonate with specific Inupiaq values. It is my interpretation that the museum is an example of 
Indigenous capitalism (i.e., NSB’s taxation of oil and gas infrastructure) being channeled into the 
promotion of cultural values through the education of visitors.
Cultural festivals constitute another space of confluence between Indigenous values and 
capitalism through tourism, as evidenced by tourism media and interviews. The official visitor’s 
guide to Barrow— a map and informational brochure available for free throughout the 
community—encourages visitors to attend three different festivals throughout the year, including 
Nalukataq in in June, which marks the end of spring whaling with food sharing and a blanket 
toss. A hotel employee explained that, “Nalukataq is open to the community and [the organizers 
are] very generous. In fact, they encourage me to bring our tourists.” She suggested that the 
festivals provide opportunities to showoff aspects of Indigenous culture that bring pride. This 
suggests that Inupiaq festivals have retained their cultural authenticity, while simultaneously 
serving as tourism attractions. Capitalism has not turned them into reified commodities, which 
corresponds with previous literature on the subject (e.g., Cohen, 1988).
Handicrafts are a key feature in some definitions of Indigenous tourism (Smith, Butler, & 
Hinch, 1996) and are prevalent in Barrow. The Inupiat Heritage Center contains a handicraft 
workshop and provides community members with equipment to fashion their items. Handicrafts 
are sold directly from the workshop by the artisans, and also at other locations around town. 
Handicrafts are primarily made from animal parts (e.g., whale baleen, walrus ivory, fur) that the 
artisans collect or purchase from Native hunters. The handicraft market within Barrow provides 
an opportunity for direct transfer of cash from visitors to artisans, and is open to any Native 
person wishing to participate, I was told. The handicraft trade allows an opportunity for self­
employment, which counteracts the tendency within capitalistic tourism of employee
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exploitation by the owning class (Bianchi, 2009, 2011; Britton, 1982a, 1991). In interviews, 
artisans spoke frequently of learning their craft from their elders. In this way, tourism-supported 
handicrafts enhance the transmission of cultural knowledge.
However, the number of jobs provided for Inupiat through Barrow’s tourism industry is 
miniscule compared to the number of jobs offered by the main employers—local government 
and Native corporations. As a government official put it, “No one needs to do tourism.” 
Moreover, tourism-related employment and other financial benefits are split between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous persons (such as taxi drivers that also serve as tour guides and the owners of 
non-Native hotels and retreatants). Research suggests that non-Indigenous tourism entrepreneurs 
in Barrow can create resentment among Native residents, and therefore mark a key space of 
divergence between capitalism and Inupiaq values.
While some Indigenous leaders expressed ambivalence towards tourists, viewing them as 
slightly annoying but tolerable due to their limited numbers, others expressed frustration about 
tour companies based outside of Barrow bringing people into town, utilizing the community’s 
resources, and leaving quickly, without benefits flowing to Native stakeholders. “It’s not a great 
advantage financially to have people come up in the morning and leave in the afternoon,” 
suggested an interviewee. Other concerns expressed by interviewees included non-guided 
tourists violating residents’ privacy (e.g., by peeking through windows). Instances such as these 
show how the profit-seeking imperative of the global tourism system conflicts with Inupiaq 
values in as far as it drives external entrepreneurs to capitalize on the resources that Indigenous 
residents view as their own—wildlife, infrastructure, public space—thereby causing community 
tension and unease.
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The most important space of divergence between capitalism and Inupiaq values within 
the tourism sector is the potentially conflicting relationship with subsistence hunting, fishing and 
whaling, which Inupiat identify as the cornerstone of their culture (NSB, 2014). One interviewee 
related a story about Duck Camp— a road-accessible area outside of Barrow where Inupiat stay 
in hunting cabins to harvest migratory fowl with shotguns. This location is also one of the best 
places for birding tourists to see the avian species they have traveled long distances to check-off 
their viewing lists. Birders have been brought to tears, I was told, as they watched certain species 
blown from the sky for traditional Indigenous uses. One Inupiaq woman lamented that when 
tourists come to subsistence spaces, “They act like they own the place.” Inupiat have fought long 
legal battles to maintain their traditional subsistence harvest, often against misguided 
conservationists. The ability to draw subsistence directly from the environment through one’s 
own labor (to control the means of production) is a significant alternative to capitalism, but 
negative attention brought to such activities—like that potentially generated by disgruntled 
tourists— could pose a threat to these rights.
In this line of reasoning, one Indigenous guide explained that he would never consider 
developing tours that revolved around subsistence activities, since subsistence rights are 
politically contingent. It is too important, in other words, to mix-up with tourism. Also, while 
Inupiat might work in tourism, they tend to prioritize their time for subsistence hunting. A self­
employed Inupiat tour guide explained:
Being the only guide for my company, I didn’t have any time to go out hunting, I 
only went out once the whole summer because I was so busy.. .because there were 
so many tourists coming up here. It can interfere.
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While the guide quoted above is resistant to mixing tourism and subsistence, other local tourism 
entrepreneurs are eager to do exactly that, under the belief that exposing tourists to traditional 
hunting, fishing, and gathering activities will actually help to build allies (rather than enemies) in 
the struggle to maintain subsistence rights.
This viewpoint corresponds with studies from Arctic Canada that portray the political and 
economic benefits associated with Indigenous subsistence tourism (Notzke, 1999; Turner et al., 
2012). A local government official described his vision:
They would bring small groups of tourists up to spend a week to ten days at a 
traditional subsistence hunting camp.. .the way we’ve done it for thousands of 
years.. .we’ve got a handful [of hunters] that are willing to do that.
Within Barrow, attitudes towards subsistence-based tourism, and tourism development 
more broadly, are heterogeneous. Out of the 29 community leaders surveyed at the workshop, six 
disagreed and one strongly disagreed that tourism is being done in a way that is consistent with 
Inupiaq values. Similarly, seven agreed and four strongly agreed that more tourism would cause 
problems in the community. While this is a minority of a non-representative sample, it, along 
with the interview data presented above, suggests that there is reason to be concerned about the 
divergences between tourism and Inupiaq values now and in the future.
Barrow’s Inupiat have a strong vision for perpetuating their values, hard-won land rights, 
and a long history of successfully engaging in capitalism through other avenues than tourism 
(e.g., through oil and gas development and, before that, interactions with Yankee whalers and
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Russian fur traders). These three traits, combined with a buffering from mass tourism created by 
geographic distance and environmental conditions, has allowed tourism to develop in Barrow in 
a relatively benign manner to date, I argue. It makes sense, then, that the Indigenous leadership 
of the community is seeking more tourism development, even if there are mixed feelings about it 
in the community.
2.3.2.4 Future Considerations
Barrow’s tourism industry exists in a context of broader pan-Arctic change. Related to 
the projected changes of environmental warming and increased industrial activity, is an 
expectation of more arctic tourism— especially marine-based tourism (Fay & Karlsdottir, 2011; 
Hall & Saarinen, 2010; Maher et al., 2014; Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
[PAME], 2009). Given this projection, along with Barrow’s expressed desire to expand its 
tourism activities, it is important to ask: How can the drawbacks of tourism in Barrow (e.g., 
external profiteers, tourism/subsistence conflict) be minimized and the benefits (e.g., Indigenous 
revenue, cultural empowerment) be maximized? While a clear community consensus in terms of 
visions for future development was not identified, a set of ideas emerged that may be useful for 
planning.
One of the keys to advancing sustainable Indigenous tourism development in Barrow 
appears to be the expansion of Inupiat capacity for, and interest in, working in tourism. One 
interviewee emphasized that training to work as a tour guide is largely an on-the-job occurrence. 
Thus, opportunities for tourism apprenticeships might be effective for getting more Inupiat 
involved, he suggested (see Weiler & Ham, 2002). From the workshop survey, 12 of 29 local
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leaders strongly agreed that tourism could provide good jobs for local residents (while six 
strongly disagreed and eight felt neutral). One hotel employee explained, “W e’ve had a handful 
of the students from the high school do on the job training here.” Training could also occur 
through Ilisagvik College, a tribal two-year institution located in Barrow. The college offers 
vocational training in other fields, but lacks specific options for individuals interested in pursuing 
tourism and hospitality training. In addition to workforce training, local leaders expressed a need 
for a designated tourism-promotion entity within local government, which could coordinate local 
efforts and advertise Barrow as a destination. Having Inupiat in these key positions, or non- 
Inupiat who adequately comprehend Inupiaq values, would help assure that training and 
advertising were done in a culturally beneficial manner and avoided exploiting the labor force.
Cruise ships are a central topic for the future, as the projected increase in tourism is 
expected to be mostly marine based (PAME, 2009). Management of cruise tourists, I was told, 
currently takes place largely by accident. Large ships carrying hundreds of passengers anchor 
offshore and ferry guests into Barrow on small boats. Cruisers spend the day wandering around 
town attempting to participate in tourist activities (eating, shopping, exploring, and taking 
photographs) in a largely uncoordinated and self-led manner. However, things are starting to 
change. One government official informed me, “Whoever is on these cruise ships, that’s not a 
cheap ticket.. .We [get] nothing from it financially, but I ’ve been.. .thinking about what a fair 
price would be for coming into town. Twenty, thirty bucks.. .[a] landing fee or something like 
that.” There is an opportunity here for increased local revenue, through both the implementation 
of a landing fee and the development of associated businesses, that would correspond with the 
vision laid out in Barrow’s comprehensive plan.
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A local government official offered a vision for attracting higher-end, longer-stay 
clientele. His goal is to enhance Barrow’s global social capital by offering curated tours that 
emphasize Barrow’s unique historic and Arctic qualities, with educated guides who can, “Tell 
them the story behind the story, and the story behind that, [to] add some time depth to what 
they’re seeing at the moment.” The interviewee worries that Barrow’s appearance, with broken 
down vehicles and abandoned buildings, may give visitors less-than-favorable interpretations of 
its residents. Helping visitors appreciate Barrow requires an educational element that addresses 
processes colonialism, Indigenous social-ecological adaptation, and the complexities of living 
above the Arctic Circle, he stated. This type of tourism, according to the interviewee, could help 
Barrow’s residents— especially its youth— see more clearly the value in their own cultural 
traditions by having visitors reflect back an appreciation for it.
These discussions beg a more general question about Barrow’s tourism carrying capacity 
and about how many tourists might be too many. A local government official explained, “UIC 
Village Corporation.. .is .. .planning to build a new hotel.. .and it’s going to have more rooms 
than Top of the World.” While Barrow may be a long way away from reaching its maximum 
tourist threshold, identifying what that point is now is highly advised. However, as one 
government official stated, “Mass tourism could be an issue, but people here are not slow to 
resolve problems.” Moreover, it appears likely that future tourism development will occur 
largely under Inupiat control, as coordination among Inupiaq organizations in the region is on the 
rise. An interviewee described the recent creation of The Voice of the Arctic Inupiat, a non-profit 
organization comprised of 27 Native entities for the expressed purpose of representing 
Indigenous perspectives at federal and international forums. Local determination, however, will
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continue to be counterbalanced by the forces of global capitalism, including the tendencies of 
external entities to exploit Barrow’s tourism resources.
Theorists of globalization have linked the presence of multinational corporations (MNCs) 
to certain impacts on host regions -  including both advantages and disadvantages. MacKinnon 
and Cumbers (2011) identify the following potential disadvantages: development increasingly 
dependent on foreign control; economy linked to narrow development trajectory; 
disruption/destruction of local culture/society; and jobs often low skilled and routine. Tourism 
MNCs -  such as cruise ship companies, international hotel chains, and international tour 
operators -  must be monitored as they expand their ‘production facilities’ within in Barrow. 
Although tourism ‘production facilities’ -  such as landscapes, heritage cites, and cultural 
encounters -  are structurally different than traditional MNC factories and offices, the potential 
for negative impacts on host communities still exists (see Britton, 1982b).
2.4 Conclusion
Bunten’s concept of Indigenous capitalism through tourism (2008, 2010, 2011) and 
Zeppel’s six criteria of Indigenous-controlled tourism (2006) show that Indigenous tourism 
should be considered sustainable when its political economy supports traditional cultural values. 
The benefit of this definition is that it admits that tourism can turn people, places, and nature into 
commodities for market-based consumption, but suggests that this is not necessarily a bad thing 
if the process is Indigenously controlled for Indigenous benefit. When capitalistic tourism is 
thoroughly enmeshed in community-oriented values, its exploitative nature is reduced, social- 
ecological alienation is minimized, and positive change (i.e., sustainable development) can
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occur. Triangulated evidence from fieldwork, workshops, and internet research show this is 
largely the case with tourism in Barrow, Alaska. However, there are important spaces of 
divergence between tourism and Inupiaq values, such as the presence of non-Indigenous tourism 
operators in the community and conflicts between tourism and subsistence. Data show that 
Inupiat have heterogeneous perceptions of current tourism in Barrow and different ideas about 
how it should develop in the future.
While a highly nuanced account of the power dynamics within Barrow around tourism 
decision making is beyond the scope of this article, it is an important area for future research. As 
Zeppel (2006) suggests, Indigenous-controlled tourism, “Typically involves small tourism 
businesses owned by tribes” (p. 9). Interestingly, Barrow’s primary tourism infrastructure is not 
owned by tribes, but rather by Native corporations and the local borough. This may be an 
important distinction given the historic competition for power between different Indigenous 
governing bodies and their beneficiaries within this region. Mason (2002), for example, contends 
that the creation of Native corporations in Alaska led to the emergence of an Indigenous 
bourgeoisie, which might signal the dominance of capitalist values over communal ones. More 
research, however, is needed to determine whether this pertains to tourism in Barrow.
The findings of this study must be considered within the larger context of tourism in 
Alaska. The conflict between tourism and subsistence in Barrow demonstrated in this study 
mirrors findings from other parts of the state. Cerveny (2004, 2007) provides rich ethnographic 
studies of socio-cultural impacts caused by increasing cruise tourism in southeast Alaska, 
emphasizing the need to coordinate tourism planning among different scales of government. The 
State of Alaska pushes hard for expanding tourism, she demonstrates, but this does not always 
correspond with the desires of particular communities. Moreover, Robards and Lovecraft (2010)
80
show that Indigenous commodification of handicrafts in Alaska is actually limited by laws 
created at the federal level, demonstrating a need for further research on local tourism and cross­
scale governance. In Barrow, the socio-cultural impacts of tourism have been smaller than in 
Cervery’s studies because there are significantly fewer tourists. However, Barrow, and other 
communities in northern Alaska may have important lessons to learn from southeast Alaska as 
the US Arctic becomes increasingly accessible to cruise ship consumers. Barrow will need to 
proactively manage future tourism development to assure that visitor numbers and activities 
remain under local control and do not create inordinate impacts on Inupiaq ways of life. The 
many heterogeneous voices in the community—of which this study has presents a few—must be 
respected. And they may benefit from learning more about how other Indigenous communities 
are working to secure their cultural values through tourism (see for example the issues 
surrounding tourism and Indigenous languages in Whitney-Squire, 2016).
On the theoretical side, this study demonstrates that radical political economy, channeled 
through the lens of Indigenous tourism, can make a contribution to the field of sustainable 
tourism studies proper. Sustainable tourism studies has been hesitant to engage radical political 
economy, I suggest, because its parent-paradigm of sustainable development is based on the 
principles of neoliberal capitalism, preventing it from mixing well with Marxism. But cases like 
Barrow (and this will be to the chagrin of hardcore Marxists) show that capitalism and its 
alternatives (e.g., social cooperatives, subsistence, self-employment, cultural empowerment) can 
coexist harmoniously in the same space and time. Through colonial processes of land control, 
Barrow’s Inupiat were essentially forced to adopt capitalism as a means of supporting communal 
Indigenous values. While this is no small task, they have embraced the challenge presented by 
Indigenous capitalism (Figure 2.2) and have been remarkably successful due to their own
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political acumen and strong commitment to communal Inupiaq values. They have been mostly 
successful to date in developing Indigenous sustainable tourism while maintaining what Marxists 
call their communal species being (Peet et al., 2011), in other words.
Within the field of geography, Gibson-Graham drew attention to the condition in which 
capitalism and its alternatives co-exists in their famous work The End o f  Capitalism (as we knew 
it): A Feminist Critique o f  Political Economy. Gibson-Graham writes:
Economic sites that have usually been seen as homogeneously capitalist may be 
re-envisioned as sites of economic difference, where a variety of capitalist and 
non-capitalist class processes interact (p. 18).
Future research in sustainable tourism studies ought to draw on Gibson-Graham and other 
similar theorists to develop new directions of inquiry into non-capitalists economies and their 
relationships with tourism. Indeed, the future of sustainable tourism might lie in understanding 
and promoting not only alternative tourism under a capitalistic model, but methods of organizing 
the production and consumption of tourism’s goods and services that are actually alternative to, 
but coexistent with, capitalism.
While there may be work taking place in this area, it would benefit from greater 
integration with Marxism and its critics. Such a research direction would help overcome the 
shortcomings of conventional capitalist development strategies, which radical political economy 
make so evident but are still prevalent in mainstream sustainable development thinking, while 
not out rightly rejecting the capitalistic realities of the current global system. Bunten’s work on
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Indigenous capitalism though tourism is moving in this direction, as is other tourism research 
(e.g., Weaver, 2013), all of which is promising.
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Table 2.1 This list o f Inupiaq values appears in public spaces around Barrow and has been adopted by Inupiaq organizations.
12 Core Inupiaq Values (Source: NSB, UIC)
Avoidance of Conflict_____________________
Compassion______________________________
Cooperation______________________________
Family and Kinship________________________
Sharing__________________________________
Respect for Nature________________________
Love and Respect of Elder and One Another
Humility_________________________________
Humor___________________________________
Hunting Traditions________________________
Knowledge of Language___________________
Spirituality_______________________________
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Table 2.2 Tourism attractions in Barrow.
General category Specific examples
Nature/geographic tourism
Wildlife viewing and photography (e.g., polar bear, birding)
Aurora Borealis viewing
Arctic Ocean/Arctic Circle/extreme latitude/top of the world
Indigenous-cultural tourism
Public Inupiaq festivals (e.g., spring whaling festival)
Inupiaq Heritage Center
Whale bone arch and archeological sites
Western-historical tourism
Military and scientific sites (e.g., DEW line radar stations)
Wiley Post/Will Rogers airplane-crash memorials
Historic western buildings (e.g., whaling station, church)
93
Figure 2.1 An example o f the Inupiat photo-collages that adorn the walls o f Top o f the World Hotel.
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Figure 2.2 An A SRC poster displayed at the Inupiat Heritage Center celebrating Indigenous capitalism.
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CHAPTER 3: MAPPING INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE US ARCTIC TO 
SUPPORT COMMUNITY WELLBEING 1
Abstract: Over the last decades, economic and political forces from inside and outside of the 
Arctic have driven the construction and expansion of industrial infrastructure—for oil and gas 
production, mining, and commercial transportation—in the US Arctic. While economic 
mechanisms within the state have allowed native corporations, regional boroughs, and certain 
communities to benefit from industrial development, negative environmental and social impacts 
have also been conditions of production. This article reviews the social-ecological context of 
industrial development in the US Arctic and establishes linkages between industrial 
infrastructure and community wellbeing. Linkages are described in terms of benefits and harms 
in the three areas of social, environmental, and economic impacts. Through a novel synthesis 
existing of data, the article demonstrates that industrial development possess the potential to 
continue producing benefits and harms for communities in the US Arctic well into the future. If 
development unfolds in the manner described in official environmental assessments, the footprint 
of physical infrastructure would increase by nearly 50 percent. Quantitative and qualitative 
infrastructure data are presented and mapped for three timeframes (existing, planned, and 
proposed) and for four terrestrial and two marine sub-regions of US Arctic. A regional overview 
is also provided. As the plausible future expansion of industrial infrastructure is significant, so is 
the need to establish political and economic institutions that assure equitable procedural 
processes and distributional outcomes of benefits and harms. This would promote a US Arctic
1 Hillmer-Pegram, K., & Walker, N. Mapping Industrial Infrastructure in the US Arctic to 
Support Community Wellbeing. Prepared for submission in Polar Geography. !
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that is not only economically profitable, but also ecologically sustainable, socially just, and 
focused on the wellbeing of its communities.
Keywords: climate change, extractive industries, Indigenous rights, sustainable development
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 The Social-Ecological Context of Industrial Infrastructure
In this chapter, the term US Arctic indicates a specific region of the state of Alaska and of 
the state and federal waters that lie primarily within the Arctic Circle (66°33' north latitude), but 
that also extend southward along the west coast of Alaska to Norton Sound, and inland in the 
northwest region of the state. The definition of the US Arctic used here is similar to the 
definitions used by international and national scientific entities, such as the Arctic Council’s 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program and the US Arctic Research Commission. Alaska 
constitutes the entire geographic extent of the US in the Arctic. In terms of the natural 
environment, the US Arctic is made up of multiple ecoregions, or “large areas of land and waters 
containing vegetation communities that share species and ecological dynamics, environmental 
conditions, and interactions” (Alaska Department of Fish and Game [ADFG], 2006, p. 26). 
Ecoregions in the US Arctic range from Polar Arctic Tundra in the far north, to Subarctic Tundra 
in the coastal west, to Boreal Forest in the interior areas of the region. The marine ecosystems of 
the Beaufort Sea, Chukchi Sea, and Bering Strait are also part of the US Arctic as defined here. 
Many regional ecosystems are in relatively pristine condition compared to other parts of the 
world, partly because industrial human activities in the Arctic have been historically restricted by 
harsh environmental conditions.
99
Non-industrial human settlements in the US Arctic can be conceptualized as a smattering 
of small hardy communities, or villages, in a vast and sparsely developed environment.2 The 
location of the communities today was influenced by the US government’s forced settlement 
policies of the early 20th century, which attempted to settle Indigenous populations that were 
largely migratory at permanent sites. The US Arctic is the homeland of multiple Alaska Native 
peoples, including speakers of the Koyukon, Tanana, and Gwich’in languages in the interior 
areas of the region, speakers of Inupiaq in the coastal and northern areas, and speakers of two 
types of Yupik in the Bering Strait area (Holton, 2014). The four census areas that are fully or 
partially within the US Arctic are home to over 30,000 people (US Census Bureau, 2013) 
distributed between 36 communities. The Alaska Native population of the four census areas 
ranges between 53% and 80% (US Census Bureau, 2013).
To varying degrees, these communities continue to draw portions of their livelihoods 
directly from local ecosystems, are largely dependent on imported fuels for energy, and strive to 
balance traditional cultural values with what is commonly referred to as modernization. A 2013 
federal report explains that:
Reliance on subsistence approaches—hunting, fishing, and gathering of plants—is 
widespread in the US Arctic. Subsistence harvesting is not simply about calories 
and nutrition; it is culturally significant for Alaska Natives and other rural 
residents (Clement, Bengtson, & Kelly, 2013, p. 14).
2While it is imperative to avoid essentializing small arctic communities as overly ‘local’, ‘rural’, 
or ‘native’ since they are actually demographically heterogeneous and modern in many ways 
(Cameron, 2012), some general description of the communities is helpful for unfamiliar readers.
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In addition to the resources acquired through subsistence activities, residents of the US Arctic 
also depend on the regional commercial economy for financial resources. In fact, money is 
required to conduct subsistence activities because of the need to purchase, maintain, and fuel 
expensive equipment, such as four-wheelers and snow machines (Brinkman et al., 2014).
Modern hunting rifles and ammunition are another substantial expense associated with 
subsistence.
Industrialized natural resource extraction, mainly for out-of-state markets, is the main 
source of activity for the US Arctic’s commercial economy. The report cited above explains:
Revenue, employment, and personal income from .. .industrial activities can 
improve the quality of life for local residents and support the ability of state and 
local governments to provide public services to communities (Clement et al.,
2013, p. 15).
Striking a sustainable balance between subsistence-based life-ways and the industrial 
economy has been identified as a key goal for future planning in the US Arctic (Clement 
et al., 2013). However, regional stakeholders have differing opinions about how to 
achieve a sustainable balance and how to define that term. Clement et al. (2013) identify 
six key stakeholder categories in the US Arctic (Table 3.1); within these categories, 
stakeholder opinions “reveal examples of both convergent and divergent views” (Clement 
et al. 2013, p. 34), about what the future of the region should look like.
Moreover, there is concern throughout the Arctic about which stakeholders have power 
over development processes and which are marginalized (e.g., Young, 2012). Negotiations about
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whether and how to pursue additional industrial development in the US Arctic, and about how to 
distribute the risks and benefits between stakeholders are ongoing and can be observed in 
government offices, community centers, and courtrooms across the region. These negotiations 
are taking place in an atmosphere marked by rapid arctic change, both environmentally and 
socially.3 Clement et al. (2013) provides a succinct summary of Arctic change:
The US Arctic is experiencing rapid, sustained change, and those changes are 
expected to continue into the coming decades due to climate change, resource 
extraction, and increasing human activities. Terrestrial, freshwater, and marine 
ecosystems as well as broader environmental, cultural, and economic trends in the 
Arctic will be affected (p. 8).
When these changes are considered alongside the sometimes divergent opinions of stakeholders 
in the US Arctic, the need for an approach to industrial development that focuses on community 
wellbeing becomes apparent. Without it, a sustainable balance between subsistence-based life- 
ways and the regional commercial economy marked by industrial activity may not be achieved.
3.1.2 Linkages between Industrial Infrastructure and Community Wellbeing
Oil and gas activities negatively impact the environment in numerous ways (National 
Research Council [NRC], 2003). Major environmental impact vectors from terrestrial and marine 
activities include:
3 For a more in-depth discussion of Arctic change than is possible here, see e.g., Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment [ACIA], 2004 and Larsen et al., 2014.
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• expulsion of waste materials into the environment during well drilling
• industrial air pollution during all phases of development and operations
• release of environmental toxins from oil spills and leaks
• vegetation destruction from infrastructure
• permanent fragmentation of animal habitat by infrastructure
• disruption of animal behavior during all phases of development and operations (including 
acoustic pollution during seismic exploration)
Scientific studies have been documenting the environmental impacts of oil and gas 
activities in the US Arctic for decades, especially on caribou— a keystone species in the 
ecosystem and a primary subsistence species. Murphy and Curatolo (1987) show that oil and gas 
infrastructure in northern Alaska, especially roads with traffic, significantly alters the activity 
patterns of caribou, causing them increased energetic stress. Similar findings were reported by 
Dyer, O’Neill, Wasel, and Boutin (2001), who document caribou avoidance distance of up to 
1000 m for industrial infrastructure in northern Canada. The presence of oil and gas 
infrastructure is also known to negatively influence the reproductive success of some nesting 
birds on the central Arctic slope (Liebezeit et al., 2009).
Walker et al. (1987) demonstrated that the total vegetative area disturbed by oil and gas 
activities far exceeds the physical footprint of the infrastructure because of the delayed reactions 
from the natural environment and because of cumulative impacts, or the fact that the aggregate 
whole of various impacts is greater than the sum of its individual parts. Cumulative impacts were 
also reported by Nellemann and Cameron (1998), who found that caribou calves and females 
were more prone to avoiding infrastructure than were adult males in the Prudhoe Bay area.
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Oil and gas activities are also known to impact the marine environment. Reeves, 
Ljungblad, and Clarke (1984) highlight the need to prevent the disruption of migrating bowhead 
whales in the Beaufort Sea that is caused by acoustic seismic surveys. This need is also 
addressed by Moore et al. (2012), who argue for a cumulative impact approach to assessing the 
detrimental effects of acoustic surveys in the Arctic; an approach based on aggregate sounds 
fields and acoustic habitats rather than on isolated activities, as is the current norm for the survey 
permitting process.
In addition to noise pollution, Alter, Simmonds, and Brandon (2010) identify ship strikes 
of whales as a major environmental impact caused by increased industrial activity in marine 
environments, including the expansion of oil and gas activities in the Arctic. Grant and Briggs 
(2002) showed that the large piles of toxic drill cuttings lying beneath many North Sea oil and 
gas platforms cause appreciable ecological damage to benthic communities. Assessments of the 
environmental impacts from the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico can give an 
impression of what a similar catastrophic disaster could mean for Arctic Alaska. Williams et al. 
(2011), for example, contend that the cetacean mortalities directly attributed to the spill could be 
up to 50 times greater than the observed number of carcasses, which would bump the number 
from 101 to 5,050.
Oil and gas activities in the US Arctic do not impact only the environment but also the 
thousands of people who live near oil and gas infrastructure. As of 2010, Alaska’s North Slope 
Borough, which almost covers the entire study area, was home to nearly 8,000 people in eight 
Native villages, with over 76% of the population being Alaska Native (Shepro, Maas, Callaway, 
McAnich, & Bergerson, 2010). The ability to draw resources from the natural environment plays 
an important role in the physical and mental health of many villages today (Kruse, 1991). Some
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villages acquire up to 50% of their caloric intake from subsistence (ADFG, 2000). The impacts 
of oil and gas activities on the US Arctic’s environment translate into social impacts through the 
disturbance of the animal and plant species that underpin subsistence.
In addition to the disturbance of subsistence species, the social impacts of oil and gas 
activities are experienced through other vectors. For example, Wernham (2007) interviews 
Alaska Natives who live inside the boundaries of NPR-A to explore the likely impacts of 
expanded oil and gas infrastructure on their health. The findings (Table 3.2) underscore the 
connections between the social impacts that government agencies such as the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) predicts will accompany expanded oil and gas infrastructure (columns 1-5) 
and additional health impacts that governmental impact statements have largely failed to 
recognize because they are less direct (column 6).
Some of the social impacts of oil and gas development in the US Arctic, however, are 
positive. Namely, oil and gas development is the main source of revenue for the North Slope 
Borough and this income allows for the provision of many important social services in the region 
(Shepro et al., 2010). The Borough gains revenue predominately through the taxes and levies that 
it places on oil and gas companies, and not though the employment of Alaska Natives. Only 20 
out of several thousand oil and gas industry employees on the North Slope were residents of the 
North Slope Borough in 2010, however (Shepro et al., 2010).
Scientific studies documenting the psychological impacts to Native Alaskans of the 1989 
Exxon Valdez oil spill are indicative of the potential social impacts of a major oil and gas 
disaster in Arctic Alaska’s OCS. Dyer (1993), for example, shows that the oil spill and 
subsequent cleanup efforts disrupted communal control of local natural resources and lead to 
reported declines of subsistence activities, sharing, and social support networks (amounting to
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what the author calls tradition loss). Palinkas, Downs, Petterson, & Russell (1993) demonstrates 
that exposure to the oil spill event was incrementally correlated with increased levels of 
depression in Alaska Natives and that the effects were stronger in Natives than in non-natives, 
indicating a cultural sensitivity to such industrial exposure.
But how do these impacts connect to community wellbeing specifically? Wellbeing is a 
notoriously difficult and contentious concept to define. However, for the purposes of this article, 
the definition used by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) is considered sufficient. 
The MEA holds that individual wellbeing consists of levels of security, basic materials, health, 
and social relations that combine to give people freedom of choice and action in terms of what 
they value doing and being (MEA, 2005). This definition of individual wellbeing can be scaled- 
up to the community level to suggest that a community possesses wellbeing when it can 
determine its own fate and its residents are safe, healthy, and relatively happy. Past actions 
imposed on communities in the US Arctic— such as forced settlement, mandatory Western 
schooling, and Christian missionization— can be interpreted as having decreased community 
wellbeing in several ways. Communities had their freedom of choice in what they value doing 
and being taken away, sometimes violently, by more powerful external organizations with 
opposing agendas. While the struggles of communities to regain control over their own fates 
have been successful to a significant degree, certain colonial legacies persist today as 
unavoidable daily realities. It is in this post-colonial context where the influence of industrial 
infrastructure on community wellbeing must be considered.
Industrial infrastructure in the US Arctic, in a strict sense, consists of human-made 
structures that support the production and consumption of natural resources (e.g., roads, 
pipelines, ports, airstrips, wells, buildings). In a more general sense, however, a single piece of
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physical infrastructure on the land or in the sea indicates a significant series of actions that 
proceeded the construction of the given structure, and other actions that will come later in time.
A drill platform, for example, indicates that industrial exploration was carried out in that location 
and that the findings indicated acceptable profit potential for the entities that constructed the 
infrastructure. Also, the permitting phases of construction (including baseline studies of 
ecological and social impacts) were carried out successfully, as were process of public input and 
political deliberations. Construction, which includes numerous vehicular trips for the 
transportation of materials and workers, occurred as well. Thinking of the future, the drill 
platform will have a limited lifespan, the length of which is determined by the characteristics of 
the resources it is accessing, and will then require a series of reclamation activities.
When assessing the influence of industrial infrastructure on community wellbeing, the 
entire timeline of activities (past, present, and future) indicated by the presence of a structure 
must be considered. Taking this into account and integrating it with the insights of the studies 
cited at the beginning of this section, it becomes possible to establish key examples of social, 
environmental, and economic benefits and harms of industrial infrastructure to communities 
(Table 3.3). In the sections that follow, existing, planned, and proposed infrastructure in the US 
Arctic is presented and then, in the conclusion, suggestions for maximizing the benefits of 
potential future infrastructure and minimizing the harms for communities are offered.
3.2 Methods
In order to inform the discussion about integrated planning of industrial development in 
the US Arctic, it is necessary to construct a comprehensive, nuanced, and (where possible)
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quantified picture of what exists and what may plausibly occur. To achieve this goal, the authors 
examined relevant documents and extracted pertinent data about industrial activities by adapting 
tables, text, and maps from the original sources cited throughout this article. Whenever possible, 
government planning documents— such as environmental impact statements, development 
permits, and other official reports—were used, as these sources are the most impartial and widely 
accepted quantifications and qualitative descriptions of industrial infrastructure and operations 
that are publicly available. Research was carried out in 2013-2014 and then updated in late 2015.
Until now the quantification of existing, planned, and proposed infrastructure in the US 
Arctic was largely piecemeal. To bridge the gaps in the existing data and build a regional 
synthesis, other sources were utilized when needed (e.g., the 2003 NRC report). Extensive efforts 
were taken to ensure the validity of all the sources used, including cross-referencing with other 
sources and expert consultation. In addition to the citation of all sources, explanations of the data 
presented in this article are provided as needed in the main text.
Many of the source documents synthesized here present different types of infrastructure 
and operations (e.g., number of gravel pads versus number of facilities) and use different units of 
accounting (e.g., miles of pipeline corridor versus total acreage disturbed by pipeline) because of 
the requirements of different regulatory agencies and the methods of previous studies. While this 
can complicate comparisons among sub-regions and time frames, the synthesis section provides 
data in a more comparable format. All maps were made using a combination of publicly 
available data layers, geo-referenced data layers that were created specifically for this project 
from official sources, and the data holdings of Audubon Alaska.
The decision to divide the data into sub-regions before synthesis was made because 
existing accounting has largely been done in accordance with these smaller political boundaries.
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The sub-regions used are: Central North Slope and state waters; National Petroleum Reserve- 
Alaska; Chukchi Sea Outer Continental Shelf; Beaufort Sea Outer Continental Shelf; Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge; and Northwest Coastal and Interior Alaska (Figure 3.1).
3.2.1 Definition of Key Terms
This study uses industrial and commercial interchangeably to reference natural resource 
extraction that is primarily oriented toward exporting resources out of the US Arctic. 
Infrastructure is used to describe human-made structures that appear in the landscapes and 
seascapes of the US Arctic and stem from oil and gas or other industrial activities. Infrastructure 
includes buildings, roads, gravel islands, docks, causeways, airstrips, pipelines, power lines, 
wells, mines, and landfills. As a complement to infrastructure, this study uses operations to 
describe the industrial human activities that commonly accompany the construction and use of 
oil and gas and other industrial infrastructure, such as the trips made by trucks, tundra vehicles, 
fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and various types of ships.
Commercial transportation comprises two areas of content. The first is the movement of 
natural resources for the primary purpose of export to non-regional markets. Examples include 
piping of oil from northern Alaska to ports in the south and potential trucking and shipping of 
coal or minerals from open-pit mines in western Alaska to distant markets. The second content 
area includes major conveyances of goods and materials— as distinct from day-to-day 
operations—that support industrial operations in the US Arctic, as well as maritime traffic that is 
primarily in support of industrial operations and that passes through the waters of the US Arctic.
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This study uses existing infrastructure to mean industrial structures that have already 
been built and operations that have already occurred as of the time of writing. Planned 
infrastructure is a relatively narrow category and describes industrial structures and activities that 
have entered the initial permitting or development phase or are likely to occur within the next 
one to two years, but have not yet been completed. Proposed infrastructure defines those 
industrial structures and activities that neither exist today nor have entered the initial permitting 
phase, but have been quantitatively or qualitatively described in federal or state government 
planning documents and could plausibly occur in the future given current knowledge of 
industrial development trends.
3.3 Industrial Infrastructure in the US Arctic’s Sub-Regions
3.3.1 Central North Slope and State Waters
Private companies began exploring the oil and gas production potential of the US Arctic 
in the early 1920s. The first development to successfully produce commercial quantities of oil in 
the region was at the Central North Slope’s Prudhoe Bay field, which was discovered in 1968 
and went online in 1977 following the completion of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) 
(NRC, 2003) (Figure 3.2).4 The completion of TAPS was a necessary precondition for successful 
production in the region because it allowed for the economically efficient transport of oil from
4 Following the definitions used by the State of Alaska’s Division of Oil and Gas, this article 
uses “field” to describe subterranean accumulations of oil and gas that consist of one or more 
pools, and “Unit” to describe the legally defined oil and gas activity areas that consist of one or 
more fields. Lease tracts and infrastructure and operations occur outside of Units as well as 
within them.
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the far north of the state to the ice-free port of Valdez in the south. Construction of the Dalton 
Highway was another infrastructure project that preceded North Slope oil and gas production.
The highway, completed in 1974, is 414 miles long and runs from the Elliot Highway north of 
Fairbanks to the industrial support center of Deadhorse, adjacent to the Prudhoe Bay field 
(Bureau of Land Management [BLM], 2013a). The Dalton Highway, along with the construction 
of a major jet airport at Deadhorse, provided access to previously remote and roadless portions of 
Alaska and allowed the construction of TAPS and much of the oil and gas infrastructure on the 
North Slope. Oil and gas infrastructure in the Central North Slope and state waters sub-region 
expanded steadily from the initial development at Prudhoe Bay as additional commercially 
viable fields were discovered (Table 3.4).
A 2003 report by the US National Research Council (NRC) quantified infrastructure 
supporting oil and gas production on the North Slope (NRC, 2003). In 2014, the NRC numbers 
were updated to include estimates of North Slope infrastructure as recent as 2011 (Raynolds et 
al., 2014) (Table 3.5). Infrastructure and operations associated with oil and gas activities in the 
Central North Slope and state waters sub-region for projects that have been brought into 
production since 2011 have not been quantified. Nor have data about the exploration activities 
that have occurred in the sub-region been quantified.
The NRC and the follow up study did not tabulate the number of wells that have been 
drilled on the North Slope. However, the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission 
(AOGCC), which maintains the state’s well database, reports that as of March 2011 there were 
6,011 wells on the terrestrial portion of the Central North Slope and 35 wells in state waters 
(Alaska Department of Administration [ADA], 2013). These numbers include all well types 
(e.g., exploration, production, injection).
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In 2012, the US Army Corps of Engineers Alaska District (USACE) completed an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) (USACE, 2012a) and issued an activity permit (USACE, 
2012b) for the development of a planned hydrocarbon production facility at the Point Thomson 
field in the eastern portion of the Central North Slope. Taken together, the EIS and the permit 
present an estimate of some of the infrastructure and operations required for the development and 
production phases of Point Thomson (Table 3.6). Reports in late 2015 indicate that the Point 
Thompson development has nearly reached completion and that the facility will be ready to 
come online in 2016 (Alaska Department of Natural Resources [ADNR], 2013a; DeMarban, 
2015).
There are many ongoing seismic explorations, incremental expansions of existing 
developments, and new developments in satellite areas of currently producing fields planned in 
the Central North Slope. Such relatively small developments and operations are difficult to track 
in detail, in part because they do not trigger major federal impact assessments. A recent North 
Slope Oil and Gas Activity Map (ADNR, 2013b), however, provides some data about such 
planned infrastructure in this sub-region (Table 3.7).
Oil and gas companies recently began exploring the potential of the Central North Slope 
to produce commercially viable oil and gas from formations of subterranean shale rock. 
Producing oil and gas from shale requires different techniques, infrastructure, and operations 
than production from the more conventional oil and gas fields in the Central North Slope. 
Hydraulic fracturing, commonly referred to as “fracking,” is the primary technique for extracting 
oil and gas from shale. If shale production proves viable on the North Slope and fracking 
becomes a common activity in the region, it could trigger an expansion of industrial 
infrastructure and operations. In 2012 the US Geological Survey (USGS) completed an estimate
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of recoverable oil and gas contained in the shale rocks of the Central North Slope and NPR-A 
(USGS, 2012). However, a 2014 article from the oil and gas industry publication Petroleum 
News concludes that “the feasibility of Alaska shale oil development remains an unknown” 
(Bailey, 2014, p. 1).
Since the 1970s, stakeholders such as State of Alaska government agencies, US 
government agencies, and private companies have been proposing development plans to build a 
natural gas pipeline and processing facilities that could bring the North Slope’s gas reserves to 
market in an economically viable manner.5 While nothing has been built to date, the State of 
Alaska’s current administration appears to support the construction of a pipeline (Associated 
Press, 2015). A report from the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Projects Office of the Federal 
Coordinator (OFC) presents the main proposals that have recently emerged for commercializing 
the gas on Alaska’s North Slope (OFC, 2013) (Table 3.8). The infrastructure and operations 
associated with proposed natural gas projects and shale oil and gas activities could fall within the 
boundaries of both the Central North Slope and of other sub-regions of the US Arctic.
3.3.2 National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska
Despite its name, the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NPR-A) has seen relatively 
little oil and gas infrastructure and operations compared to the Central North Slope and state 
waters sub-region (Figure 3.3). AOGCC reports that there were 122 hydrocarbon wells (of all
5 Natural gas must be piped at a low temperature because of its physical properties, while oil 
must be piped at a higher temperature so it flows readily. Thus, the existing TAPS cannot be 
used to transport economically viable quantities of natural gas and a dedicated gas pipeline or 
trucking operation would be required for production (OFC, 2013).
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types combined) in NPR-A as of March 2011 (ADA, 2013). However, BLM reports that 136 test 
holes were drilled in NPR-A before official leasing began in 1982. These older wells are known 
as legacy wells (BLM, 2013b). Aside from the non-exporting oil and gas production facilities 
around the village of Barrow, there are no producing developments inside NPR-A at the time of 
writing. Some of the major oil and gas activities that have occurred in NPR-A include formation 
of the first two federal Units, beginning in 2008, and completion of the most recent NPR-A 
management plan in 2012 and a federal Record of Decision (ROD) authorizing development that 
would facilitate the first oil production from NPR-A (Table 3.9).
The boundary of the Colville River Unit in the Central North Slope sub-region extends 
westerly across the eastern border of NPR-A and infrastructure is spreading in that direction too. 
In 2014, ConocoPhilips completed the construction of a gravel pad for a production facility 
called CD-5 within NPR-A (ADNR, 2014b) and plan to drill 15 wells from that site in 2016 
(ADNR, 2015). Construction is also underway on industrial crossings of the Colville River 
(including three completed bridges), which constitutes NPR-A’s border with the Central North 
Slope, and ongoing seismic surveys are taking place in the region (ADNR, 2015). BLM’s 2015 
ROD authorized the following infrastructure expansion to link CD-5 with the federal Greater 
Mooses Tooth Unit One (GMT-1) and then to begin production at GMT-1: 12 acre gravel pad,
33 wells, 7.6 mile gravel road, 8.4 mile elevated pipeline, and all accompanying industrial 
activity (e.g., transport of personal and materials) (BLM, 2015).
BLM’s 2012 Final Integrated Activity Plan/Environmental Impact Statement 
(FIAP/EIS) provides an estimate of the infrastructure and operations that could be needed for 
exploration, development, and production of the estimated known oil and gas reserves within 
NPR-A (BLM, 2012). The plan states that BLM’s figures “provide realistic and conservative
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estimates for impact analysis that make it very unlikely that this FIAP/EIS will underestimate the 
impacts” (BLM, 2012, p. 71). The preferred development estimate (alternative B-2) includes 
proposed activities for the Greater Mooses Tooth Unit, the Bear Tooth Unit, and Umiat (Table 
3.10).
Proposed offshore oil and gas developments discussed in the following two sections 
could affect the amount of infrastructure and operations that eventually occur within NPR-A. 
Offshore developments in federal waters could require the construction of connecting pipelines 
and roads that cut across portions of NPR-A in order to transport oil and gas from offshore 
production facilities to the existing infrastructure and TAPS at the Prudhoe Bay field. However, 
such infrastructure and operations were not estimated by BLM’s 2012 FIAP/EIS. In addition, the 
State of Alaska’s Roads to Resources Initiative, specifically the Foothills West Transportation 
Access project, could spur industrial development in NPR-A by providing increased terrestrial 
access to the sub-region, which is discussed further in the section on Wester Coastal and Interior 
Alaska.
3.3.3. Chukchi Sea Outer Continental Shelf
To date, there are five decommissioned and abandoned exploration wells in the Chukchi 
Sea Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), which were drilled between 1989 and 1991 (Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management [BOEM], 2012a), and one exploration well that Shell began in 2012 
at the Burger prospect (ADNR, 2012b) and completed in 2015 (Figure 3.4). 6 The existing wells
6 An oil and gas “prospect” is a defined area that companies predict to contain commercially 
viable oil and gas based on the results of previous exploration efforts, such as seismic surveys.
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are spread around five oil and gas prospects called Burger, Klondike, Crackerjack, Popcorn, and 
Diamond. Existing oil and gas infrastructure and operations in the sub-region have been 
relatively minimal (Table 3.11).
In recent years, oil and gas companies have submitted applications for industrial activities 
in this sub-region, with Shell conducting limited drilling activities in the Chukchi Sea OCS in 
2012 and again in 2015. However, following its 2015 summer exploration activities, Shell has 
decided to cease exploration in the Chukchi Sea OCS for the foreseeable future -  citing 
insufficient oil discoveries -  and is winding down its existing operations in the region (Shell, 
2015). The next potential lease sale had been scheduled for 2016 (BOEM, 2012a), but was 
recently canceled due to perceived lack of interest from industry (US Department of the Interior 
[USDOI], 2015).
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and its predecessor agency, the 
Minerals Management Service (MMS), have generated multiple estimates of proposed 
infrastructure and operations in the Chukchi Sea OCS over the years. BOEM’s recent report 
Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program: 2012-2017 Final Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement (BOEM, 2012b), presents estimates for (1) the infrastructure 
that could be built over the next 40-50 years specifically as a result of the 2012-17 program and 
(2) infrastructure that could be built over the next 40-50 years in the cumulative case scenario, 
which includes all past and potential oil and gas infrastructure from all past and potential lease 
sales in the sub-region, within the given time frame. Regarding the estimates, BOEM states, “It 
should be noted that the cumulative case scenario.. .reflects inherent uncertainty about the future 
of OCS oil and gas activities.. ,[F]uture activity is unpredictable and could span a considerable 
range” (BOEM, 2012b, p. 4-660). The cumulative case estimate includes the pipeline that could
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be required to connect offshore production facilities to existing infrastructure by cutting across 
NPR-A (Table 3.12). These plans, however, may be contingent upon Shell or another large 
corporation restarting exploration and production activates in the OCS.
3.3.4 Beaufort Sea Outer Continental Shelf
To date, there are 30 decommissioned and abandoned exploration wells in the Beaufort 
Sea OCS, which were drilled between 1981 and 2002 (BOEM, 2012a), and the top hole of one 
well that was drilled in 2012 at the Sivulliq prospect (ADNR, 2012b) (Figure 3.5). The Northstar 
production island and its buried pipeline to land are located in state waters but the facility 
produces from oil and gas fields that are covered by both state and federal leases. Oil and gas 
activities in the Beaufort Sea OCS have been occurring for decades (Table 3.13).
Shell conducted limited drilling activities in the Beaufort Sea OCS in 2012, and there 
have been a number of proposals to drill specific wells in the recent past. At the time of writing, 
none of these existing proposals is active, and there are no planned oil and gas activities in the 
Beaufort Sea OCS. The next potential lease sale had been scheduled for 2017 (BOEM, 2012a), 
but was recently canceled due to perceived lack of interest by industry (USDOI, 2015).
In 2002, MMS completed an EIS for the proposed development of an oil production 
facility at the Liberty Unit, which is located in federal waters eight miles east of the Endicott 
field (MMS, 2002). The 2002 EIS assessed a proposal that centered on the development of an 
offshore island that would house the production facilities and connect to existing infrastructure 
via buried pipelines, similar to the Northstar project. This proposal, however, was later rejected 
in favor of a proposal that centered on ultra-extended reach drilling from the existing Endicott
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facilities (in state waters) to access the oil in the Liberty field. The second proposal for 
developing the Liberty Unit, however, was also rejected due to feasibility issues. The most recent 
proposal again calls for the construction of an offshore island in federal waters with buried 
pipelines connecting to shore. Primary ownership of the Liberty project was acquired by Hilcorp 
Alaska LLC in 2014, and they released a revised development and production plan in late 2015 
(Hilcorp Alaska LLC, 2015).
The EIS for BOEM’s most recent five year program (BOEM, 2012b) estimates some of 
the infrastructure and operations that would be required for developing the known estimated oil 
and gas reserves in the Beaufort Sea OCS. As was the case for the Chukchi Sea OCS, the five- 
year program presents estimates for (1) the infrastructure that could be built over the next 40-50 
years specifically as a result of the 2012-2017 program and (2) infrastructure that could be built 
over the next 40-50 years in the cumulative case scenario, which includes all past and potential 
oil and gas infrastructure from all past and potential lease sales in the sub-region, within the 
given time frame. Once again, BOEM cautions that “the cumulative case scenario.. .reflects 
inherent uncertainty about the future of OCS oil and gas activities.. ,[F]uture activity is 
unpredictable and could span a considerable range” (BOEM, 2012b, p. 660). The data from the 
cumulative case includes BOEM’s estimates for development of the Liberty Unit and pipeline to 
connect to existing infrastructure (Table 3.14).
3.3.5 Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
The US National Wildlife Refuge System goal is to promote conservation, management, 
and restoration of wildlife, fish, and plant species for the enjoyment of Americans. The Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) was originally set aside for refuge purposes in 1957, prior to
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Alaska statehood, and then officially established in 1960. ANWR was expanded in size and 
acquired many of its current features in 1980 with President Carter’s signing of the Alaska 
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) (Figure 3.6).7 ANILCA’s stated purposes 
for the Arctic Refuge include:
(i) to conserve fish and wildlife populations and habitats in their natural 
d iv e rs ity .; (ii) to fulfill the international fish and wildlife treaty obligations of 
the United States; (iii) to provide the opportunity for continued subsistence uses 
by local residents; and (iv) to ensure water quality and necessary water quantity 
within the refuge (1980, section 303).
In addition to defining these purposes for ANWR, ANILCA designated eight million acres of the 
existing refuge as Wilderness, which guarantees the highest level of protection within the 
National Refuge System. However, a 1.5 million acre area between the refuge’s northern 
coastline and the foothills of the Brooks Range (i.e., the Coastal Plain) was excluded from the 
Wilderness designation.
Section 1002 of ANILCA called for a comprehensive assessment of the Coastal Plain 
area, which is commonly referred to as the “ 1002 area.” The assessment was to provide Congress 
with information about the area’s fish and wildlife resources, the potential impacts of oil and gas 
activities on those resources, and an estimate of the area’s oil and gas resource potential.
7 ANILCA designated 18 million acres as part of ANWR, another one million were added in 
1983, and 325,000 more acres in 1988 (US Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS], 2008).
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An oil and gas seismic exploration program for the 1002 area was conducted between 
1983 and 1985 (US Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS], 2008). One exploration well was also 
drilled by oil companies on Native lands within ANWR boundaries. The data from seismic 
exploration have received multiple interpretations over the years and have led some stakeholders, 
such as the State of Alaska, to conclude that the area could produce economically viable oil and 
gas. However, section 1003 of ANILCA states, "production of oil and gas from the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge is prohibited and no leasing or other development leading to 
production of oil and gas.. .shall be undertaken until authorized by an act of Congress"
(ANILCA, 1980).
While the federal status of ANWR with regard to oil and gas activities is clear, the State 
of Alaska has promoted exploration in the Coastal Plain (1002 area). In 2013 the State’s Division 
of Oil and Gas released a document called The Oil and Gas Resource Evaluation and Exploration 
Proposal for the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 1002 Area (ADNR, 2013c). The state’s 
proposal urges the US Congress to open the 1002 area to exploration and lays out a seven-year 
exploration plan that includes, inter alia, 3-D seismic survey of 3,305 square miles and the 
drilling of up to 16 exploration wells. While it is important to understand what the State of 
Alaska has had in mind for ANWR, this article does not include the activities described above in 
the proposed category of infrastructure and operation because oil and gas activities are currently 
prohibited within the borders of ANWR.
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3.3.6 Northwest Coastal and Interior Alaska
According to the AOGCC database, a small number of abandoned oil and gas exploration 
wells are scattered around the Northwest Coastal and Interior Alaska sub-region (ADA, 2013) 
(Figure 3.7). However, neither the State of Alaska nor the federal government holds oil and gas 
lease sales in this region at this time. Infrastructure and operations in the sub-region related to 
commercial transportation, rather than oil and gas, is the focus of this section. A timeline reveals 
major activities related to commercial transportation in the lands and waters of Northwest 
Coastal and Interior Alaska (Table 3.15).
In addition to portions of TAPS and the Dalton Highway located south of the North 
Slope, there are three other major gravel roads in this sub-region. These roads originate near the 
city of Nome on the Seward Peninsula. Some of the roads around Nome were constructed in 
order to facilitate gold mining in the area (which began in the early 1900s and largely ended in 
the 1960s), while others serve primarily to connect existing communities (ADFG, 2014).
Commercial transportation in this sub-region is driven in part by the Red Dog mine, 
located 52 miles inland between the coastal villages of Kotzebue and Kivalina (Red Dog Mine, 
2009). Red Dog mine extracts zinc and lead ore from open-pit site and mineral concentrates are 
trucked from the mine to a coastal port facility, and then shipped to markets (Red Dog Mine,
2009). The road from the mine to the port and the port itself are called the DeLong Mountain 
Transportation System (DMTS), owned by the Alaska Industrial Development and Export 
Authority (AIDEA). Because the waters surrounding the DTMS port are shallow, long distance 
ore carriers are required to anchor offshore in deeper waters and shallow-draft barges are used to 
transfer materials into the carriers in a process called lightering (Red Dog Mine, 2009). In
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addition to the port at Red Dog mine, the other primary ports in the region are shallow draft ports 
(<30 feet) at Kotzebue and Nome (Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment [PAME], 2009).
Marine vessel traffic is another component of transportation in the Northwest Coastal and 
Interior Alaska sub-region. Maritime activity in the area includes vessels engaged in commercial 
transportation (e.g., cargo ships. tankers, ice breakers), scientific research vessels, pleasure 
vessels, and other boats. Annually there are over 400 transits of marine vessels through the 
Bering Strait, a number that includes both commercial vessels and non-commercial vessels, such 
as military, research, and law-enforcement vessels (USACE & Alaska Department of 
Transportation and Public Facilities [ADOT&PF], 2013). The number of large commercial 
vessels passing through the Bering Strait annually has been estimated at closer to 150 (excluding 
fishing vessels which are usually smaller) (PAME, 2009).
The Marine Exchange of Alaska monitors marine vessel traffic in Alaska’s waters. A 
summary of Marine Exchange data for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011 suggest an increasing 
trend in the numbers of non-fishing vessels over 100 feet in length for the regions of the North 
Slope, Bering Strait, and Norton Sound combined (Table 3.16). Data on the Red Dog Mine and 
the gravel roads around Nome discussed above are also presented.
New commercial transportation in the Northwest Coastal and Interior Alaska sub-region 
is proposed by the Roads to Resources Initiative (R2R), led by the Alaska Department of 
Transportation and Public Facilities (ADOT&PF), which works with interested parties to “design 
and build projects that support development of natural resources in the oil and gas, alternative 
energy, mining, timber, fisheries, and agriculture industries” (ADOT&PF, 2011a). While R2R is 
an ongoing program, as of early 2014 construction had begun on a new road that will eventually 
connect the western terminus of the Elliot Highway (near Manley Hot Springs) to an area of the
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Yukon River near the village of Tanana (ADOT&PF, 2011b). The Road to Tanana, as the project 
is named, is planned to be 36 miles long (ADNR, 2013d) and should reach completion by the 
end of 2015 (Bodony, 2015). According to the 2010 state-sponsored Western Alaska Access 
Planning Study, the road is viewed as the first segment of a more extensive road project 
(described below), which will eventually connect to the roads around Nome on the Seward 
Peninsula. The larger project is intended to provide increased access to remote villages and 
promote the development of natural resources in the southern part the sub-region (ADOT&PF,
2010). In addition to the Road to Tanana, three other R2R projects fall in the proposed category 
(Table 3.17).
Proposed infrastructure in the sub-region also includes an 11.2 mile two-lane gravel road 
between the village of Kotzebue and the coastal area of Cape Blossom to the south (ADOT&PF, 
2011c). A 1983 feasibility study commissioned by the State of Alaska recommended Cape 
Blossom as the best location around Kotzebue to construct a deep-draft port in anticipation of the 
increased vessel traffic expected to accompany development of coal mining in the area. While 
coal mining around Kotzebue has not materialized to date, ADOT&PF reports that the EIS for 
the road to Cape Blossom has been completed and that the road project is currently in the design 
phase (ADOT&PF, 2011c).
Another assessment of potential locations for a deep-draft port to serve the US Arctic was 
recently completed, and much of the assessment’s study area falls within the Northwest Coastal 
and Interior Alaska sub-region. In 2013, ADOT&PF and USACE released their first-year report 
for the assessment (USACE & ADOT&PF, 2013). Regarding the need for the assessment and the 
subsequent construction of a new port, the report states, “Marine Vessel traffic in the Arctic 
Ocean is growing dramatically with the thinning and retreat of the Arctic Ocean ice pack. This
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creates the potential for conflict, accidents, and incidents” (p. 9). Accordingly, they contend that 
a deep-draft port is needed in the sub-region to enhance economic development, oil spill 
response capacity, community resupply, the US presence in the Arctic, and search and rescue 
capability in the region. The first-year report recommended the Nome/Port Clarence area as the 
best location for a deep-draft port to serve the US Arctic. A 2015 Environmental Assessment 
suggests that the deep-draft port in Nome would include “a 2,150-foot-long (655 meters) 
extension of the existing 2,700-foot-long (823 meters) causeway, removal of the existing 270- 
foot-long (655 meters) spur, and dredging of the associated entrance channel to a depth of -28 
feet (8.5 meters)” (USACE, 2015).
Proposed commercial marine vessel traffic in the Arctic that could affect North West 
Coastal and Interior Alaska is qualitatively summarized by the Arctic Council’s 2009 Arctic 
Marine Shipping Assessment:
Arctic natural resource development (hydrocarbons, hard minerals and fisheries) 
and regional trade are the key drivers of future Arctic marine activity. ... Future 
Arctic marine activity will include many non-Arctic stakeholders [and] multiple 
users in Arctic waterways . .  Offshore hydrocarbon developments may lead to 
increased marine traffic in the Bering Strait region (PAME, 2009, p. 5).
It has also been proposed that trans-Arctic shipping i.e., shipping that uses the Arctic Ocean to 
link the Pacific Ocean with the Atlantic Ocean, will increase as sea ice decreases along the 
Northern Sea Route (north of the Russian Federation), the Trans-Arctic Sea Route (across the 
North Pole), and the Northwest Passage (north of Canada). Increased shipping and vessel activity
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along the Northern Sea Route has already been observed (PAME, 2009). Recent projections 
suggest that substantial increases to shipping will be possible for certain types of ships by 2050 
(Smith & Stephenson, 2013).
3.3.7 Regional Overview and Data Synthesis
This section provides a quick reference to “what is” and “what could be” with regard to 
the industrial infrastructure in the US Arctic that supports oil and gas activities and commercial 
transportation (Figure 3.8). The chapter synthesizes the existing, planned, and proposed 
infrastructure that the previous six sections present separately (Table 3.18).
Infrastructure is divided into existing, planned and proposed timeframes. Some 
potentially significant proposed infrastructure projects have not been quantified in a manner that 
allows for their inclusion in the comparison. This is the case for (1) gas pipeline and trucking 
projects, (2) development of shale oil and gas, (3) a potential road that may parallel a future 
pipeline cutting across NPR-A to support OCS development in the Chukchi Sea, and (4) 
construction of a deep-draft port. These projects are described in the Comments column of the 
table and must be considered when analyzing different infrastructure futures for the region and 
their impacts on community wellbeing.
Infrastructure data have been grouped into five main categories and rounded to the 
nearest whole number for ease of comparison. Data adhere to the following descriptions unless 
noted otherwise:
• Structures: indicates the number of structures and includes gravel pads, gravel
islands, gravel airstrips, gravel helipads, bridges, and facilities (e.g., pump stations).
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• Wells: indicates the number of oil and gas wells and includes all types (e.g., 
exploration, production, injection, abandoned).
• Roads: indicates miles of road, causeway, and tundra scar (i.e., semi-permanent 
indentations in the tundra caused by vehicular traffic).
• Pipeline: indicates miles of pipeline.
• Footprint: indicates the acreage covered by infrastructure and, where available, 
gravel-borrow sites (i.e., locations where gravel is mined from for construction); excludes 
acres that are temporarily disturbed (e.g., by exploration activities that do not disturb the 
environment in continuing ways).8
3.3.8 Summary of Findings
Industrial infrastructure in the US Arctic related to oil and gas production and 
commercial transportation has expanded substantially since the first commercial wells were 
drilled in the early 1960s. Today, the existing estimated footprint of oil and gas infrastructure 
totals well over 18,000 acres. At the time of this writing, expansion of oil and gas infrastructure 
continues as the industry develops specific projects located at the outer edges of the existing 
infrastructural complex. For example, infrastructure is expanding to the east in the form of the 
Point Thomson project and to the west through the ongoing development of the Colville River 
and Greater Mooses Tooth Units within NPR-A. Simultaneously, oil and gas exploration 
activities continue to the north (in multiple offshore environments) and to the south of existing
8 There is an ongoing debate in the scientific community over how to categorize the impacts of 
some oil and gas activities. This article reproduces the terminology used by the cited references 
to describe impacts.
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infrastructure (in the foothills of the Brooks Range). Commercial transportation infrastructure is 
also expanding, as construction crews finalize road from the Manley Hot Springs area to Tanana. 
These construction projects and others are categorized as planned infrastructure in this article. 
They are relatively modest in scope and size, adding to the extent of existing infrastructure by 
only a few percent. Nonetheless, these projects represent the latest stages of a long-term trend of 
incremental expansion of industrial infrastructure in the region.
If the projects captured in the proposed infrastructure category proceed, it would result in 
a considerably larger expansion of industrial infrastructure. As mentioned throughout this article, 
there is a high degree of uncertainty about the future of industrial infrastructure in the US Arctic. 
For that reason, it is impossible to predict which projects will go forward, what they will look 
like, and when they will be developed; especially considering Shell’s recent shutdown of its 
offshore exploration program. However, if proposed infrastructure projects develop in the 
manner described in state and federal analyses, the extent of the US Arctic’s industrial 
infrastructure would increase significantly. The number of structures would almost double, from 
460 to 816. The number of wells would increase by around one third, from 6,215 to 8,673. Miles 
of road would more than double, from 1,138 to 2,503. Miles of pipeline would more than 
quadruple, from 901 to 4,667. Lastly, the infrastructure footprint would increase by about 50 
percent, with over 27,000 acres of the US Arctic ultimately being directly covered or excavated 
for industrial development. The area affected by that infrastructure footprint—what the NRC 
refers to as “zones of influence”—would be considerably greater (NRC, 2003, p. 9).
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3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
If the impacts (both positive and negative) of industrial infrastructure on the wellbeing of 
communities that are in the vicinity of development is proportional to the amount of 
infrastructure that exists on the ground and in the sea, then future impacts in the US Arctic could 
be considerable in a maximum development scenario. However, a minimum development 
scenario -  which could plausibly include no additional construction of industrial infrastructure -  
should also be considered and would raise a different set of questions. Namely questions about 
decommissioning the infrastructure that has already been build and rehabilitating affected land- 
and seascapes (see e.g., Jorgenson & Joyce, 1994). If industrial actors were to wind down their 
operations, significant clean up expenses could be transferred to affected communities if  the 
associated corporations do not fulfill their reclamation responsibilities
(Marion, Massicotte, & Duhn, 2014). But what determines whether future impacts manifest as 
benefits or harms to communities? The key lies in governance.
Analyzing the role of governance in mitigating the relationship between industrial 
activity and community wellbeing in the Arctic is an emerging theme in academic research. 
Nuttall (2010), provides an ethnography-based analysis of how ‘dreams’ of oil and gas wealth 
have shaped relations between Indigenous people and federal governments in Canada and the 
US, highlighting both benefits and drawbacks of current relations but emphasizing the need for 
increased representation of Indigenous interests. Similarly, an edited volume out of 
Fennoscandia asks whether pan-arctic oil and gas development has moved beyond sustainability 
(Mikkelsen & Langhelle, 2008). The authors’ answer is that it depends on how one defines 
sustainability. The resources being extracted are non-renewable, they point out, but the revenue
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from development could be invested in economic diversification for economic growth that is 
sustainable. Hovelsrud, Poppel, Van Oort, and Reist (2011) focus on rural arctic communities 
and their adaptive capacities to a variety of changes, including increased industrial activity, 
concluding that governance will determine whether communities prosper or wither in the future.
With regard to the US Arctic specifically, Haley et al. (2011) argue that good governance 
of oil and gas production in Alaska’s offshore environment includes strengthening the 
institutions that assure community-based involvement in decision making. Meanwhile, Sherval 
(2013) suggests that Alaska’s oil and gas resources could contribute to the nation’s energy 
independence, while enhancing local energy security for Alaskan communities as well. Clearly, 
the nexus of natural resources, Indigenous people, and governance in the Arctic is a crucial area 
of research and action. This article intends to contribute to the emerging body of literature that 
critically examines the relationship between community wellbeing and industrial activity in the 
Arctic by a) demonstrating a methodology that is forward looking in its emphasis on plausible 
future infrastructure and b) providing an in-depth case study of infrastructure development in the 
US Arctic, which had not existed until now
What would governance that maximizes the benefits of industrial activities for 
communities look like? This article suggest that two main factors play a critical role in 
governance: a) power (i.e., the ability to control processes of development) and b) the flow of 
financial capital (i.e., who profits from development). Currently, out of all stakeholders in the US 
Arctic, corporations are arguably the most powerful because they have the most financial capital. 
Under the US’s free market system, in order for anyone to benefit financially from development, 
corporations must be willing to invest their capital in production activities. From there, other 
stakeholders such as native corporations and municipal, state, and federal governments can
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extract revenue from the activities of the corporations and derive a share of the generated profit. 
Mechanisms for extracting revenue from corporations include taxing their activities on owned 
land, auctioning off rights to develop certain tracts of federal territory, and selling the rights to 
develop owned oil, gas, and minerals. Despite such mechanisms, the capital possessed by 
corporations give them significant leverage in governance. Also, corporations stand to secure the 
largest profits from the expansion of development.
The next question is whether the corporations, who are profiting the most, are also 
incurring the biggest risk. If  such an assessment is calculated strictly in terms of dollars, the 
answer might be yes. Corporations invest hundreds of millions of dollars into various phases on 
industrial activity on well calculated gambles that may or may not pay off. However, when risks 
are calculated in other ways, it would appear that communities actually have the most to lose 
from increased industrial development. If either a major industrial accident or the crossing of an 
ecological tipping point caused by cumulative impacts occurs, the subsistence life-ways of 
Alaska Natives and other rural residents could be direly compromised. It is the stance of this 
paper that cultural sovereignty should be considered more valuable than the profits of 
transnational corporations.
However, the political-economic situation is complex because the economies of local and 
state governments are highly dependent on continued revenue streams from natural resource 
extraction, and are therefore also at risk from decreases in production. In late 2015, the economic 
vulnerability of local stakeholders to industrial withdrawal is playing out in the region, after 
Shell decided to abandon their efforts to establish production wells in the Chukchi Sea OCS. The 
‘domino effect’ from Shell’s pullout includes federal agencies canceling offshore lease sales,
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decreased discussion about the need for a US Arctic deep-draft port, and a general anxiety 
among those who derive economic benefit from the fossil fuel industry in Alaska.
Good governance would include rules that pulled more of the control and financial 
benefit associated with industrial infrastructure away from the corporations and put it in the 
hands of communities. This could include a major restructuring of the benefit agreements 
between corporations and native interests, whereby the amount of profit extracted by the native 
interests increased substantially (perhaps in step with the amount of new infrastructure). 
Institutional adaptations could also include native organizations becoming the main actors in 
decision making about future development, rather than the current situation that sees industry 
calling the shots and non-native governments being the main regulators (but with minor 
Indigenous participation). Institutional adaptations such as these could limit the economic 
vulnerability of local actors allowing them to regulate the degree to which they become 
dependent on volatile industrial industries.
As a nation, the US could develop a new understanding of what the role of corporations 
should be in society; the US could implement a standard of corporate social responsibility 
whereby society broadly (and directly-impacted communities specifically) were the main 
beneficiaries of industrial activity, rather than the owners of the transnational corporations 
operating in the region. These are radical recommendations, but these are also radical times. The 
Arctic is changing at an unprecedented rate and so too must governance.
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Table 3.1 Stakeholders in the US Arctic.
Stakeholder Description
Tribal Governments 
and Alaska Native 
Organizations
Alaska Native interests are represented by: (1) tribal governments 
that operate within individual communities and regionally, (2) 
tribally authorized groups, and (3) Alaska Native Corporations 
established under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
Industrial and
Commercial
Stakeholders
These include representatives from the following industries: oil and 
gas, renewable energy, mining, shipping, commercial fisheries, and 
tourism
State of Alaska The Alaska Statehood Act of 1958 granted the state approximately 
104 million acres of land, ownership of the submerged lands of 
navigable waterways, and submerged lands up to 3 miles offshore 
under the Submerged Lands Act
Municipal
Governments
These include cities, villages, and boroughs; they represent 
communities that are usually considered to be remote from large 
population centers
Conservation
Organizations
These include non-governmental conservation and environmental 
organizations
Federal Government More than 20 federal agencies play a role in management and 
research in the US Arctic.
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Table 3.2 Predicted social impacts o f NPR-A oil and gas development (columns 1-5) (BLM, 2012) and likely resultant health 
impacts (column 6) (Wernham, 2007).
1.
Subsistence
2. Sociocultural 3. Economy 4. Air 
quality
5. Water 
quality
6. Likely 
resultant health 
impacts
Displacement 
of hunters 
away from 
productive 
areas
Loss/degradation 
of traditional 
subsistence areas
Taxation of
oil facilities
allows
continuing
services,
balancing
declining
revenues
from other oil
development
Episodic 
localized 
decreased air
quality
events near 
oil
development
facilities
Small 
inadvertent 
discharge: 
spills, etc.
Increased 
psychological and 
social pathology 
(alcohol and drug 
abuse, depression, 
anxiety, child 
abuse, domestic 
violence, suicide)
Displacement 
/dispersion of 
animals
Fear of 
contaminants
Native 
corporations 
provide 
dividends to 
shareholders
Incremental
degradation
of air quality
in/near
subsistence
camps
Occasional 
large spills
Increased injury 
rates
Reduced
populations
of
subsistence
species
Subsistence 
impacts lead to 
breakdown of 
kinship/communi 
ty sharing 
networks
Increased 
income from 
employment
Increased risk of 
diabetes and 
related metabolic 
disorders
Subsistence 
impacts lead to 
difficulty in 
transmitting 
cultural axioms 
to youth
Large loss of 
revenue 
sources at 
conclusion of 
project
Increased food 
insecurity
Increasing 
economic 
disparities within 
villages
Increased 
pulmonary and 
cardiovascular 
disease
Acculturation 
from intense 
exposure to large 
numbers of 
transient outside 
workers
Increased 
exposure to agents 
causing 
malignancies, 
neurodevelopment 
al delay, and 
endocrine 
disruption
Alcohol and drug 
trafficking via 
new access routes
Increased 
exposure to 
pathogens, HIV, 
and syphilis
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Table 3.3 Examples o f the benefits and harms to community wellbeing indicated by industrial infrastructure in arctic Alaska in 
terms o f social, environmental, and economic impacts.
Social Environmental Economic
Benefits Infrastructure can 
increase connectedness 
between communities, if 
public use is allowed
Community ties can be 
strengthened through 
processes of informing 
infrastructure decisions
Development can require 
ecological assessments that 
promote conservation in the 
long-run
Renewable energy 
infrastructure could reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, 
compared to oil industry
Development can create 
jobs in construction, 
support, and science; 
aiding subsistence
Production can generate 
revenue for boroughs 
and regional native 
corporations
Harms Development can bring 
undesirable people and 
substances into 
communities
Infrastructure can alter 
culturally significant 
landscapes and be a 
reminder of colonialism
Infrastructure can fragment 
ecosystems and generate 
pollution, disrupting 
subsistence species
The production of oil and 
gas contributes to global 
greenhouse gas emissions 
and climate change
Revenue from 
production can create 
dependency on non­
renewable resources
Participation in industry 
can create new economic 
class stratifications 
within communities
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Table 3.4 Existing oil and gas activities in the Central North Slope and State waters sub-region.
Year(s) Event
1963-67 First drilling of exploration wells by private companies a
1964 First State of Alaska lease sale a
1968 Discovery of Prudhoe Bay field, the largest in North America a
1977 Trans-Alaska Pipeline System operational a, Beginning of production from 
Prudhoe Bay field (Prudhoe Bay Unit) a
1979 Initial leasing of Beaufort Sea state waters a
1981 Beginning of production from Lisburne field (Prudhoe Bay Unit) and Kuparuk 
field (Kuparuk River Unit) a
1985 Beginning of production from Milne Point field (Milne Point Unit) a
1987 Beginning of production from Endicott field (Duck Island Unit) a
1989 Beginning of production from Sag Delta North field (Duck Island Unit) a
1991 Beginning of production from Schrader Bluff field (Milne Point Unit) a
1993 Beginning of production from North Prudhoe Bay field and Pt. McIntyre field 
(Prudhoe Bay Unit) a
1994 Beginning of production from Niakuk field and West Beach field (Prudhoe Bay 
Unit) and Sag River field (Milne Point Unit) a
1996 Beginning of production from Cascade field (Milne Point Unit) a
1998 Beginning of production from Eider field (Duck Island Unit), Tabasco field, Tarn 
field, and West Sak field (Kuparuk River Unit), and Badami field (Badami Unit) a
1999 Beginning of production from Midnight Sun field (Prudhoe Bay Unit) a
2000 Beginning of production from Alpine field: CD-1 and CD-2 pads (Colville River 
Unit) a
2001 Beginning of production from Northstar field (Northstar Unit), Aurora field, 
Borealis field, and Polaris field (Prudhoe Bay Unit), and Meltwater field (Kuparuk 
River Unit) a
2002 Beginning of production from Palm field (Kuparuk River Unit) a
2003 Beginning of production from Orion field (Prudhoe Bay Unit) and Ugnu field 
(Milne Point Unit) a
2005 Beginning of production from Raven field (Prudhoe Bay Unit) a, 3-D seismic 
survey in Harrison Bay (Beaufort Sea) b
2006 Beginning of production from Fiord: CD-3 pad and Nanuq: CD-4 pad (Colville 
River Unit) a
2008 3-D seismic survey in Smith Bay (Beaufort Sea) c, Beginning of production from 
Kaparuk field (Oooguruk Unit) d
2010 Beginning of production from Nuiqsut field (Ooogurk Unit) e
2011 Beginning of production from Schrader Bluff field (Nikaitchuq Unit) f
2012 Drilling of two exploration wells for shale oil along Dalton Highway (south of 
existing Units) and additional shale tests near Umiat and the southeast border of 
NPR-A g
Sources: a(BLM, 2012); b(ADNR, 2006); c(ADNR, 2008a); d(ADNR, 2008b); e(ADNR, 
2011a); f(ADNR, 2011b); g(ADNR, 2012a)
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Table 3.5 Existing Central North Slope and state waters oil and gas infrastructure in 2011.
Type Amount
Gravel road and causeway 423 miles/3,100 acres a
Other travel ways (peat roads, tractor trail/tundra scar, 
and exploration road)
189 miles a
Dalton Highway (North Slope portion only) 170 miles/332 acres b
Facilities (production, processing, support, and 
exploration)
400 facility pads/5,793 acres a
Airstrips 13 airstrip pads/358 acres a
Gravel offshore islands 20 offshore island pads/202 acres a
Gravel mines in rivers 5,385 acres a
Gravel mines in tundra 1,378 acres a
Pipeline corridors (in-field) 491 miles a
Trans-Alaska Pipeline (North Slope portion only) 166 miles b
Culverts 2037 a
Bridges a72
Active Landfills 1 a
Power transmission lines 336 miles a
Total directly disturbed ground 18,357 acres a
Sources: a(Raynolds et al. 2014); b(NRC 2003)
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Table 3.6 Planned Point Thomson infrastructure as of 2012.
Type Amount
Gravel pads 55.3 acre Central Pad a 1 
20.9 acre East Pad a 
20.6 acre West Pad a 
6.81 acres of additional pads a 2
Airstrip and 
helipad
42.3 acres a
Gravel roads 10.1 miles a
Pipelines 12-inch export pipeline: 23 miles b
8-inch infield gathering pipelines: 10 miles b
Vertical support members for pipelines: .13 acres a
Gravel mine 48.9 acres infield gravel mine a yielding 2.2 million cubic yards of gravel b
Other
infrastructure
Pier: 120 feet by 30 feet, 5 mooring dolphins, and 1,500 cubic yards of 
dredging b
Dredged material deposit: 1.4 acres a 
Emergency boat launch: .05 acres a 
Wildlife corridor: .25 acres a 
Electrical trenching: .41 acres a 
Culvert scour protection: .09 acres a 
Gravel stockpile: 5.2 acres a
Development 
phase operations 
and seasonal 
infrastructure
11,000 vehicle trips, including 300 barge trips b
129 miles of seasonal ice road for pipeline construction, equipment
transport, and supplies (up to 3 years) b
23 miles of seasonal infield ice roads throughout production phase b
Sources: a(USACE, 2012b); b(USACE, 2012a)
1This number includes 12.9 acres of existing pad (PTU-3)
2This number includes 4.1 acres of existing pad (Alaska C-1 pad)
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Table 3.7 Planned infrastructure and operations in the Central North Slope and State waters as of 2013.
Infrastructure Location Activity phase
22 wells Mustang field (South 
Miluveach Unit)
Development, expect to 
begin production in late 
2014
24 wells and pad, access road, 
gravel mine, pipelines, power 
lines
Shark Tooth field (Kupaurk 
River Unit)
Development, expect to 
begin production in late 
2015
2 wells Qugruk field (east of 
Colville River Unit)
Exploration
1 well Southeast of Kuparuk River 
Unit
Exploration
3-D seismic survey of shale 
formations (mileage unknown)
Along Dalton highway, 
south of existing Units
Exploration
293 square miles of 3-D seismic 
survey
Schrader Bluff, south of 
Kupaurk River Unit
Exploration
280 square miles of 3-D seismic 
survey
Southeast of Badami Unit 
and south of Point Thomson 
Unit
Exploration
Up to 8 wells in 2014-2015 and 
surveys (mileage unknown)
Smith Bay in state waters 
offshore of NPR-A
Exploration
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Table 3.8 Recent proposed projects for commercializing North Slope natural gas.
Main concept Infrastructure and operations Project
status
Pipe gas to Nikiski, Alaska 
where it would be processed 
for sale to Asian markets via 
shipping
800 mile long pipeline, mostly buried, 
paralleling TAPS from Prudhoe Bay to 
Fairbanks, then cutting south to Nikiski on 
the Kenai Peninsula, a processing plant
Being
assessed for 
feasibility
Pipe gas to Alberta, Canada 
where it would enter an 
existing pipeline system for 
sale to US markets
1,700 mile long pipeline, buried, paralleling 
TAPS from Prudhoe Bay to Delta Junction 
(southeast of Fairbanks) and then cutting 
southeast to Alberta
On hold
Pipe gas to southcentral 
Alaska where it would be 
processed and sold to the 
Alaskan market
737 mile long pipeline, buried, paralleling 
TAPS from Prudhoe Bay to the Big Lakes 
area (north of Anchorage), a processing plant
Being
actively
pursued
Truck gas to Fairbanks, 
Alaska where it would be sold 
to markets in the state’s 
interior
A processing plant on the North Slope, 
storage tanks in Fairbanks, and a fleet of 
trucks operating continuously along the 
Dalton Highway
Being
actively
pursued
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Table 3.9 Existing oil and gas activities in NPR-A.
Year Event
1950 Beginning of production from South Barrow field (non-export) a
1976 Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 becomes NPR-A managed by BLM, USGS launches 
major exploration efforts in NPR-A a
1981 Beginning of production from East Barrow field (non-export) a
1982 Beginning of leasing in NPR-A a
1985 First industry exploration well drilled in NPR-A a
1993 Beginning of production from Walakpa field (non-export) a
2008 Formation of first federal oil and gas Unit (Greater Mooses Tooth) in NPR-A b, first 
discoveries and wells drilled in Greater Mooses Tooth Unit c, continued seismic survey 
activities around Umiat on southeast border of NPR-A b
2009 Formation of Bear Tooth Unit in NPR-A (adjacent to Greater Mooses Tooth Unit) d
2010 USGS finishes an updated assessment of oil and gas reserves in NPR-A e
2012 Completion of most recent NPR-A comprehensive management plan and EIS
2013 First discoveries and wells drilled in Bear Tooth Unit
2015 Record of Decision authorizing development of Greater Mooses Tooth One project 
(first potential production of oil from federal land in NPR-A)g
Sources:a(BLM, 2012); b(ADNR, 2008a); c(ADNR, 2009a); d(ADNR, 2009b); e(USGS, 2010); 
f(ADNR, 2013a); g(BLM, 2015)
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Table 3.10 Proposed infrastructure and operations supporting oil and gas production in NPR-A.
Type Amount1
Wells (oil and gas exploration) 152 wells/912 acres (short term)2
Central processing facilities 8 /320 acres (long term)
Gravel production pads (oil and gas) 82/580 acres (long term)
Wells (oil and gas production) 705 wells (no additional acreage)
In-field gravel roads 566 miles/4,245 acres (long term)
Gravel runways 27/297 acres (long term)
Pipelines 1,520 miles/8002 acres (short term), 1,653 acres (long 
term)
Pump stations and staging bases 5 /160 acres (long term)
Gravel pits < 31/1,125 acres (long term)
Ice roads/snow packed trails 59,342 miles/249,246 acres (short term)
Ice air strips 65/715 acres (short term)
Surveying (2-D and 3-D) and camp 
train
61,093 miles/581,397 acres (short term)
Total short term disturbed land area 846,661 acres
Total long term disturbed land area 8,402 acres
1Data from (BLM 2012)
2BLM (2012), explains, “Short-term activities are commonly associated with the footprint 
during winter exploration or construction, while the long-term acreage figures reflect the 
gravel footprint of the development” (p. 71).
3Combined total of seismic surveying and exploration from (BLM, 2012)
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Table 3.11 Existing oil and gas activities in the Chukchi Sea OCS.
Year(s) Event
1989­
1991
First five exploration wells drilled a
2008 Lease sale 193 (most recent lease sale)
2012 BOEM completes most recent five year plan covering 2012-2017 a, Drilling of top 
hole at Burger-A prospect b
2016 Next potential lease sale c
Sources: a( BOEM, 2012a);b(ADNR, 2012b); c(ADNR, 2013b)
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Table 3.12 Proposed infrastructure and operations supporting oil and gas production in the Chukchi Sea OCS.
Type Amount1
Production platforms 3-16 structures
Exploration wells 12-54
Production wells 234-1,115
New offshore pipeline 150-1,000 miles
New onshore pipeline 250-500 miles
New waste facilities 2-4
New gas processing facilities 2-4
Dock/causeways 2-4
Vessel trips per week (service and 
helicopter)
6-96
Total offshore bottom area disturbed 10-60 acres (platform footprint), 518-3,459 (pipeline 
construction)
Total terrestrial area disturbed 4,510-9,019 acres (pipeline construction)
1All data from BOEM (2012b)
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Table 3.13 Existing oil and gas activities in the Beaufort Sea OCS.
Year Event
1979 Initial leasing of Beaufort Sea OCS federal waters a
1981 First exploration well drilled a
2007 Lease sale 202 (most recent lease sale)
2008 Seismic survey in Beaufort Sea OCS, including around Liberty Unit b
2012 BOEM completes most recent five year plan, covering 2012-2017, drilling of top hole 
for well at Sivulliq prospect (north of Point Thomson Unit) c
2017 Next potential lease sale d
Sources: a(BOEM, 2012a); b(ADNR, 2008b); c(ADNR, 2012b); d(ADNR, 2013b)
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Table 3.14 Proposed infrastructure and operations supporting oil and gas production in the Beaufort Sea OCS.
Type Amount1
Production platforms 2-10 structures
Exploration wells 12-40
Production wells 110-335
New offshore pipeline 50-423 miles
New onshore pipeline 40-290 miles
New waste facilities 2-4
New gas processing facilities 2-4
Dock/causeways 2-4
Vessel trips per week (service and 
helicopter)
4-60
Total offshore bottom area disturbed 7.4-37 acres (platform footprint), 173-1,470 (pipeline 
construction)
Total terrestrial area disturbed 717-4,510 acres (pipeline construction)
1All data from (BOEM, 2012b)
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Table 3.15 Existing commercial transportation activities in Northwest Coastal and Interior Alaska.
Year Event
1974 Completion of Dalton Highway a
1989 Beginning of operations at Red Dog mine main pit b
2011 Beginning of EIS for Roads to Resources Initiative c (suspended in 2013 because of 
changes made to project proposals) d
2012 Red Dog mine ends main pit production and begins production at Aqqaluk pit b
2013 Release of first year report for current assessment of deep draft port locations e
Sources: a(BLM, 2013a); b(Red Dog Mine, 2009); c(ADNR, 2011c); d(ADNR, 2013b); 
e(USACE & ADOT&PF, 2013)
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Table 3.16 Existing commercial transportation infrastructure and operations in Northwest Coastal and Interior Alaska.
Type Amount
Dalton Highway (south of North Slope) 244 miles1
TAPS (south of North Slope to end of 
Dalton Highway)
244 miles2
Roads around Nome a 72 miles: Teller Highway 
86 miles: Kougarok Road 
72 miles: Nome-Council Road
Red Dog mine b 3 1,531 acres disturbed (open-pits, waste areas, 
support facilities)
52 miles/616 acres disturbed: DMTS road and port
406.5 additional acres disturbed by Aqqaluk
extension preferred alternative
48.9 vehicle trips per day on DMTS
27 ore carriers per year anchor in deep water
offshore of the port
327 round trips for barges and tugs per year to load 
ore carriers
12 barges per year to supply mine
Up to 11 fixed wing flights per week (between
mine and other Alaska locations)
Marine vessel trips of non-fishing 
vessels over 100 feet c
602 in 2009 
986 in 2010 
678 in 2011
Bering Strait transits of all vessel types c >400 per year
1This number was calculated by subtracting the number of miles on the North Slope presented 
by NRC (2003) from the total length of the Dalton Highway as reported by BLM (2013a). 
2This is a very rough estimate made by this report based on the fact that TAPS runs roughly 
parallel to the Dalton Highway in this sub-region.
3Estimates by USACE (2009) use data from 2006 (acres), 2003 (DMTS road trips), 2005 
(marine vessel trips) and 2008 (fixed wing trips).
Sources: a(ADFG, 2014); b(USACE, 2009); c(USACE & ADOT&PF, 2013)
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Table 3.17 Proposed projects of the Roads to Resources Initiative.
Name Description Estimated 
road length
Road to Nome 
(proposed expansion of 
the planned Road to 
Tanana)
“Overland access from Interior Alaska to the Seward 
Peninsula has long been a key element of Alaska’s 
transportation planning ... to address national 
security, for economic development, and to improve 
community access to goods and services.” a
500 miles a
Foothills West 
Transportation Access1
“This project will provide access to known gas and 
oil reserves on the north side of the Brooks Range, 
about 100 miles west of the Dalton Highway, 
[around Umiat].” b
100 miles b
Ambler Mining District 
Access
“This project is to provide an all-season 
transportation access road to promote exploration, 
development, and production of known mineral 
resources in the Ambler mineral belt.” b
200 miles c
1 This project would like 
however, it is presented
y fall in the Central North Slope and State waters sub-region, 
iere in order to keep all the R2R projects in the same section.
Sources: a(ADOT&PF, 2010); b(ADOT&PF, 2011b); c(US National Park Service [USNPS], 
2014)
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Table 3.18 Synthesis of existing, planned, and proposed infrastructure for the US Arctic and each sub-region.
Entire Region
Existing Infrastructure Planned
Infrastructure
Proposed Infrastructure Comments
The US 
Arctic
Structures 460 Structures 7 Structures 349 Acres o f temporarily disturbed land 
and sea (from industrial activities 
such as oil and gas exploration) are 
not represented in this table.
Wells 6,215 Wells 57 Wells 2,401
Roads 1,138 miles Roads 21
miles
Roads 1,365 miles
Pipeline 901 miles Pipeline 33
miles
Pipeline 3,733 miles
Footprint 18,454 acres Footprint 202
acres
Footprint 8,499 acres
Sub-regiono
Central 
North Slope 
and State 
waters
Structures 460 a Structures 7 b c Structures - These numbers do not include the 
proposed gas pipeline (ranging from 
737 miles to 1,700 miles, but not all 
in this sub-region) or the proposed 
shale developments.
The State o f Alaska does not provide 
comprehensive projection o f 
additional infrastructure for 
incremental expansion within existing 
Units or new development from 
current leases.
Wells 6,046 e Wells 57 c Wells -
Road 612 miles a Road 10
miles
b
Road
Pipeline 657 miles a
(pipeline
corridor)
Pipeline 33
miles
b
Pipeline
Footprint 15,900 acres 
(this is a 
projection for 
2012 from d)
Footprint 202
acres
b
Footprint
NPR-A Structures - Structures - Structures 122 d These numbers only include 
production from within NPR-A and 
do not include estimates for 
infrastructure supporting proposed 
OCS production from federal offshore 
waters.
Wells 122 e Wells - Wells 857 d
Road - Road - Road 566 miles d
Pipeline - Pipeline - Pipeline 1,520 miles d
Footprint - Footprint - Footprint 8,402 acres d
Chukchi Sea 
OCS
Structures - Structures - Structures 28 f These numbers do not include a road 
that could run parallel to the proposed 
onshore pipeline that would cross 
NPR-A to connect proposed offshore 
infrastructure to existing onshore 
infrastructure (BLM, 2012).
Wells 5 g (does not 
include top 
hole drilled in 
2012 h)
Wells Wells 1,169 f
Road - Road - Road -
Pipeline - Pipeline - Pipeline 1,500 miles f
Footprint - Footprint - Footprint 60 acres f
Beaufort Sea 
OCS
Structures - Structures - Structures 22 f These numbers assume that any 
infrastructure from the proposed 
Liberty project is included in the 
estimates from BOEM (2012b).
Wells 30 g (does not 
include top 
hole drilled in 
2012 h)
Wells Wells 375 f
Road - Road - Road -
Pipeline - Pipeline - Pipeline 713 miles f
Footprint - Footprint - Footprint 37 acres f
ANWR Structures - Structures - Structures - Oil and gas activities and commercial 
transportation are not permitted in
ANWR.
Wells 1 i Wells - Wells -
Road - Road - Road -
Pipeline - Pipeline - Pipeline -
Footprint - Footprint - Footprint -
Northwest 
Coastal and 
Interior 
Alaska
Structures - Structures - Structures - These numbers do not include the 
acres impacted by the proposed deep- 
draft port.
Wells 11 e Wells - Wells -
Road 526 miles (see 
table 9.2 for 
references)
Road 11
miles
j
Road 800 miles (see 
table 9.3 for 
references)
Pipeline 244 miles (see 
table 9.2 for 
references)
Pipeline Pipeline
Footprint 2,554 acres 
(includes Red 
Dog mine open 
pits k)
Footprint Footprint
Sources: “(Raynolds et al., 2014); b(USACE, 2012b); c(ADNR, 2013b); d(BLM, 2012); e(ADA, 2013); f(BOEM, 2012b); g(BOEM, 2012a); 
h(ADNR, 2012b); i(ADNR, 2009c); j(ADNR, 2013d); k(USACE, 2009)
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CHAPTER 4: RELEVANCE OF A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SEA AREA TO THE 
BERING STRAIT REGION: A POLICY ANALYSIS USING RESILIENCE-BASED 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES1
Abstract: The Bering Strait, separating the North American and Asian continents, is a productive 
social-ecological marine system that is vulnerable to increasing maritime traffic. In other parts of 
the world, the International Maritime Organization, an agency of the United Nations, has 
designated similar marine systems as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) in efforts to 
protect vulnerable resources from international shipping. We present information about the 14 
existing PSSAs around the world and the political process by which designation is achieved. We 
examine specific characteristics of the Bering Strait system that are relevant to a PSSA 
application; including vulnerable resources -  marine mammals and their contribution to the food 
and cultural security of Indigenous communities -  threats to these resources from shipping 
activities, and the viable mitigation options to reduce these threats. We then use five criteria 
derived from empirical research on resilience-based governance to analyze if a PSSA designation 
would promote resilience of marine mammal populations and Indigenous communities to 
increased maritime activities. Despite the elusiveness of a definitive answer, we conclude that 
while the designation is not a perfect fit from a theoretical standpoint, it still holds the potential 
to benefit the resilience of marine mammals and Indigenous communities. We finish by 
identifying critical challenges and tradeoffs that practitioners would need to negotiate when 
attempting to apply theoretical governance-principles via real-world policy tools.
1 Hillmer-Pegram, K., & Robards, M. D. (2015). Relevance of a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area 
to the Bering Strait Region: a Policy Analysis Using Resilience-Based Governance Principles. 
Ecology and Society, 20(1), 26-36. doi:10.5751/ES-07081-200126
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4.1 Introduction
Experts from multiple fields of the social and natural sciences have proposed frameworks 
and principles for steering human-environment interactions in directions that promote their long 
term health and sustainability; through management approaches that account for both the 
environmental and social dimensions of a given system. Prominent examples include: principles 
of ecosystem stewardship (Chapin et al. 2009); ecosystem-based management (McLeod and 
Leslie 2009); integrated management (Sorensen 1997); adaptive management (Lee 1999); 
adaptive co-management (Armitage et al. 2007); design principles for sustainable management 
of common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990); and resilience-based governance (Garmestani and 
Benson 2013).
However, there is a practical need to move beyond academic explorations of what good 
governance may theoretically look like, and better understand the process of implementing 
broad-scale practices that support resilient human-environment interactions. Scholars have begun 
unraveling this component of the policy process by offering critiques of resilience-based 
governance research and the resultant frameworks it calls for. Legal scholars, for example, have 
brought to light multiple ways social-ecological resilience may not be compatible with the 
processes inherent in dominant legal systems of western societies (Holt et al. 2011; Ruhl 2010; 
Ruhl and Fischman 2010; Ruhl 2012; Doremus 1991; Doremus 2003a; 2003b).
Taking these critiques seriously, we engage a core group of five resilience-based 
governance principles, including two derived from legal studies and the policy sciences, to 
explore a case study of protecting transboundary marine environmental and cultural resources in 
the Arctic through an international policy tool called a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA).
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By doing so, we are able to assess whether the designation would foster resilience within this 
social-ecological system. Our discussion underscores important lessons for practitioners and 
scholars interested in taking the core group of principles from social-ecological governance 
frameworks and implementing them through specific real-world policy tools. Our analysis 
exposes tensions between theory and practice and prompts further questions concerning whether 
the protective status offered by a PSSA is a) viable, and b) likely an effective governance tool for 
promoting resilience.
While comparing a policy option to a set of theoretical principles (even when the 
principles are derived from empirical studies) may not provide conclusive evidence of the 
policy’s eventual effectiveness, such analysis is useful in at least two main measures. First, it can 
provide guidance in decision-making contexts where uncertainty is high. In our case study, given 
the potentially non-linear rate of Arctic industrialization, environmental change, and the high 
number of other variables influencing the social-ecological system, accurately predicting future 
system states quantitatively is difficult, if  not impossible. Thus, there is value in demonstrating 
that a given policy option meets a set of principles that have been shown in other cases to 
promote resilience. Second, an analysis based on theoretical criteria opens the door for a 
discourse on praxis (i.e., the practical application of theory). In addition to exploring whether a 
PSSA will foster system resilience, we wish to offer inights for resilience practitioners. How can 
they incorporate the tradeoffs and challenges of the policy process into developing framworks 
promoting social-ecological health and sustainability?
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4.1.2 Background
While environmental scholars use terms like resilience-based governance (Anderies et al. 
2006; Plummer and Armitage 2007; Chapin et al. 2009), they have generally focused on desired 
institutional outcomes, while failing to adequately define the procedural mechanisms underlying 
the concept, which are an inherently social set of political and deliberative processes. Garmestani 
and Benson (2013) were two of the first scholars to use the specific term resilience-based 
governance. They use the concept in relation to US law, exploring a legal framework that would 
incorporate the insights of resilience science by accounting for complexity and unpredictability 
in social-ecological systems. However, such a framework, which they call reflexive law, is 
largely absent in the United States. Reflexive law would allow “for iterative processes in the law 
and policy processes,” “seek[s] to determine the organizational and procedural aspects of 
regulated action,” and “incorporate[s] top-down, as well as bottom-up aspects of data collection 
and integration into the management paradigm.” Reflexive law would be better synchronized 
with inherent patterns and processes of social-ecological systems than current United States’ 
laws, which are predominately top-down, non-iterative, and outcome-focused. Reflexive law 
would facilitate adaptive management and adaptive governance, both of which are “vehicles for 
putting resilience theory into practice.”
Garmestani and Benson (2013) usefully distinguishing between adaptive management 
and adaptive governance. Both share the basic tenet of being able to change the rules (i.e., the 
institutions) that steer human interactions with the environment in response to new knowledge 
about environmental and social conditions. The most important difference, however, is that 
adaptive management occurs through conventional institutions of rulemaking and enforcement
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(e.g., the US Departments of the Interior and Commerce), while adaptive governance includes 
the influence of not only the government but also a range of other actors (e.g., Non­
Governmental Organizations, corporations, community groups), and can include informal norms 
of behavior, as well as more formalized rules. Governance is more concerned with power sharing 
between actor groups at different scales than is management, which usually occurs at a single 
scale (Garmestani and Benson 2013).
We return to the concept of resilience-based governance later in the article, identifying 
five main principles and using the principles as an assessment rubric for our case study. 
Importantly, identifying the core principles of resilience-based governance is not simply a 
semantic exercise but has real-world ramifications, as stakeholders increasingly use resilience as 
a normative policy goal (Cote and Nightingale 2012; Robards et al. 2011). We now turn to the 
case study; the proposition of establishing a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area in the Bering Strait.
4.3 A Bering Strait Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA)
Our case study focuses on the Bering Strait—the transboundary marine area separating 
Alaska in the US from Chukotka in the Russian Federation. We limit the geographic scope of our 
assessment to the area from St. Lawrence Island north through the Bering Strait to Point Hope in 
the northeast, and Wrangel Island in the northwest. We focus on the specific policy tool of a 
PSSA designation to protect this area, because it represents an international social-ecological 
policy tool that has been designed to mitigate threats to local resources from international 
activities. It is the only tool at the International Maritime Organization that allows for local 
cultural and ecological resources to justify environmental protections through the regulation of
178
international vessel traffic (as opposed to vessel or mariner safety justifying regulations). 
Consequently, the international deliberations about the legal application of this tool to protect 
local ecosystem services at the expense to “freedom of navigation” offers valuable insights into 
the implementability of multi-scale institutions that can facilitate resilience.
4.3.1 Key Bering Strait Ecological and Cultural Resources
The Bering Strait region encompasses the Bering Strait, an 85 kilometer-wide passage 
that connects the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea to the Chukchi Sea and Arctic Ocean; and 
the Anadyr Strait, a 70 kilometer-wide passage separating St. Lawrence Island in Alaska from 
Chukotka. This transboundary region is globally significant for marine, avian and coastal 
biological diversity, and home to a wide array of Indigenous subsistence communities dependent 
on marine life for their food and cultural security. The International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) has designated 13 ecological and biological sensitive areas in the Arctic as a 
whole and three of these are in the Bering Strait region alone. Some species such as the Western 
Arctic bowhead whale and Pacific walrus have almost their entire population (~17,000 and 
>150,000 animals, respectively) pass through the area twice each year (Robards 2013).
Profound reductions and changing patterns of sea-ice cover in recent years as a result of 
climate change are affecting wildlife distributions and subsistence hunters’ ability to secure food 
(Robards et al. 2013). The changing sea ice combined with strong currents, globally iconic 
aggregations of Arctic wildlife, and over 20,000 Indigenous people living in coastal villages and 
reliant on local marine ecosystem services, make this region a challenging area for mitigating the 
cumulative risks of climate change, new industrial developments, and international shipping.
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4.3.2 Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs)
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the United Nations’ agency 
responsible for the safety and security of international shipping and the prevention of marine 
pollution. IMO pursues its objectives through creating and implementing an authoritative and 
universally applicable regulatory framework for international shipping. One component of 
IMO’s purview is the designation of various marine protected areas around the world, including 
PSSAs, which are one specific type of protected area. IMO states:
A Particularly Sensitive Sea Area is an area that needs special protection through 
action by IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological or 
socio-economic or scientific reasons and which may be vulnerable to damage by 
international maritime activities (IMO 2013).
In practice, a PSSA is an international legal status that allows countries to promulgate 
regulations, called Associated Protective Measures (APMs), for all vessels in their waters, not 
just their own flagged vessels or those visiting their own ports. This includes vessels in innocent 
passage or in “international waters” such as narrow straits separating different countries (like the 
Bering Strait).
APMs serve as the ‘teeth’ of the PSSA policy tool. Each APM is linked to specific 
marine ecosystem services, with the goal of sustaining those services in the face of threats from 
vessel traffic. The following suite of mandatory APMs have been authorized in existing PSSAs 
around the world (Table 4.1): (1) ship routing schemes; (2) ship reporting programs; (3) ship
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pilotage programs; (4) no anchoring areas; (5) areas to be avoided; and (6) Special Area status 
(another IMO tool focused on preventing marine pollution from international vessel traffic). 
IMO is granted the power from United Nation member countries to authorize enforcement of 
APMs through international legal precedent, including the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(Unlu 2004). However, it is the individual countries that carry the legal authority to monitor and 
enforce the rules in their own waters. Because of the high-level authoritative status of IMO, 
PSSA designation grants marine areas unparalleled international recognition compared to many 
other marine protective statuses (Roberts 2007).
The application assessment process within IMO has changed since the first PSSA was 
designated in 1990 and a revised set of guidelines from 2005 is in affect today. To start, a PSSA 
designation for an international strait requires the different coastal states with authority over that 
area to submit a mutually-agreed to application to the IMO. This application must pass a three- 
part stepwise test. First, the area must possess significant resources in at least one of three 
categories: (1) ecological; (2) social, economic, and cultural; or (3) scientific and educational. 
Second, those resources must be shown to be vulnerable to the impacts of international maritime 
traffic. Third, the demonstrated vulnerabilities must be realistically reducible through the 
implementation of APMs.
To gain insight into whether a PSSA status is appropriate for the Bering Strait, we 
reviewed the successful applications for the 14 existing PSSAs (application are available at: 
http://docs.imo.org). Key features of each area that made it viable for PSSA designation and the 
associated APMs are presented in Table 4.1. We also show the diverse character and magnitude 
of vessel traffic at the time of designation for each of the existing PSSAs (Table 4.2), which 
range from iconic marine environments like the Great Barrier Reef, to highly industrialized
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transportation zones like the Baltic Sea (with over 65,000 vessel transits per year), to relatively 
pristine ecosystems like the waters of Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument in 
Hawai’i. What all PSSAs share, however, is possession of significant resources that are 
vulnerable to international shipping but can be protected.
4.3.3 Risk Factors in the Bering Strait Resulting from Maritime Traffic
According to Rear Admiral Thomas Ostebo, Commander of the 17th District of the US 
Coast Guard, about 500 vessels transited the Bering Strait in 2012 (Personal Communication). 
Vessel traffic through the Bering and Anadyr straits is expected to significantly increase over the 
next decade and beyond as the Arctic warms, industrial activities such as mineral and oil and gas 
extraction expand, and as the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage become more active 
trans-global shipping routes (Smith and Stephenson 2013). Already cargo on the Northern Sea 
Route has increased by an order of magnitude since 2007, with over 1.3 million tons of cargo 
transported in 2013 by 71 vessels (information from Center for High North Logistics, accessed 
7/20/2104), up from only two vessels in 2007 (Figure 4.1). Arctic shipping has transitioned from 
what had previously been called “experimental” shipping activities (Brigham 2010) to at least a 
more routine use of the Northern Sea Route. Increases in vessel traffic supporting the massive 
mining efforts that dot the Arctic landscape (termed destination traffic) are also evidenced by a 
suite of new vessel lines linking United States, Canadian, and Russian ports (AMSA 2009).
We focus on the known impacts that vessel traffic could have on (1) iconic populations of 
large cetaceans (bowhead Balaena mysticetus and gray whale Eschrichtius robustus) that 
congregate in vast numbers in this region; and (2) Indigenous food and cultural security along
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the coasts of the Bering Strait region. Other ecosystem services (such as seals or commercial 
fish) are present in the region, but are beyond the scope of a single manuscript. Aggregations of 
whales in shipping lanes elsewhere (including Alaska) have resulted in persistent ship strikes and 
the death of whales (e.g., Neilson et al. 2012; Silber et al. 2012). In the Bering Strait region, 
whale strikes by ships could impact conservation, food security, and trigger other political 
processes (i.e., actions at the International Whaling Commission through subsistence quotas or 
nationally via the Marine Mammal Protection Act). Without policies that proactively address the 
risks associated with when large vessels are transiting hotspot areas for marine mammals, or 
areas that support Indigenous subsistence practices, negative impacts on marine mammal 
populations and Indigenous food security are expected.
4.3.4 Implementing a PSSA in the Bering Strait
The Bering Strait meets the basic criteria necessary for a PSSA designation from the 
IMO. The area (1) possesses resources from the necessary resource categories (marine mammals 
and Indigenous cultural practices), (2) those resources are vulnerable to international maritime 
traffic (i.e., via ship strikes or disturbance of subsistence), and (3) the resources could 
realistically be protected by measures used in other PSSAs (Table 4.3). Mandatory reporting, 
ship routing schemes, areas to be avoided, and IMO Special Areas are potential candidates for 
mitigating our identified risks, and each have precedent elsewhere. However, speed restrictions 
for vessels have no PSSA precedent to date, but are likely one of the most valuable tools for 
reducing fatal vessel strikes on large cetaceans (Laist et al. 2014). Collectively, these types of 
measures also offer opportunities for officials to monitor and enforce marine vessel activity from
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afar (via vessel tracking systems), which is an especially important consideration in such a 
sparsely populated remote region.
Given that a PSSA designation is a reasonable scenario for the Bering Strait (i.e., it is 
theoretically consistent with the language and role of a PSSA, as well as existing precedents), we 
now ask if a PSSA designation would promote social-ecological resilience in the system. To do 
so, we draw on five theoretical principles.
4.4 Resilience-Based Governance Principles
We identify three principles of resilience-based governance that integrate the central 
governance themes within current resilience and social-ecological system literatures (e.g., Young 
2002; Folke et al. 2005; Berkes et al. 2007; Olsson et al. 2007; Carpenter and Brock 2008; 
Brondizio et al. 2009). These principals include the core ideas that institutions that guide human- 
environment interactions must a) be ecosystem-based, b) consider cross-scale impacts, and c) be 
adaptive in order to foster resilience. However, recent critiques from scholars of legal and policy 
studies emphasize that rules of environmental governance must also be legitimate, which is 
largely a function of social perception, and implementable through law, which is a function of 
the process of extant legal systems. We therefore add the two principles of legitimacy and 
implementability, thus grounding the established theoretical ideals of system function with the 
political and legal realities of operationalization.
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4.4.1 Principle 1: Institutions must be Ecosystem-Based
The rules that steer human-environment interactions must fit the complexity of the 
ecosystems they are intended to govern (Young 2002). Context-specific ecosystem-based rules 
accounting for all ecosystem services are needed because ecosystems and their human users are 
heterogeneous over space and time, generally making one-size-fits-all approaches ineffective 
(Daily and Matson 2008; Crowder and Norse 2008). The operationalization of in-depth local 
observations and knowledge of natural processes, which is often derived from bottom-up through 
local research and (sometimes Indigenous) stakeholders is also widely regarded as a critical 
component of ecosystem-based approaches (Berkes et al. 2007). Ecosystem-based governance 
can be challenged by outdated institutional structures that fail to address complex environmental 
interactions across space, time, and system components, resulting in the erosion of resilience. 
However, case studies suggest that bottom-up pilot programs supported by top-down structures 
can help overcome this barrier (Osterblom et al. 2010).
4.4.2 Principle 2: Institutions must be Cross-Scale
Rules of environmental governance must function effectively across scales or levels in 
order to promote resilience, since the connections between ecosystems and people who use them 
transcend any single scale or level (Olsson et al. 2007). Rules that exhibit congruence between 
the international, national, and sub-national scales (i.e., multi-level governance) are often 
difficult to achieve since stakeholders can possess different and conflicting priorities (Adger et 
al. 2005; Brondizio et al. 2009) and even fundamentally different types of environmental
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knowledge (Ahlborg and Nightingale 2012). Conflicts across scales can be managed through 
strong social networks and leaders that bridge organizations, policy levels, and system scales, or 
enhance knowledge flow (Olsson et al. 2006; Bodin and Crona 2009). Polycentric governance, 
emphasizing the functional overlap in multi-level governance systems, has also been shown to be 
responsive to novel conditions (Fabricius et al. 2007; Biggs et al. 2012).
4.4.3 Principle 3: Institutions must be Adaptive
Rules steering human-environment interactions must be flexible enough to change 
(incrementally or entirely) should new environmental and social conditions render them 
ineffective (Nelson et al. 2007; Rijke et al., 2013). The ability of social systems to incorporate 
knowledge from past ecological experiences (in the existing or analogue systems) into future 
decisions (i.e., to reflect and learn) is central to effective adaptive governance (Folke et al. 2005). 
Social systems are increasingly expected to adapt proactively to anticipated ecological changes 
in order to maintain resilience, due to the increasingly rapidity and unpredictability of change 
(Ash et al. 2012). The capacity to adapt the rules of human-environment interaction, both 
reactively and proactively, is a keystone of resilience-based governance.
4.4.4 Principle 4: Institutions must be Legitimate
Multi-sector stakeholders at various scales must collaborate in some manner during 
policy formation, implementation, and amendment in order for rules to be legitimate (Cosens 
2013). From a normative stance, environmental governance must represent the wills of affected
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groups, as resilience itself could prove undesirable if  the social system is undemocratic (Lebel et 
al. 2006). The preferences of local stakeholders can be trumped by the priorities of larger-scale 
groups under the banner of accomplishing ‘the greater good’ (e.g., Robards and Greenberg 
2007). Conversely, powerful small-scale special interests can overpower the democratic process 
of larger groups in some circumstances to accomplish their own security (Robards and Lovecraft 
2010). The presence of power dynamics emphasizes the need to consider normative aspects of 
environmental institutions (Lovecraft 2008; Robards et al. 2011). Legitimate environmental 
policies can also help assure compliance through what Agrawal (2005) describes as 
environmentalities, where the subjects of governance view the rules as part of their own 
identities, sometimes because they have a meaningful voice in creating and implementing them 
(Plummer and Armitage 2007).
4.4.5 Principle 5: Institutions must be Implementable
Rules for ecosystem governance must be implementable through existing legal 
frameworks in order to promote resilience (Ruhl 2010). It makes little difference if a policy tool 
is ecosystem-based, adaptive, cross-scale, and legitimate if the laws that would implement the 
tool are not viable or do not support proper functioning. The legal sciences challenge resilience 
thinking on this front by showing that courts of law generally favor stability over adaptability 
and can thereby be at odds with the other requirements of resilience-based governance (Ruhl and 
Fischman 2010). For resilient social-ecological systems, there must be congruence between not 
only the ecosystems and the rules that govern them but also between the rules and the legal 
frameworks that bring the rules into being and control their adaptation. Non-implementable rules
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(either formal or informal), like those offered up by many well-intentioned, but unrealistic 
academic theoreticians, do little to stem unsustainable human-environment interactions 
(Garmestani and Benson 2013).
4.5 Analysis and Discussion
We break this section into two parts: (1) the political issues around the question of 
whether a PSSA could be adopted for the Bering Strait, and (2) the likely results should a PSSA 
be adopted and implemented. Two of the resilience-based governance principles fall broadly 
under the first category (cross-scale and implementable) and three fall under the second 
(ecosystem-based, adaptable, and legitimate). We identify how key characteristics of the Bering 
Strait system lend themselves to (or constrain) the implementation of each principle of 
resilience-based governance (Table 4.4).
4.5.1 Political Issues
4.5.1.1 Does a PSSA Function Effectively Across Scales?
Many hurdles would have to be overcome for a Bering Strait PSSA to function 
effectively as an institution of cross-scale governance. Because of the overarching international 
importance of the freedom of the seas, the national priorities of the US and the Russian 
Federation might align more closely with the priorities of transnational shipping corporations 
than with the priorities of local subsistence hunters or marine mammal conservation. Such cross-
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scale tensions could inhibit the initial PSSA application process if  more economically or 
international maritime freedom-motivated stakeholders protest the designation.
In addition, based on the top-down structure of the PSSA application process, there is no 
evidence that a Bering Strait PSSA would help alleviate the historic cross-scale hostility on the 
part of the State of Alaska toward attempts by the US federal government to create policies that 
might adversely affect Alaska’s economic interests, as regulating maritime traffic in the Bering 
Strait might be perceived to do. There is a long-standing tension, for example, between the state 
and federal governments with respect to who can profit from commercial activity in the Arctic 
offshore environment, including the Bering Strait (e.g., Paulin 2013).
4.5.1.2 Is a PSSA Implementable?
While implementablity through existing legal and political systems is a key component of 
successful environmental policy (Cumming 2013), and PSSAs have been successfully 
implemented around the world, questions remain about whether the US and Russian Federation 
possess the political will to create a Bering Strait PSSA at this time. The application process 
requires committed resources and prolonged collaboration, both scientifically and politically. 
While the US and Russian Federation possess such resources, current tensions between the 
countries might make a partnership unlikely. If such tensions can be overcome, both countries 
possess the technological capacity to monitor and enforce the APMs. Moreover, both countries 
are member states of the International Maritime Organization; a requirement for PSSA 
designation.
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The existence of stable legal systems in both nations is critical for implementability as 
well, since it would ultimately be the onus of the US and Russian Federation to confront 
shipping companies if the companies failed to abide by the protective measures. The relative 
simplicity of the APMs that the International Maritime Organization could apply in the Bering 
Strait (e.g., clearly defined shipping lanes, vessel notifications, and automated electronic 
tracking) is favorable for effective monitoring and enforcement. However, the potential exists for 
those negatively impacted by increased regulation (i.e., the shipping companies) to attempt to 
hinder the progress of the application process.
4.5.2 Likely Results
4.5.2.1 Is the Institution Ecosystem-Based?
The environmental science contained in the PSSA application would have to address the 
complexity and interconnectedness of this transboundary ecosystem. The application would also 
need to address the ecological changes occurring in Bering Strait. However, it is unclear whether 
the PSSA application would include local-scale and traditional ecological knowledge, as this is 
not a current requirement of the International Maritime Organization.
Roberts (2007) argues that the increased level of regional environmental knowledge 
generated through a successful PSSA application is one of the main benefits of achieving the 
designation; consistent with the strong emphasis on learning within the resilience literature 
(Tschakert and Dietrich 2010). By highlighting the connections between animals and their 
habitats, PSSAs avoid the pitfall of protecting specific species rather than overall systems, which
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other environmental laws (e.g., the Endangered Species Act) have fallen into (Benson 2012). 
Overall, PSSAs achieve a good institutional fit with the environment by invoking protective 
measures that target the particular ecosystem services of each area, rather than attempting to 
protect the environment through blanket policies.
4.5.2.2 Are the Institutions Adaptive?
A Bering Strait PSSA might not be adequately adaptive to handle the rapidly changing 
Arctic environment. While it is hypothetically possible for the coastal states (US and Russian 
Federation) to apply to the International Maritime Organization to amend an APM following its 
implementation (Unlu 2004), there is no precedent of this occurring. Nor does the International 
Maritime Organization offer a clearly defined process for the adaptation of APMs if needed (e.g., 
guidelines for monitoring change, thresholds of change to qualify for an amendment, amendment 
timeline). An entirely new institutional mechanism would need to be developed to give countries 
the power to change APMs in order to achieve this principle. From within the resilience 
literature, Walker (2012) poses the question, “What are the rules for changing the rules?” In the 
case of the PSSA policy tool, there are no rules for changing the rules. There is no clear process, 
for example, to change areas to be avoided if whales alter their migratory patterns, or for scaling 
back mandatory reporting measures if marine traffic flows subside. Institutional rigidity, or the 
inability to adapt, can lead to dysfunctional governance practices in a changing environment 
(e.g., Carpenter and Brock 2008).
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4.5.2.3 Are the Institutions Perceived as Legitimate?
Because the PSSA application and designation processes do not contain a formalized 
mechanism to ensure the participation of the State of Alaska and Chukotka regional 
governments, or Indigenous groups, it is possible that a PSSA would be perceived as illegitimate 
by key stakeholders. Some applications for existing PSSAs do emphasize Indigenous use of 
marine areas for nutritional and cultural purposes, but there is no required inclusion of 
Indigenous issues at the International Maritime Organization (there is a Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues at the United Nations, but the link between this forum and the International 
Martime Organization is beyond the scope of this discussion). Cosens (2013) writes, “[C]hanges 
to governance needed to foster ecosystem resilience will not be adopted by democratic societies 
without careful attention to their effect on the social system itself.” PSSAs are arguably 
undemocratic institutions, initiated, pursued, and regulated by government agencies at the 
national and international scale. Inadequate participation in policy processes can leave 
stakeholders feeling resentful, thereby delegitimizing the policy (Cosens and Williams 2012). 
Greater emphasis on stakeholder inclusion in the PSSA application process would be required to 
fulfill this principle.
A second component of legitimacy is the perception of contemporary need for a PSSA -  
is there a current problem or is this about a perceived potential problem in the future (after some 
threshold in vessel traffic is reached). While PSSAs have generally, but not always reacted to a 
recognized problem, proactive examples do exist with low transit numbers such as in the 
northwest Hawaiian Islands. For Bering Strait, the relatively few transiting vessels, perhaps 
warrants closer attention to the value of proactive voluntary measures within the APMs
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(Huntington et al., in press). Governments and international shipping companies, who are likely 
to view mandatory regulations as an imposition on maritime freedoms, or an impediment to their 
efficient operation, are likely to be more amenable to such voluntary measures. Voluntary 
measures foster social learning, facilitate adaptive change, and could foster learning and new 
environmentalities (central tenets of resilience approaches). Furthermore, additional protective 
measures known to reduce impacts to whales such as limited speeds, which have no precedent in 
PSSAs elsewhere could be explored. However, for the protective measures we identify, 
international compliance with voluntary measures may not always be adequate (McKenna et al. 
2012), supporting the value of a policy ‘testing period’ in which compliance and effectiveness 
can be assessed prior to finalizing APMs for a PSSA.
4.6 Conclusion
We addressed the concept of a PSSA designation in the Bering Strait region, and if it 
would increase the resilience of the social-ecological system. We did so by objectively 
comparing what we know about PSSAs as a policy tool and what we know about the Bering 
Strait social-ecological system in the context of five principles of resilience-based governance. 
Our principles included three that were derived from the current resilience and social-ecological 
system literatures, and two from the legal and policy science literatures concerning the political 
and legal realities of operationalization.
Holling (2012), in responding to an article demonstrating the difficulties of actualizing 
resilience-based governance, acknowledged the imperative to create environmental policies even 
in the absence of perfect options. He states:
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All that can be done now is to focus on some fundamental developments that slow 
the worst problems and also dramatically explore several real options that are 
promising gambles (p. 1).
A PSSA designation is a real and promising option for the Bering Strait, providing opportunities 
to support social-ecological resilience in the presence of uncertainty. Of the five principles, our 
analysis suggests that the potential exclusion of key stakeholders (notably Indigenous 
communities and the regional governments) is perhaps the greatest weakness of the PSSA policy 
tool.
With regard to the question of praxis, we reiterate some frequently identified challenges 
and tradeoffs that resilience practitioners should be prepared to address - the real work of ‘doing 
resilience’ lies here (Table 4.5). We contend that, while the identification of best-practice 
principles for social-ecological governance is important, they are by-and-large already known. 
Consequently, we recommend resilience practitioners step away from the burgeoning array of 
theoretical frameworks and focus on the implementation of these frameworks by managers, 
policy makers, lawyers, and stakeholders. These are the people who are making the day-to-day 
decisions and difficult trade-offs concerning natural resource management. A greater focus is 
needed from academics exploring new modes of governance on the types of factors that support 
or detract from praxis as we have begun to unravel here. Further integration of resilience ideals 
with the Policy Sciences, Political Philosophy, and with concept of Power offer fruitful further 
directions.
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Table 4.1 Existing PSSAs (all data from IMO application documents) and whether Associated Protective Measures were 
proactively or reactively responding to threats.
PSSA Countries Examples of
ecological
resources
Examples of 
social, 
economic, 
and cultural 
resources
Examples of 
scientific and 
educational 
resources
Associated
protective
measure(s)
W as designation 
proactive or 
reactive to 
ecological 
degradation?
Great Barrier Reef Australia Coral reefs 
and related 
species
Traditional 
fishing and 
tourism
Broad range of
natural
phenomenon
Pilotage,
reporting
Largely proactive
The Sabana- 
Camaguey Archipelago
Cuba Marine 
species and 
landscapes
Fishing and 
tourism
Cayo Coco 
research center
Areas to 
avoid
Largely proactive
Malpelo Island Columbia Mangroves,
coral,
beaches, fish,
Fishing Established
research
collaborations
Areas to 
avoid
Largely reactive to 
illegal fishing and 
increased pleasure 
cruising
Sea around the Florida 
Keys
United States Coral reefs 
and marine 
mammals
Fishing and 
tourism
Draws
international
scientists
Areas to 
avoid, and 
no
anchoring
areas
Largely reactive, 
but phrased in 
terms of 
“preventing 
damage”
W adden Sea Denmark,
Germany,
Netherlands
Tidal flats 
and seals
Fishing and 
tourism
Established
scientific
institutions
Routing Largely proactive, 
area is already 
protected by 
numerous measures
Paracas National 
Reserve
Peru Marine 
mammals, 
birds, and 
flora
Tourism Educational 
programs 
carried out
Areas to 
avoid
Largely proactive, 
no serious previous 
impacts mentioned
W estern European 
Waters
Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain, United 
Kingdom
Marine 
mammals, 
shellfish, and 
unique 
landscapes
Seafood 
industry and 
tourism
Established
biodiversity
research
Reporting Largely proactive 
but phrased in 
terms o f reacting to 
threat o f  marine 
pollution from ship 
wrecks
Torres Strait Extension 
of Great Barrier Reef 
PSSA
Australia, Papua 
New Guinea
Coral, marine
mammals,
fish
Indigenous
hunting
Collaborative 
Indigenous and 
scientific 
research
Pilotage,
routing
Largely proactive 
with some mention 
of vessel pollution
Canary Islands Spain Marine
mammals,
high
biodiversity
Tourism Established
international
research
Areas to 
avoid, 
routing, 
reporting
Largely proactive
Galapagos Archipelago Ecuador Marine 
mammals, 
sea birds, 
mangroves
Small-scale
fishing
Collaborative 
local and 
scientific 
programs
Area to 
avoid, 
reporting, 
routing
Largely proactive 
with some 
reference to ship 
groundings
Baltic Sea Area Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania,
Poland, Sweden
Wetlands, sea 
birds, fish
Fishing and 
tourism
History o f  data 
collection
Routing, 
areas to 
avoid,
Special Area
Largely reactive to 
pollution and 
substantial number 
o f recent vessel 
accidents
Papahanaumokuake a 
Marine National 
Monument
United States Marine 
mammals, 
coral reefs, 
fish
Numerous 
sacred cites
Baseline for 
undisturbed 
ecosystem
Areas to
avoid,
reporting
Largely proactive
Strait o f  Bonifacio France, Italy Fish, flora n/a Potential for
sustainable
resource
management
research
Routing, 
areas to 
avoid, 
reporting, 
pilotage
Largely reactive to 
series o f recent 
vessel groundings
Saba Bank in the 
Caribbean Sea
Netherlands Coral reefs 
and related 
species
Small-scale
fishing
Baseline for 
undisturbed 
ecosystem
No
anchoring 
area, area to 
avoid
Largely proactive 
with m inor mention 
of previous anchor 
damage to reef
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Table 4.2 Vessel usage in the Particularly Sensitive Sea Area prior to designation by the International Maritime Organization.
PSSA Designation
Year
Estimated num ber of vessels 
annually reported in  PSSA and 
immediate vicinity at the time of  
designation
Primary Vessel Types
Great Barrier Reef 1990 2,000 ships passing through PSSA 
area each year1
Tanker, cargo, recreational/tourism vessels
Sabana- Camaguey Archipelago 1997 No specific data Fishing vessels and vessels over 150 gross 
tonnage2
Malpelo Island 2002 1,139 vessels in vicinity o f  PSSA 
area3
Tanker, cargo, local fishing vessels
Sea around Florida Keys 2002 8,000 large cargo ships transit 
PSSA area4
Tanker, cargo, cruise ships
W adden Sea 2002 No specific data, but very heavily 
trafficked5
Tanker, cargo, passenger, fishing, special 
purpose, recreational
Paracas National Reserve 2003 4,740-6,420 vessels in vicinity of 
PSSA area6
Tanker, cargo
W estern European Waters 2004 43,209 vessels in PSSA area7 All types
Torres Strait 2005 1,008 vessels making 3,136 
voyages in PSSA area8
Tanker, cargo, fishing vessels
Canary Islands 2005 1,500 vessels pass through PSSA 
area9
Tanker, cargo, fishing
Galapagos Archipelago 2005 156 vessels made port call in 
PSSA area10
Tourism, fishing, Cargo/Container
Baltic Sea Area 2005 65,000 vessels entered PSSA 
area11
Tankers, cargo, container
Papahanaumokuakea Marine 
National Monument
2007 75 vessels voluntarily reported 
within PSSA area12 
34 vessels in PSSA area on 
average: 1994-200413
Freighters, tankers, fishing, research
Strait o f  Bonifacio 2011 2,984 mandatory vessel reports in 
PSSA area14
Tanker, cargo, passenger, fishing, 
recreational
Saba Bank in the Caribbean Sea 2012 200 vessels pass through PSSA 
area15
Tanker, cargo
1 IMO document MEPC 46/23, Annex 6, p. 17; 2IMO document MEPC 46/23, Annex 6, p. 21; 3IMO document MEPC 46/6/3, p. 3; 4IMO 
document MEPC 46/6/2, p. 7; 5IMO document MEPC 48/7/2, p. 8; 6IMO document MEPC 48/7, Annex, p. 15, adapted figure; 7IMO 
document MEPC 49/8/1, Annex 1, p. 36; 8IMO document MEPC 49/8, p. 13; 9IMO document MEPC 51/8, Annex, p. 11; 10IMO document 
MEPC 51/8/2, p. 12, adapted figure; n IMO document MEPC 51/8/1, p. 11; 12IMO document MEPC 56/8, p. 12, adapted figure; 13Franklin, 
2008; 14IMO document MEPC 61/9, Annex, p. 10; 15IMO document NAV 58/3, p. 3.
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Table 4.3 Selected examples of Bering Strait resources, vulnerabilities and mitigation tools.
Bering Strait Resource Vulnerability to 
shipping
Mitigation tools
Ecological
Large cetaceans Fatal Ship strikes Vessel speed 
Areas to be 
avoided, 
Routing, 
Reporting
Critical wildlife habitats Disturbance that 
displaces animals away 
from critical habitats
Areas to be 
avoided
Social, cultural, and economic
Ability of hunters to be successful and 
safe
Disturbance that 
displaces animals away 
from villages or where 
wakes jeopardize the 
safety of hunters, 
particularly in broken ice
Areas to be 
avoided, 
Routing 
Reporting,
Health of subsistence resources Pollution Special Areas
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Table 4.4 Bering Strait: System properties and decision processes associated with operationalization o f resilience-based 
governance principles through a PSSA.
Resilience-Based
Governance
Principle
Bering Strait System Properties Decision Processes
Political Issues around Designation
Cross-scale Stakeholder groups at the local, sub-national, national, and 
international scales have substantial interest in how the 
Bering Strait is governed -  economically as well as 
environmentally; both economic and environmental 
drivers across scales affect the system.
The process o f  selecting protective measures needs 
to accommodate the sometimes conflicting 
environmental, economic, and political 
considerations that occur across scales, and 
effectively address cross-scale interactions. 
Understanding cross-scale trade-offs will be a 
critical consideration in analyses o f the viability and 
effectiveness o f  a PSSA designation. The US and 
Russian Federation would have to come together, 
along with other stakeholders, to create a successful 
application.
Implementable The national governments that would be tasked with 
enforcing protective measures are stable and both legal 
systems possess the capacity to enforce rules. However 
tensions between the US and Russian Federation may 
continue to exacerbate agreements.
National governments would have to choose to 
work together and commit financial resources for 
effective monitoring tools (e.g., through vessel 
monitoring and reporting o f  seasonal risks to 
cetaceans), and enforcement to proactively prevent 
negative impacts on cetaceans, ecosystems, and 
cultures. The maritime insurance industry may also 
monitor actions that jeopardize the health and safety 
o f Indigenous groups or iconic coastal aggregations 
o f wildlife as part o f mitigating their own risks.
Likely Results if  Implemented
Ecosystem-based The Bering Strait ecosystem is reasonably bounded and 
studied, providing much of the necessary information to 
inform protective measures. However, the area is rapidly 
changing due to global climate change and social or 
economic factors. Combined with the remoteness, this can 
be a harsh and challenging environment to conduct 
environmental research or to assess long-term chronic or 
actute impacts o f  vessel traffic on the marine environment 
and the people who rely on it.
The PSSA application would need to address the 
protection o f  ecosystem functions and key 
processes. The specific justification for a PSSA (as 
required) in this case study is the health and safety 
o f large cetaceans and Indigenous communities in a 
migration bottleneck. The inclusion of human 
interests within the ecosystem, including the safety 
o f hunters and the health o f  subsistence resources 
(through minimizing discharges) reflects important 
ecosystem-based considerations.
Adaptive There is reasonable ecological, economic, social, and 
vessel baseline data about the Bering Strait, but data on 
the local rates and processes o f change are often lacking. 
Directional change in system properties is predicted to 
continue in the foreseeable future but there is uncertainty 
about rates o f change making management decision rules 
difficult to develop.
While IMO has been reticent to apply adaptive or 
seasonal protective measures under a PSSA 
designation, seasonal application o f  protective 
measures and monitoring o f key system variables 
would be essential i f  seeking to ensure an optimal 
link between economic, social, and ecosystem 
needs in Bering Strait. However, political trade-offs 
with an adaptive approach may support more static, 
or alternatively voluntary protective measures. 
Furthermore, in the case o f cetacean strikes, the 
importance o f  an effective monitoring system to 
assess the prevalence o f  strikes is vital for an 
adaptive approach to reducing impacts.
Legitimate While there is historical precedent for a strong focus on 
the freedom o f navigation across the w orld’s oceans, there 
has been minimal attention to the voice o f Indigenous 
coastal food security in IMO policy decisions. In contrast, 
in the United States, there is relatively strong recognition 
o f Indigenous rights and increasing numbers o f  formal 
processes for tribal consultation or co-management. 
Nevertheless state-federal relations may exacerbate 
existing cross-scale political tensions both in the US and 
Russian Federation.
The US and Russian Federation governments, along 
with sub-national and international stakeholder 
groups would need to support protective measures. 
These would reflect the needs and interests o f 
Indigenous subsistence hunters as well as the 
conservation and economic needs o f  regional and 
national governments. Conversely, international 
shipping and national security interests would need 
to support actions that impact policy positions 
concerning the established legitimacy o f freedom of 
navigation elsewhere.
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Table 4.5 Key challenges and tradeoffs for operationalizing resilience-based governance.
• Reconciling different priorities across scales and in areas of multiple jurisdictional 
oversight
• Institutionalizing effective processes for adaptive environmental policies
• Achieving adequate stakeholder participation to ensure legitimacy at local, regional, 
national, and international scales
• Generating political will to act proactively (especially in transboundary areas)
• Balancing environmental protection with economic or maritime freedom__________
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Transit Traffic on the Northern Sea Route: 1990-2013
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
2010 2015
Figure 4.1 Reported vessel traffic on the Northern Sea Route, 1990 -  2013. While transits are regarded as those vessels passing 
between the Barents and Bering Seas via the set of waterways between Kara Gate at the southern tip of Novaya Zemlya) and 
the Bering Strait, this is only a small proportion of the vessel traffic entering the Northern Sea Route which includes cabotage 
and import/export (Data from  High North Logistics).
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I apply the radical resilience framework developed in the general 
introduction to the three case studies presented in the body of the dissertation. This is achieved 
by rereading each case study in light of the five questions that were generated by integrating 
vocabulary from radical political economy with key concepts from conventional resilience 
thinking. The questions are:
• What are the key social-ecological dynamics of the given system?
• Who benefits from the arrangement, at what scale, and how much?
• Who suffers from the arrangement, and at what scale, and how much?
• Is power equitably distributed in this arrangement?
• In this context, what should be made resilient to what and for whom?
After addressing the above questions for each case study, I turn to a discussion of the 
dissertation’s overarching research question: How is the global capitalist system affecting the 
social-ecological resilience of Indigenous communities in northern Alaska as the Arctic 
continues to industrialize? Finally, I offer recommendations for improving Arctic stewardship, 
which advances the dissertation’s goal of improving resilience thinking and its application. First, 
however, I further examine what a reconstructed resilience thinking looks like in terms theory, 
research, and action.
Resilience thinking has produced myriad theoretical heuristics that represent the key 
ontologies and epistemologies of the field (see Walker et al., 2006). I am focusing my
211
reconstruction on the adaptive cycle, which is arguably the most important heuristic, as it lies at 
the center of much resilience-based analysis. The adaptive cycle is intended to provide a general 
model for the process by which systems change over time. In this model, systems move through 
four unique and sequential stages and then start over again: growth, conservation, release, and 
renewal. The act of passing through these phases (which is represented graphically by a figure- 
eight shape lying on its side) gives systems the capacity to respond to changes imposed upon 
them from outside or inside their own boundaries. When a system reorganizes following a 
release phase, it can do so either around the same fundamental structures and functions, which is 
considered an adaptation, or around fundamentally different structures and functions, which is 
termed a transformation. Adaptive cycles exist at multiple spatial and temporal scales and are 
linked across scales to other adaptive cycles, forming a panarchy of mutually influential driving 
forces. Clearly this heuristic is highly abstract, but that is what grants it generalizability.
The connection between the adaptive cycle and radical political economy is that 
resilience thinkers speak of the capacity of systems to adapt and transform in terms of their 
capital -  a concept central to political economy. Walker and Cooper (2011), in comparing natural 
systems to economic systems, explain that in the view of Holling (who is considered the 
originator of resilience thinking), “What unites these diverse systems... is the proposition that 
each can be defined by a concept of ‘capital’ -  this capital be it fin an c ia l. or biophysical, is the 
inherent potential of a system that is available for change” (8). If we take seriously Marx’s 
definition of capitalism, as described in the Introduction, it becomes apparent that in capitalist 
systems, the systems potentiality is exploited and appropriated by an elite minority class that 
uses it to maximize its own profits. When a system’s social and natural capital is controlled in a 
capitalistic manner, it is easy to see how systems can be directed to operate in ways that benefit
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the capitalists. The seizing of control over systems by capitalists can take the form of either 
transforming a non-capitalist system into a capitalist mode of production and consumption 
(which is what sustainable development via neoliberalization is often criticized for), or, 
alternatively, by maintaining a system in a capitalist mode in the face of movement towards 
system transformation.
Remembering the critiques of resilience thinking and insights of Gibson-Graham (1996) 
about alternatives to capitalism, we can see that while it may be the presence of capital within a 
system that signifies its capacity for adaptation and transformation, it is by whom the 
exploitation of that capital is appropriated and how the value is disturbed and reinvested that 
actually matter for the structure and function of the system (e.g., the production of social well­
being vs. negative externalities). Radical resilience conceptualizes the adaptive cycles of social- 
ecological systems as being largely steered by human decisions and power (this is the 
Anthropocene after all), and would explicitly acknowledge the social and ecological 
undesirability of capitalist systems. The reconstruction does not fundamentally change the 
adaptive capacity heuristic, but it does alter our understanding of the nature of capital in the 
cycle. Other foundational theoretical concepts in resilience thinking (e.g., panarchy, traps, 
feedbacks, cross-scale interactions, fast and slow variables) should be similarly recast in light of 
a critical understanding of capital and its multiple potential uses.
In terms of research, a reconstructed resilience thinking would include a new method for 
bounding systems. Speaking from personal experience, resilience thinkers are trained to limit the 
scope of their analysis by drawing strict boundaries around a system of interest. The problem 
with this, however, which MacKinnon and Derickson (2013) point out, is that resilience-based 
research often focuses on local to regional scale systems while ignoring the embeddedness of
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such systems in larger scale circuits of capitalist production and consumption. In resilience 
language, the perturbation of neoliberalism’s international policies to the resilience of non­
capitalist systems must become a central topic of study for a reconstructed resilience thinking. 
How can non-market, sharing economies be made resilient to the global sustainable development 
agenda, for example? Complementarily, the study of transforming capitalist systems into non­
capitalist systems within the theoretical framework of resilience thinking would be an area of 
research. This second line of research would complement the efforts of political ecology to be a 
“seed” of positive action, instead of just a “hatchet” with which to critique.
The dominant methodology of conventional resilience thinking (i.e., modeling) gets to 
the heart of the ontological and epistemological divide between positivists and critical theorists 
(Cote & Nightingale, 2012). Can we really ever know a system? Nevertheless, there is a growing 
body of resilience-based research that engages alternative qualitative methodologies, such as 
ethnography. A mixed-methods approach to researching the resilience of alternatives to 
capitalism is the most promising option for moving forward, as this would create a better 
understanding of the role of identities in non-capitalist resilience, while also offering new 
modeling challenges, such as calculating the statistical influence of international free trade 
policies on the self-perceived well-being of ecosystem dependent local populations. Importantly, 
the indicators that researchers measure as proxies of resilience would change from absolute 
economic output, for example, and instead examine the social distribution of economic capital.
Lastly, a reconstructed resilience thinking could empower action that leads to genuine 
movement away from capitalistic social-ecological relations, and some research suggests that is 
already the case (e.g., MacKinnon & Derickson, 2013). This might include communities 
separating themselves from global flows of capitalism in a return to local production and
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consumption. It might see communities accessing global flows of capital, but then using them for 
communal purposes, thus subverting the logics of capital accumulation and creating 
heterogeneous systems where multiple modes of economy exist side-by-side, like those 
suggested by Gibson-Graham. The key in terms of action, is to prevent capitalists from using 
resilience thinking as a discursive tool to make people believe that it is their responsibility, as 
individuals or communities, to absorb the harms of capitalism.
Perhaps the most important alteration for the research, theory, and action aspects of a 
rebuilt resilience thinking is the conceptual move of framing capitalism as an undesirable system 
trait rather than a natural social-ecological condition. Remember, getting rid of capitalism here 
does not mean getting rid of markets or the exploitation of labor to produce surplus value, which 
are acceptable, but rather getting rid of the appropriation of that surplus value by an elite class, 
which leads to harmful social-ecological relations (i.e., externalities). Resilience thinking is a 
powerful conceptual framework that can be used to steer transformations in a desirable direction. 
It is up to critical scholars to wrestle the definition of ‘desirable’ away from the capitalist agenda 
and to save resilience thinking from its unfortunate ingestion of the contradictions of capitalism.
Radical resilience is exciting because it provides a well-reasoned and specific idea for 
harnessing existing resources to increase social well-being and environmental sustainability. It 
takes the resilience thinking bundle of theory, research, and action that we already have and 
points in a new direction. It builds on the essential work of critiquing resilience and tries to take 
the next step of reconstruction. It is hopeful and optimistic because it emphasizes ‘the good’ in 
alternative ways of doing economy—we can still produce and consume and invest, we just have 
to do it in ways that subvert capital accumulation by the elite. Perhaps this is a step towards 
creating systems of social, environmental, and economic relations that are every bit as efficient
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and energized as capitalist systems, but based on an entrepreneurship of communal well-being, 
rather than of selfish greed. The interpretation of resilience described above allows a radical 
rereading of the three case studies the dissertations presented previously.
5.2 Case 1: Tourism
5.2.1 What are the Key Social-Ecological Dynamics of the Given System?
This case study examined the tourism situation in Barrow, Alaska. A key driver of 
tourism in the community was shown to be the community’s natural capital, especially the desire 
of tourists to view certain animals such as polar bears and specific avian species. The case also 
revealed that tourists are attracted to the community due to its extreme northern-ness, which 
brings with it natural phenomenon such as the presence of sea ice, tree-free landscapes, and the 
aurora borealis. While the Northern Lights will remain unaffected by global warming, the same 
cannot be said for Barrow’s other natural attractions. Climate change is predicted to degrade the 
suitability of critical habitat for polar bears and other species that are highly adapted to the 
Arctic’s unique climate (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014). Reduced 
sea ice, increased landscape shrubification, and a northerly advancing tree line have also been 
projected by ecological and geophysical models under climate change scenarios (IPCC, 2014). 
For tourism, these changes could constitute a reduction in the desirability of the community as a 
destination, although this could be many years off and further research is needed to understand 
the motivation of Barrow’s tourists quantitatively.
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In the interim, knowledge about climate change and its impacts in the Arctic might create 
a temporary increase in tourism, as visitors seize what they view as their last chance to 
experience threatened phenomenon. In Barrow, climate change may actually increase polar bear 
viewing opportunities in the near term, as reduced sea ice has been linked to increased use of 
land among polar bears in the Chukchi Sea area (Rode et al., 2015). A significant tension within 
Arctic tourism is that tourists’ activities tend to exacerbate the impacts on the natural 
phenomenon they seek to experience though, for example, the emission of greenhouse gases 
associated with travel and more direct harassment of species during viewing activities. Tourism 
in Barrow also has a strong cultural component. The Indigenous Inupiat culture is both a tourism 
attraction and a potential site for tourism impacts. Impacts can occur through external cultural 
commodification and through increased competition for subsistence resources including access 
to specific species and relevant landscapes.
5.2.2 Who Benefits from the Arrangement, at What Scale, and How Much?
The benefits of tourism in Barrow are split between local and non-local stakeholders. 
Local beneficiaries include tour guides, hotels, restaurants, and handicraft artisans who extract 
profit from visitors to the community. Local beneficiaries are split between Alaska Native and 
non-native individuals and business owners. Beneficiaries outside of the community primarily 
consist of tourism companies that utilize Barrow as a destination, such as those based in other 
parts of Alaska and in more distant locations such as Europe and Asia (e.g., foreign cruise ship 
lines). Tourists themselves also ostensibly benefit from tourism in Barrow, although in a non- 
financial manner. Comparing the prices of the tourism services offered by local Indigenous
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beneficiaries to those offered by non-local beneficiaries reveals a significant contrast. Inupiaq 
artisans sell their handicrafts for between a few tens of dollars to a few hundred dollars usually, 
with occasional custom pieces reaching into the thousands of dollars. Similarly, a two to three 
hour tour with an Inupiaq guide in Barrow costs a few hundred dollars per person.
In contrast to the small tour operators and independent artisans located within Barrow, 
the Asia-based cruise line Crystal Cruises is planning a 2016 transit of the Northwest Passage 
that illustrates the scale of non-local tourism activities occurring in the region (Crystal Cruises, 
n.d.). Crystal Serenity is the name of the ship making the transit, and tickets for one of its 1,080 
passenger spaces range between $21,000 and $46,000, depending on the level of luxury desired. 
Of course tourists would spend significantly more money in Barrow if they stayed there for a 
length of time comparable to the duration of a cruise, and of course the cruise goes to more 
location than Barrow. The point of this comparison is simply to illustrate that the portion of the 
total arctic tourism dollar being spent in Indigenous communities is very small.
5.2.3 Who Suffers from the Arrangement, at What Scale, and How Much?
The tragic irony of Arctic tourists contributing to the destruction of the very ecosystems 
they visit through the emission of greenhouse gases has not been lost on tourism scholars. 
Dawson, Stewart, Lemelin, and Scott (2010), for example, quantify emissions and gauge 
tourists’ perceptions of their own carbon choices related to polar bear viewing in Churchill, 
Canada. There is also concern that Arctic tourism has already and will increasingly disturb 
Indigenous cultures by introducing large numbers of visitors to small, largely-Indigenous coastal 
communities that may not be well equipped to handle such human influx, neither in terms of
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physical infrastructure nor culturally (Luck, Maher, & Stewart, 2010). Moreover, communities 
run the risk of potentially overinvesting in tourism infrastructure, which may be profitable in the 
short term, but later prove costly to maintain if tourism number decrease. Larger tourism 
business operating in the region possess the ability to simply stop running Arctic tours if  it 
becomes unprofitable. As the case study of Barrow shows, many of the concerns about who 
suffers from Arctic tourism are based on projections about what might happen in the future, 
rather than current conditions. However, as the Crystal Cruise transit of the Northwest Passage 
described above indicates, the future appears to be approaching rapidly.
5.2.4 Is Power Equitably Distributed in this Arrangement?
Within the tourism system of Barrow, Alaska, power is divided between stakeholders 
across various scales. The local governments (city and borough) and native corporations (village 
and regional) hold jurisdiction over different segments of the land and own some of the tourism 
infrastructure in and around the community, and thus control tourism activities to some extent. 
The City of Barrow, I was told during an interview, possess jurisdiction over the portion of the 
coastline where cruise passengers make landfall, which would give the city the right to extract a 
head tax on cruise tourists. At larger scales, the activities of tourists in Alaska are affected by 
state, federal, and transnational rules and regulations pertaining to the movement of people 
through space and their allowable impacts on natural environments. The production and sale of 
Indigenous handicrafts, for example, is limited by marine mammal protection laws imposed by 
the US federal government (Robards & Lovecraft, 2010). Similarly, cruise tourism is governed 
in part by the UN International Maritime Organization, but also by the standards of industry
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organizations, which have emerged from decades of complex political debates and legal 
decisions about passenger safety, inter alia. Due to the long distances and high costs associated 
with Arctic tourism, large tourism businesses hold substantial power in the system because they 
possess the financial capital needed to generate the economies of scale that make Arctic tourism 
profitable. Lastly, the tourists themselves possess consumer power.
5.2.5 In this Context, what should be made Resilient to What and for Whom?
Approaching resilience thinking from the perspective of radical political economy reveals 
that in the case of tourism in Barrow, the distribution of risk and benefits are more evenly 
distributed between stakeholders (along axes of local vs. non-local, Indigenous vs. non- 
Indigenous, and financially powerful vs. financially disempowered) than in the cases of natural 
resource extraction and shipping that follow. This is because the risks and benefits are currently 
less, in an absolute sense, in this case than in the others; that is to say that tourism does not 
currently produce the same levels of profits nor social-ecological harms as natural resource 
extraction and shipping.
However, tourism is similar to the other cases to the extent that non-local, financially 
powerful actors (e.g., cruise ship firms, tour companies based in southern Alaska) still extract the 
most financial benefit and carry the least risk, since they can simply leave the region if changing 
conditions challenge their bottom line. Local communities, on the other hand, are intrinsically 
tied to a particular territory and thereby find themselves subjected to the changes being brought 
about largely by outside influences, such as globalization. Globalization affects demand for, 
supply of, and access to tourism destination in the Arctic broadly, and in northern Alaska more
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specifically. Take China, for example, which after opening its borders to the rest of the world 
through its increasing embrace of capitalism, has generated a large middle-class society of 
consumers and investors. Evidence suggests that China’s new capitalists are increasing demand 
for tourism destinations -  including those in the Arctic -  as they gain consumptive power (Li, 
Lai, Harrill, Kline, & Wang, 2011), while also increasing the supply of Arctic destinations 
through foreign direct investment and the establishment of Chinese tourism enterprises in 
locations such as Iceland (Huijbens & Alessio, 2015). Globalization is partially defined by an 
increased rate in the flow of people and capital around the world, and increasing demand for and 
supply of Arctic tourism destinations is part of this phenomenon. When considering resilience in 
this context, we ought to ask, how can local goals for tourism development be made resilient to 
(1) agendas and priorities of outside actors and (2) environmental change, and how can this be 
done for the benefit of local stakeholders, especially Indigenous populations?
5.3 Case 2: Natural Resource Extraction
5.3.1 What are the Key Social-Ecological Dynamics of the Given System?
Within the region that this case study defines as US Arctic, there are over 30,000 
residents -  a high percentage of whom are Alaska Natives engaged, to varying degrees, in 
subsistence lifestyles. Natural resource extraction in this region, in the form of oil and gas 
production, mining, and all accompanying development, has caused direct alterations of 
particular places on landscapes and seascapes, while also contributing to cumulative impacts on 
regional ecosystems more broadly. Oil leaks and mine tailings pose the threat of environmental
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pollution, while industrial phenomenon like seismic prospecting and the construction of roads, 
pipelines, and offshore drill platforms may disrupt the normal patterns of keystone species, such 
as caribou and bowhead whales (Glenn, Itta, & Napageak, 2011; Huntington, 2009). Climate 
change is also contributing to the cumulative impacts to regional ecosystems through, for 
example, altering the abundance and spatial distribution of caribou food sources and arctic sea 
ice (IPCC, 2014). In contrast, the production of oil and gas resources in the region contributes to 
climate change through the release of greenhouse gases during the combustion of these fossil 
fuels for energy.
5.3.2 Who Benefits from the Arrangement, at What Scale, and How Much?
The corporations responsible for industrial development are the largest beneficiaries of 
existing and plausible future development in US Arctic, despite being based outside of the 
region. Local communities, however, also receive substantial benefits from natural resource 
extraction through a variety of financial arrangements that channel revenue to regional boroughs, 
native corporations, and individuals (e.g., taxes, royalties, partnerships, employment). The native 
regional corporation in Northwest Arctic Borough reports that in 2015 Red Dog Mine paid $11.6 
million to the borough in lieu of taxes, $187 million in royalties to native shareholders, and $39.3 
million in wages to native employees (NANA Regional Corporation, 2015). This financial 
inflow aids local communities in securing basic social services and helps subsistence users pay 
for the modern technology needed for subsistence hunting and gathering, such as snow 
machines, boats, and fuel. The corporate partner in Red Dog Mine is a Canadian firm called 
Teck -  who reported gross corporate profits of nearly $3 billion in 2014 from 12 mining
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operations spread throughout North and South America (Teck Resources Limited, 2015). A 
similar dynamic is present between the oil and gas corporations operating in the region (e.g., 
Shell, Exxon-Mobile, BP) and local communities; wherein significant financial revenues flow to 
boroughs and native corporations while extra-local corporations running the activates secure 
huge profits.
5.3.3 Who Suffers from the Arrangement, at What Scale, and How Much?
The ecosystems that have been directly impacted by the building of industrial 
infrastructure are some of the largest losers in this arrangement. As the case study points out, the 
footprint of existing infrastructure is over 18,000 acres, and that could increase by nearly 50% 
under a maximum development scenario. Moreover, the area affected by industrial activities is 
much greater than the actual footprint (National Research Council [NRC], 2003). This affected 
space, both terrestrial and maritime, is no longer engaged in producing the same level of 
ecosystem services that unaltered environments would supply (although permitting processes 
aim to minimize impacts on ecosystem services, such as habitat provision for subsistence 
species). Through the degradation of ecosystems and also the reduction in physical space 
available for subsistence use, local communities are negatively affected by industrial activity in 
the region.
Industrial activity has also made local communities vulnerable to volatility in global 
natural resource markets. Due to their dependence on the revenue associated with the single 
sector of either mining or oil and gas, a crash in these markets could spell financial disaster for 
communities that have little economic diversification. However, this is also largely the case for
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the State of Alaska. The financial future of many communities is linked to the production of non­
renewable resources, which is not conducive to long term sustainability. The multi-national 
corporations that run natural resource extraction, on the other hand, are less vulnerable to a halt 
in production from within the region. As we saw with Red Dog mine and as is the case for the 
big oil and gas companies, natural resource corporations in northern Alaska have operations 
throughout the world. If the resources dry up in Alaska, or if  market forces make continued 
operation unprofitable, they can refocus their efforts elsewhere. Obviously the same cannot be 
said for regional communities, for whom location is unalterable.
5.3.4 Is Power Equitably Distributed in this Arrangement?
A degree of equity and power sharing was established by the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA) of the US Congress, which granted native populations ownership over 
limited portions of the surface and subsurface lands in US Arctic. It is the act of owning the land 
that allows Alaska Natives to secure revenue flows from some of the natural resources extraction 
taking place in the region. However, in many ways it is still the multi-national corporations that 
hold the power since they decide whether or not to operate in the region -  decisions that 
Marxism shows are based strictly on profitability analyses. Other stakeholders, such as the State 
of Alaska and the federal government, can encourage or discourage natural resource extraction 
by making the processes relatively easier (e.g., streamlining permitting) or harder (e.g., 
increasing environmental regulations), but it is ultimately the corporations whom everyone else 
seems to be waiting on. This situation played out in the study region following the summer of 
2015, when Shell decided to end its explorations activities in the Chukchi Sea. Shell’s
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withdrawal caused other companies who were depending on them as a partner for field 
development to end operations in the region as well, and other stakeholders to worry about where 
the next oil will come from.
There is also a question of equity and power sharing within local communities. In other 
contexts, integration into global capitalism has generated class divisions within communities that 
did not exist beforehand through, for example, the creation of local elites, i.e., those who control 
financial capital within a community (e.g., Ovadia, 2012). While limited research argues this is 
the case in Alaska (Mason, 2002), and future research should explore this, it is worth noting that 
the tendency towards local elitism may be mitigated by two factors. First, native persons became 
shareholders in their respective native corporations as part of ANCSA, assuring everyone alive at 
the time (not just local elites who possess privileged relationships with corporate leaders) 
received a piece of corporate profits. Second, the native cultures in the region strongly value 
sharing and community wellbeing over individualism, which may curtail rampant greed and 
excessive accumulation on the part of individuals. That being said, the relationship between 
Indigenous values and Western values is under continual negotiation.
5.3.5 In this Context, what should be made Resilient to What and for Whom?
This case study brings into relief the complexity and conflicting nature of the relationship 
in the US Arctic between local communities, multi-national natural resource corporations, and 
global markets. On the one hand, communities secure important revenue from these corporations 
because they own land that is valuable to processes of extraction. On the other hand, 
communities have become highly dependent on nonrenewable resources, and global markets
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over which they have little influence, as it is the corporations that engage the market, not the 
communities. The corporations with which communities have established financial relationship 
possess greater flexibility in terms of being able to leave the region should production prove 
unprofitable. Ecosystems have already absorbed significant impacts; directly from infrastructure 
development and indirectly from the climate warming caused by the release of greenhouse 
gasses that the infrastructure development facilitates.
A resilience approach that is informed by radical political economy directs us to examine 
the plight of those who have been historically marginalized through processes of capital 
production and consumption. In this case it may be difficult to say that local communities in 
Northern Alaska are in this marginalized position, since they have profited from the extraction of 
natural resources. However, when the revenue garnered by communities is compared to that of 
the multi-national corporations, and the relative degrees of vulnerability that each has incurred as 
a result of their ties to global markets, it is clear that local communities are indeed in a 
disadvantaged position. Moreover, when examined historically, we see that the current state of 
affairs, with some equity and power sharing, resulted from processes of colonial dispossession 
whereby Alaska Natives waged an intense political battle for ownership over their historic 
homeland, and were able to secure only a small portion of their original claims. For the sake of 
equity, the focus of resilience should be on local communities to the economic and ecological 
vulnerability brought about by decades of nonrenewable natural resource extraction, and this 
should be pursued for the Indigenous inhabitants of the region.
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5.4 Case 3: Shipping
5.4.1 What are the Key Social-Ecological Dynamics of the Given System?
This case study focuses the transboundary area of the Bering Strait, between the Russian 
Federation and the US state of Alaska. Within this space, comprised of maritime and coastal 
environments, over 20,000 Indigenous people draw at least part of their livelihood directly from 
the ecosystem. Key subsistence activities include fishing, hunting of marine mammals, and 
gathering of edible plant and animal species. Changes to the Bering Strait ecosystem are being 
driven by both climate change and globalization. Rising air and water temperatures are altering 
the sea ice regime, which in turn affects keystone species such as walrus, for whom sea ice 
constitutes critical habitat. Reduced sea ice, the desire of international shipping companies to 
minimize their transportation costs, and increased hydrocarbon production in the Russian 
maritime Arctic is leading to increased shipping through the Bering Strait. Such large ships, 
however, are known to disrupt marine mammals (sometimes by striking them directly) and 
discharge pollution into marine ecosystem (Neilson, Gabriele, Jensen, Jackson, & Straley, 2012; 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment [PAME], 2009). This case study is largely forward 
looking, as it focuses on predicted increases in shipping and policy strategies for mitigating the 
accordant social-ecological impacts.
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5.4.2 Who Benefits from the Arrangement, at What Scale, and How Much?
International, non-local shipping firms benefit financially from the current and projected 
future social-ecological arrangements in the Bering Strait, whereby free passage is assured under 
the international convention of the Law of the Sea. Studies indicate that cargo ships using 
transarctic routes can reduce the distance between Europe and Asia by as much as 40% 
compared to using the Suez Canal (Liu & Kronback, 2009). Translating this reduced distance 
into profit, however, is complicated by factors such of the time per year that the route is passible 
and cost of hiring ice breakers to aid in transit. Liu and Kronback (2009) estimate that if  the 
conditions are right, shipping companies transitioning to a transarctic route can expect an annual 
profit growth of up to 83%. Subsistence users in the Bering Strait also benefit from the natural 
capital in the region. Subsistence is closely linked to cultural and spiritual wellbeing for Alaska 
Natives (Clement, Bengtson, & Kelly, 2013) and prevents the need to import costly foods from 
non-local sources, which are also less healthy. A recent survey of four Bering Strait villages 
revealed that the harvest of wild foods provides the daily caloric needs for residents at the rates 
of 27%, 30%, 40%, and 86% respectively (Fall et al., 2013).
5.4.3 Who Suffers from the Arrangement, at What Scale, and How Much?
Looking towards the future, migratory whale species stand to be negatively impacted by 
increased shipping, as the rate of ship strikes will likely increase. Local subsistence hunters also 
stand to lose out, as climate change and more ships are expected to decrease their capacities to 
access healthy wild foods. Moreover, local communities have little to gain from increased
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shipping, because they are not owners within those circuits of capital, and thus cannot profit. 
International shipping companies, on the other hand, have little to lose from operating in the 
region, as they are usually well insured against various types of maritime accidents that may be 
associated with transiting icy waters. Overinvesting in transarctic shipping (e.g., building ice 
reinforced vessels) is one area of risk for international corporations, as is a negative impact on 
their reputation in the case of a major accident.
5.4.4 Is Power Equitably Distributed in this Arrangement?
International shipping corporations stand to gain substantial profits from increasing 
operations in the Bering Strait and, outside of some manageable financial risk, have little to lose. 
In contrast, climate change and shipping in the region threaten to end the life of specific marine 
mammals -  through both direct ship strikes and the degradation of critical habitat. Subsistence 
users stand to lose the cornerstone of their culture if they can no longer hunt and gather 
successfully, and to incur significant financial burdens if it becomes necessary to import more 
food. The parties who stand to be negatively impacted have little power over determining the 
rules that control shipping and climate change in the region.
This is largely a case where international shipping is empowered to act environmentally 
irresponsible by an absence of strict regulations. Since the region is an international strait, ships 
are unrestricted by national standards and subject only to the international laws (e.g., Law of Sea, 
endangered species agreements, Polar Code) that favor the free passage of vessels. The Polar 
Code, for example, which is scheduled to enter into effect on January 1st, 2017 does not include 
any regulations equivalent to those that could be provided by Particularly Sensitive Sea Area
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designation. Areas to be avoided, mandatory pilotage, ship reporting, no anchorage areas, ship 
routing schemes, and even voluntary speed limits are all absent from the Polar Code 
(International Maritime Organization, n.d.). This freedom is granted by the rules of the United 
Nations and is a product of the same neoliberal ideology that endorses free markets and other 
policy strategies that mobilize capitalist economics.
Subsistence users can use their status in state, federal, and international politics -  which 
is not insubstantial -  to lobby for regulations in the region, but they have little direct control of 
the situation. Local communities may also be able to invoking national-scale laws, such as the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act, to limit the activities of 
shipping in the region. NGOs play a significant role in promoting a discourse of environmental 
conservation, but their power is also small compared to that of industry to transit freely in the 
international strait.
5.4.5 In this Context, what should be made Resilient to What and for Whom?
In the case study presented in the dissertation, my coauthor and I discuss the resilience of 
the Bering Strait social-ecological system. We define the system as the set of relationships 
between the regions ecosystems, its subsistence users, and shipping. As is common in 
mainstream resilience thinking, we are uncritical of capitalist modes of production and 
consumption (represented by international shipping in this case) and seek a way to balance this 
with the needs of other users through improved governance. We never seriously consider the 
highly inequitable distribution of risks and benefits incurred by industry on the one hand, and
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local users and marine mammals on the other hand, nor do we acknowledge the highly 
inequitable power relations between these actors.
By using a radical political economy approach to consider resilience in the Bering Strait 
it becomes clear that in order to promote equity, local users and local ecosystems should be 
given priority over international shipping. In this case, the extra-local capitalist economic activity 
provides little to no benefit to local users and stands to directly impair non-capitalist social- 
ecological relations (i.e., subsistence) and destroy the life of marine mammals. When we 
consider Bering Strait resilience, then, it should be in terms of the resilience of ecosystems and 
subsistence systems to international shipping and climate change, for the local users and local 
ecosystems.
5.5 Global Capitalism’s Effects on Indigenous Communities: Northern Alaska and Beyond
5.5.1 Overview
Economic activity can be viewed as impacting the environment through two basic 
mechanisms. First, economic production is fundamentally a consumptive phenomenon, meaning 
that elements of the non-human world (what is commonly called raw materials) must be enter the 
process at the beginning to create a product for exchange. Humans are also drawn into the 
process of production in the form of labor and sometimes as commodities. Secondly, processes 
of production by which raw materials are transformed into their exchangeable forms (including 
transportation to markets) and processes of consumption often entail the generation of 
environmentally harmful byproducts. Pollution must then be absorbed by the environment. This
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model of the environment as source for economic products and sink for economic byproducts, 
while highly simplified, is an accurate and inescapable representation of reality.
Economies in and of themselves are not necessarily ecologically unsustainable or socially 
unjust. Economic modes of exchange—whereby goods and services are distributed to humans— 
are fundamental aspects of social existence and can likely operate within environmental 
boundaries whereby the continuation of the economy can last indefinitely. This does not mean 
that the economy will remain in a single state for all time, consuming the same raw materials at 
the same levels, producing the same products, and seeing the same dynamics of exchange. 
Ecosystems, or the environment, or nature, changes on its own in addition to coevolving with 
society, so economies must adapt to natural variability over time to remain viable. Along these 
lines, political ecologists have cautioned against the “rejection of forms of economic activity that 
may be less environmentally damaging than assumed” (Forsyth, 2004, p. 118), including 
industrialization processes that are genuinely controlled by local interests. While economic 
activity should never be thought of as inherently objectionable, it is still possible to reflect on the 
impacts of global capitalism on Indigenous communities in northern Alaska and the wider 
Arctic.
5.5.2 Northern Alaska and the wider Arctic
Looking at the three case studies together through the lens of radical resilience 
demonstrates that global capitalism has a mixed impact on the resilience of local communities in 
northern Alaska. The effect is likely worse than conventional resilience thinking would 
acknowledge, but better than hardcore radical political economy would admit. As discussed in
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the introduction, resilience is fundamentally a process whereby systems change, or adapt, in 
order to remain the same. For many of the communities in northern Alaska, remaining the same 
specifically includes maintaining the ability to engage in subsistence livelihoods, as subsistence 
has been identified by communities as a cornerstone of their identity (Thornton, 1998). As the 
case studies reveal, the forces of global capitalism manifest in northern Alaska as specific 
industrial activities (e.g., tourism, natural resource extraction, shipping) that negatively impact 
the habitats of subsistence species and compete with subsistence users for access to landscapes 
and seascapes. Moreover, the greenhouse gas emissions that are part and parcel to industrial 
capitalism are contributing to the rapid change of the Arctic environment. The supply of 
subsistence resources in northern Alaska and the ability to access them would likely be more 
reliable overall if  capitalism did not affect the region via industrialization and climate change.
However, the same forces of global capitalism that negatively impact the supply of 
subsistence species and access to them also support community resilience in other ways. As the 
case studies show, industrial corporations serve as an important source of financial capital for 
many communities in the region— contributing to the community’s adaptive capacity, which 
allows them to change in order to remain the same. This is seen, for example, in the adoption of 
modern technology for subsistence purposes, including four-wheelers, outboard engines, 
snowmobiles, and high-tech rifles. Technology allows subsistence users to overcome some of the 
challenges of a changing resource base by traveling longer distances in shorter periods of time to 
access preferred species. Technology has also enhanced subsistence planning within 
communities through the provision of satellite images, GPS, and mapping (Chapin, Lamb, & 
Threlkeld, 2005). In a broader sense, integration into global markets allows communities to fund 
many important western-style social and consumer services that are also elements of community
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identity, and therefore constitute a component of resilience. Schools, retirement homes, banks, 
and retail stores are examples of the social and consumer services that integrations with global 
capitalism helps finance and support.
In what ways are the findings from this comparative case study applicable to arctic 
Indigenous communities outside of northern Alaska in regards to their plights to remain 
resilient? Considering first Indigenous communities in the rest of Alaska, it can be observed that 
some of the key social-ecological conditions are similar to those in northern Alaska, while others 
are different. Indigenous populations in the rest of Alaska are culturally and linguistically distinct 
from the groups in northern Alaska (Holton, 2014), but all Alaska Natives groups were subject to 
the 1971 ANCSA legislation that enrolled them into Native corporations. Some Native 
corporations flourished while others went bankrupt, but the takeaway is that all of Alaska’s 
diverse Indigenous communities went through the same capitalist enculturation process at the 
same time, and thus share a specific legal capacity to engage in capitalist pursuits for the benefit 
of their people. The regional economies of Alaska vary, with service industries and fisheries 
being highly developed in southcentral Alaska and tourism being a large source of local revenue 
in southeast Alaska. It is also worth noting that certain impacts from shipping (e.g., marine 
mammal strikes) will not directly affect the preferred subsistence species of Indigenous 
communities in interior Alaska, since they are non-coastal.
However, other shipping impacts (e.g., marine pollution) may affect subsistence salmon 
in the interior, since salmon spend a portion of their life in the open sea. Similarly, while interior 
Indigenous communities and coastal communities in the southern Alaska will not experience 
direct negative impacts from disappearing sea ice (since they have never relied on it), they have 
climate change threats to contend with too, including invasive species, flooding, and forest fires
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(IPCC, 2014). To summarize, while the specifics of each Indigenous community’s social- 
ecological system throughout Alaska differ, the general process of change that each is going 
through -  in terms of environmental-capitalist relations -  is quite similar. Capitalism is both a 
cause and a solution to contemporary problems, but its influence on resilience depends on how it 
is done, who controls it, and who the main beneficiaries are.
In Canada and Greenland, the situation is similar in many ways to northern Alaska. The 
Indigenous populations, while culturally distinct from Alaska’s Inupiat Inuit, are ethnically and 
linguistically Inuit as well (Arctic Centre -  University of Lapland, n.d.). Canada’s and 
Greenland’s Inuit have similar colonial histories to Alaska’s Indigenous groups -  having 
withstood forced settlement, religious missionaries, forced schooling, and attempts to eradicate 
their languages. The regions also share the trait of a relatively recent -  last three decades or so -  
movement toward Indigenous self-empowerment, in terms of land rights and political 
representation at the national and international scales (Larsen, Nilsson, & Young, 2014). This 
empowerment trend has meant increased Indigenous interaction with corporations operating in 
each groups’ respective territory. Indigenous peoples in Canada and Greenland have emerged on 
the political-economic scene as players that must now be consulted with, at the least, or 
partnered with, at the most. Moreover, the industries operating in Canada and Greenland are 
quite similar to northern Alaska, with oil and gas being prominent, and increases in tourism and 
shipping predicted (Larsen et al., 2014). However, Alaska is the only of these three regions to be 
subjected to the increases in shipping caused by the Bering Strait bottle neck. Also, Canada’s and 
Greenland’s Inuit do not operate in the same corporate structure as Alaska’s Native corporations, 
which has ramifications for the structure of Indigenous-industry relations. Indigenous 
subsistence practices in Canada and Greenland are similar to northern Alaska, with whales and
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caribou being key (Arctic Council, 2013). Being careful to avoid erroneous extrapolation, it still 
appears safe to conclude that the impacts of industrial activity on Indigenous communities in 
Canada and Greenland are also mixed, but slightly worse than in northern Alaska. This is 
thought to be because Canada’s and Greenland’s Inuit do have an Indigenous corporate culture 
that is as well-developed (nor as lucrative) as that of Alaska’s Indigenous populations. Thus, the 
former groups are subject to the same threats from capitalism -  environmental degradation and 
social exploitation -  but are not able to extract the same degree of benefit. Whether Alaska’s 
Indigenous capitalists have lessons to teach Inuit in the rest of North America is an interesting 
question for future research.
In arctic Europe (Norway, Finland, and Sweden) and arctic Russia, the primary nature- 
based livelihoods of Indigenous people are reindeer herding and fishing (Arctic Council, 2013). 
The Sami, whose recognized homeland extends throughout the artic European countries and into 
western Russia, and the Nenets of northern Russia are the largest Indigenous groups in arctic 
Eurasia. The colonial histories of Indigenous people on these continents is fundamentally similar 
to that in North America, being marked by forced schooling, religious missionization, attempts at 
linguistic eradication, and other forms of cultural assimilation and marginalization (Larsen et al., 
2014). One notable difference between the arctic Indigenous groups of Eurasia and those of 
North America is the former -  especially the Nenets -  have retained elements of their pre­
colonial nomadic lifestyle, which revolves finding pasture for their reindeer by moving their 
communities across the tundra. Similar to North American arctic Indigenous groups, however, 
traditional livelihoods in arctic Eurasia are threatened by increasing levels of industrialization -  
including oil and gas pipelines that inhibit reindeer grazing -  and climate change, which is 
altering the distribution of the lichen that reindeer eat (Arctic Council, 2013). The international
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tourism industry has already commodified Sami culture to a significant degree, with only 
minimal benefits flowing to the Sami. The presence of a developed tourism industry in arctic 
Europe contrasts to arctic Russia, where tourism is currently small, but growing, as Russia only 
opened to the forces of global capitalism a few decades ago. Across arctic Eurasia, coastal 
Indigenous communities that depend on fishing are vulnerable to increases in shipping along the 
Northern Sea Route, with Russian offshore oil production being a major cause. The benefits of 
capitalism for these groups varies. While a large portion of Sami and some Nenets are now 
urbanized and depend on social services provided by taxes on capitalist activities, many continue 
traditional lifestyles (Larsen et al., 2014). Unlike Indigenous communities in Alaska, Sami and 
Nenets have not been organized into for-profit corporations, and so their capacity to benefit from 
increasing levels of arctic industrialization is likely less than Indigenous communities in US 
Arctic, although additional research is needed to confirm this.
Comparing the social-ecological relationship between Indigenous communities and 
industrialization in northern Alaska to those in Canada, Greenland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, 
and Russia reveals broad similarities, with one major contrast being the corporate structure of 
Alaska’s Indigenous communities. Currently communities in northern Alaska are remaining 
resilient, as they adapt to increased industrialization and climate change. However, as the case 
studies demonstrate, social-ecological changes are projected to continue, and to increase in many 
cases, over the next decades. In the Introduction I showed that arctic stewardship is a promising 
governance framework for steering arctic change is a desirable direction, but that it remained 
somewhat problematic from a theoretical perspective because it did not adequately integrate 
insights from critical social theory writ large and radical political economy specifically. In the 
following section, I offer recommendations for arctic stewardship that address these shortcoming
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and are intended to create a future that has a more equitable distribution of the social-ecological 
benefits and risks that are associated with arctic change.
5.6 Recommendation for Arctic Governance
The panarchy model from resilience theory conceptualizes how systems change at given 
scales and how coupled systems at different scales affect one another (see Figure 1.3 in General 
Introduction). Panarchy holds that the relationship between systems at multiple scales is often 
dominated by the function, structure, and identity of the large scale systems but that this 
relationship can, at times, be controlled by smaller scale systems. The tendency of large-scale 
systems to control smaller-scale systems occurs through a process called system memory, while 
the rarer occurrence of small scale systems dominating a system of coupled cross-scale systems 
is called revolt (Figure 5.1). The understanding that revolts can occur across spatial scales from 
the bottom up influenced early resilience thinkers to name their model panarchy, which 
distinguished it from other conceptualizations of cross-scale system interactions that posited a 
strictly hierarchical (top-down) relationship between systems (Gunderson & Holling, 2002).
The recommendations I offer for arctic governance are meant to enhance the possibilities 
for revolt within the matrix of coupled social-ecological systems that affect biological diversity 
and human wellbeing in the Arctic. These systems include the community-scale subsistence 
systems that are a cornerstone of Indigenous identity in the Arctic and the global scale capitalist 
economic systems at the root of many arctic changes. By promoting the capacity of small-scale 
systems to influence control over large scale systems in the Arctic, I am attempting to correct for 
the problem that MacKinnon and Derickson (2013) identify as being present in recent attempts to
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apply resilience thinking through the creation of public policy. The authors show that when 
resilience thinking is applied to communities without consideration of the larger-scale structural 
processes that create the need to be resilient in the first place, a condition of responsibility 
without power can occur. In other words, the onus to adapt to global changes is being put onto 
communities but communities do not necessarily possess the capacities (i.e., economic, political, 
environmental) to make the changes that would be required in order to maintain the desired 
structure, function and identity of the system from the community perspective. Promoting the 
ability of small-scale systems to revolt is a strategy for empowering communities with the 
capacities they need to influence larger-scale systems, so that they have both the responsibility 
and the power to remain resilient. Three recommendations for promoting revolt are provided and 
discussed in turn: 1) communities need sovereignty over the territory they use for subsistence; 2) 
communities need effective representation in regional scale deliberations that will affect them; 
and 3) communities need effective representation in global scale deliberations that will affect 
them.
5.6.1 Territorial Sovereignty
Currently the power to control the territory on which Indigenous groups in the Arctic 
conduct subsistence is divided between federal, sub-federal and local stakeholders, with the 
allocation of power-sharing varying by country. In Alaska for example, the management of land 
and sea resources is split between the federal and state governments based on land ownership, 
with Indigenous interests being represented through co-management arrangements in some 
cases. However, in order for communities to increase their power over social-ecological systems
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at larger scales, it is necessary for them to acquire sovereignty over the spaces where subsistence 
occurs. This would strengthen Indigenous communities at the community and regional scale, 
giving them a firm base of resource control on which they could build the capacity to affect 
change at larger scales. It is necessary for Indigenous communities to control subsistence at the 
local-scale before they attempt to influence the larger scale processes that also affect subsistence. 
The main challenge to this recommendation is that state and federal agencies are unlikely to 
relinquish power over managing subsistence resources without being forced to do so through 
legal battles.
While sovereignty is never complete nor total, current management regimes could 
transition to allow Indigenous groups more power -  and government agencies less -  over 
decisions about when, where, and how to hunt, fish, and gather. One such effort in this direction 
is from Alaska where tribal governments have been waging a ten-year legal battle in the nation’s 
court system to achieve land-rights comparable to those of tribal governments in the United 
States’ lower 48 states. Currently the laws are different in Alaska because they were created at a 
different period of time under alternate circumstances. In brief, Alaska tribes are arguing that the 
federal government should be able to take land into trust on behalf of the tribes to create the 
equivalent of Indian reservations, which are units of territory over which tribal governments 
possess primary jurisdiction. The action is opposed by the State of Alaska, which intends to 
maintain its authority over much of the territory in question. A recent legal ruling (Akiachak 
Native Community v. Department of the Interior) has gone in the direction of the tribes, as a US 
federal appeals court decided that Alaska Natives cannot be treated differently than other Native 
Americans in terms of lands-in-trust (“Tribes in Alaska Celebrate”, 2016). Currently in Alaska, 
the only Indigenous entities allowed to own land are the Native corporations, which has caused
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resentment amongst those who believe that Indigenous interests are better represented by tribal 
governments. Moreover, Native corporations do not possess primary jurisdiction over 
subsistence on the lands that they own. Thus, while there is a degree of Indigenous sovereignty 
currently, is perceived as inadequate by many Alaska Natives.
5.6.2 Effective Representation at the Regional Scale
In the Arctic, community stakeholders need to have representation in deliberative 
processes at the regional scale, which is meant to mean all scales between communities and the 
Arctic as a whole. As discussed in the tourism chapter of this dissertation, native groups in the 
northern portion of Alaska have come together to form a non-profit organization with the explicit 
goal of representing Indigenous interests at larger scale political and economic forums. Time will 
tell whether this effort and others that are underway in the Arctic are truly effective in 
influencing the functioning of systems at larger scales. The presence of Indigenous groups within 
the Arctic Council through their Permanent Participant status is another example of community 
representation at a larger scale. The Arctic Council itself, however, does not possess direct 
regulatory power in the Arctic and operates instead by attempting to steer discourses about arctic 
change through the production of knowledge. Thus, the Arctic Council remains questionable in 
terms of serving as an avenue to affect change directly. A radical political economy perspective 
suggests that much of the real power in the Arctic is held by the multinational corporations that 
possess the massive financial capital to operate in the region. Gaining effective community 
representation in the decision making processes of such corporations will require increases in
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both community power (via territorial sovereignty for example) and increased corporate social 
responsibility on the part of the corporations.
This is not meant to imply that there is currently a complete absence of representation by 
Indigenous groups at the regional scale, even within the corporate world. In Alaska the recently 
created Arctic Inupiat Offshore LLC -  a partnership between the Arctic Slope Regional 
Corporation and six North Slope village corporations -  is testament to the capacity of the 
region’s Indigenous groups to represent themselves in the capitalist arena. Arctic Inupiat 
Offshore has a binding agreement with the oil-giant Shell that gives them the option to acquire 
an interest in Shell’s offshore leases in the Chukchi Sea, off of the northwest coast of Alaska 
(Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, 2014). While Shell has since halted their activities in this 
region, following the 2014 crash in global oil prices, the agreement nonetheless marks a major 
achievement in Indigenous-corporate cooperation and profit sharing in the natural resource 
sector. This type of political economic representation could be pursued by Indigenous groups in 
other parts of the Arctic.
5.6.3 Effective Representation at the Global Scale
Aspects of global scale systems that affect the resilience of arctic communities include 
global agreements on issues such as international trade and environmental pollution (including 
greenhouse gas emissions). Such agreements, while global in scope and effect, are commonly 
negotiated at specific places over a specified period of time. Indigenous communities need 
effective representation at such negotiations to prevent what have been called “new forms of 
global colonization” (Langton, 2003) and to increase the capacity for systemic revolt. In 2015,
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for example, delegations of Inuit leaders from the Arctic traveled to Paris, France to participate 
in the United Nations Conference on Climate Change. Again, however, questions remain about 
the adequacy of the Indigenous participation in terms of actual influence, as there is no mandate 
for decision makers to address community concerns to the extents demanded by different 
communities. Radical political economy demonstrates how decisions made at the global scale 
over the last few decades have largely followed neoliberal logics in their prioritization of 
capitalism through free trade, the spread of markets, and the rolling back of government social 
programs. While global capitalism supports community resilience in the Arctic in some regards, 
it also challenges it by contributing to climate change and increasing competition for the use of 
land and sea. An effective voice for Arctic communities at global deliberations could decrease 
the negative impacts of globalization at the local scale.
Indigenous representation at the global scale is being pursued currently by the Inuit 
Circumpolar Council (ICC). Founded in 1977 to help unify Indigenous political activity, ICC 
now represent over 160,000 Inuit from four Arctic nations (Canada, Greenland, Russia, and US) 
and serves as a major international non-government organization (Inuit Circumpolar Council 
Canada, n.d.). ICC concerns itself with a wide range of Indigenous issues, including equitable 
trade, environmental protection, self-governance, resource management, and community health. 
ICC focuses its effort on interacting with the United Nations and the Arctic Council, and the 
various sub-organizations of each. ICC is an important voice for arctic Indigenous groups at the 
global level and future efforts can build on its success. However, the ultimate assessment of the 
effectiveness of such organization will be demonstrated by whether Indigenous arctic 
communities continue to exist in the manner they desire as the Arctic changes.
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5.7 Conclusion
The Arctic is a rapidly changing region. Climate change and socio-economic 
globalization are challenging the sustainability of Indigenous communities by altering the 
landscapes and seascapes from which they draw their subsistence. However, global changes are 
also affording communities new opportunities to engage in the benefits of the global economy 
and many communities have integrated such opportunities into their own identities. In order to 
guide future changes in a manner that promotes biological conservation and human wellbeing, 
scholars and policy makers are increasing turning to resilience thinking and the closely related 
concept of arctic stewardship. However, critics of resilience thinking have been quick to point 
out its inadequacies in terms of failing to understand critical social theory and, therefore, in 
inadvertently supporting environmentally and socially destructive modes of economic production 
and consumption.
In the Introduction I laid out the contributions that the field of radical political economy 
can make to resilience thinking, and proposed the framework of radical resilience that asks a 
specific set of questions aimed at integrating systems thinking with Marxism and post-Marxism. 
In this Conclusion, I examined three case studies about arctic change and industrialization in 
northern Alaska through the lens of radical resilience. This examination demonstrates that 
resilience of local communities in the Arctic is both negatively and positively impacted by global 
scale capitalism -  the effects are complex and mixed, in other words. Further quantifying these 
impacts is one important area for future research. I then fed this finding back into the arctic 
stewardship framework for governance of arctic change by making three recommendations to 
support the capacity for revolt within the panarchy of arctic social-ecological systems. In the 
section that follows, I consider what such a revolt might look like.
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First, however, it is important to inquire as to why Indigenous communities in northern 
Alaska have embraced capitalism at all. Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
(1971) helps shed light on this phenomenon. Gramsci, writing from prison in the first half of the 
20th century, used his formulation of hegemony to explain why capitalism had not been 
overthrown by communist revolutions -  as Marx predicted it would be -  in most of the western 
world. He described a process by which the bourgeoisie perpetuate capitalist culture through not 
only violence and coercion, but also through ideology and the manufacturing of consent 
(Gramsci, 1971). Political leaders in capitalist nations, he reckoned, use their material and 
discursive authority to engender within the exploited working class an association and affinity 
with the goals and values of the bourgeoisie -  to trick the working class, in other words, into 
convoluting their own wellbeing with that of their masters. Within a hegemonic ideology, 
capitalist values appear as common sense (or natural) and the exploited, operating under a false 
consciousness, voluntarily participate in social (and ecological) relations that go against their 
actual own best interests.
In northern Alaska, the passing of ANCSA -  which created for-profit Native corporations 
for the first time -  can be viewed as an act of hegemonic power. After centuries of colonial 
domination (including attempted cultural genocide and territorial dispossession), the US federal 
government presented Alaska’s Indigenous groups with an opportunity to participate in the 
capitalist system -  to buy-in to what appeared as the only game in town by exchanging their land 
claims for 44 million acres of land and close to a billion dollars. With no perceived viable 
alternatives for the survival of their people, Alaska Natives consented to join the global capitalist 
system and, in so doing, perpetuate capitalist hegemony. There were, and are, however, radical 
Native activists the resist integration into global capitalism. Moreover, as this dissertation shows,
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the hegemony is not complete within Indigenous communities, as anti-capitalist communal 
values persist. This is a key reason why livelihood such as subsistence hunting and gathering are 
so important for the future of humanity -  they provide a concrete alternative to the socially and 
ecologically destructive relations of capitalist ideology (see Hunn, 1999).
In contrast to traditional subsistence activities, when viewed through a Gramscian 
theoretical lens, multilateral environmental agreement -  such as the Particularly Sensitive Sea 
Areas discussed in Chapter 4 -  are not concrete alternatives to capitalist ideology. Instead, they 
are understood as regulatory instruments that attempt to minimize the social-ecological harms of 
capitalism, but only within the constraints of global hegemonic system that has already 
positioned capitalism an unquestionable (see the column “Conventional Resilience Thinking” in 
the Introduction’s Table 1.1).
Communities in northern Alaska neither completely embrace nor completely reject 
capitalism and its associated benefits and harms. As demonstrated in the tourism case study, 
capitalism is embraced only to the degree that it supports the values of the Indigenous culture. In 
Barrow and presumably other primarily Indigenous communities in the US Arctic, capitalism is 
largely embedded in Indigenous values and must confirm to certain principles, such as sharing, 
compassion, and respect for nature. If the Arctic social-ecological panarchy experienced a revolt 
-  whereby the structure, function, and identity of large scale systems was determined by smaller 
scale systems -  values such as those practiced by the Inupiat would assume a more central role at 
the regional and global scales. Principles such as sharing, compassion, and respect for nature 
stand in stark contrast to the values of capitalism, which include individualized pursuit of profit, 
a survival of the fittest mentality, and viewing nature only in terms of its value within capital 
circuits of production and consumption. The neoliberal ideology that has guided current global
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trade agreements and environmental protocols (emphasizing privatization, competitive markets, 
and the shrinking of environmental regulations) could be severely challenged by the upscaling of 
community-oriented Indigenous values.
Conventional arctic stewardship informed by mainstream resilience thinking calls for a 
balanced approach to negotiating the benefits and risks of change between stakeholder groups at 
different scales. However, it does little to challenge the dominance of the capitalism-supporting 
neoliberal global system that is the root of many community scale problems in the Arctic. More 
promising for creating positive change is a form of arctic stewardship that embraces radical 
resilience, which has been informed by radical political economy. Such an approach 
acknowledges that capitalism brings certain inescapable harms to social-ecological systems and, 
rather than attempting to promote capitalism at all costs, embraces capitalism only to the extent 
that it serves to enhance community wellbeing as defined from within. To prioritize community 
wellbeing, a recast arctic stewardship would need to call for revolt, or the increased effective 
representation of community interests at all scales. The potential results of a global system 
structured around, for example, sharing, compassion, and respect for nature, (and ways that these 
values potentially already operate at the global scale) is another promising area for future 
research.
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